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Crisis Learning Games

  • Russell J. Leng (a1)

Findings from a data-based study of bargaining in recurrent crises between evenly matched states provide the foundation for the construction of four crisis-learning games. Symmetrical and asymmetrical nuclear and nonnuclear sequential three-by-three games assuming complete information and nonmyopic play are presented and analyzed. The empirical study indicated that states that were unsuccessful in one crisis were likely to move to more coercive bargaining strategies in the next crisis. The four sequential games offer insights as to why this is likely to produce unwanted consequences, while demonstrating the importance of the participants' initial strategy choices. With the realpolitik lessons suggested by the earlier study removed, the dynamics of the games present a case for beginning with a cooperative strategy and moving to reciprocating, or tit-for-tat, bargaining.

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American Political Science Review
  • ISSN: 0003-0554
  • EISSN: 1537-5943
  • URL: /core/journals/american-political-science-review
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