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Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development

  • Mancur Olson (a1)
Abstract

Under anarchy, uncoordinated competitive theft by “roving bandits” destroys the incentive to invest and produce, leaving little for either the population or the bandits. Both can be better off if a bandit sets himself up as a dictator—a “stationary bandit” who monopolizes and rationalizes theft in the form of taxes. A secure autocrat has an encompassing interest in his domain that leads him to provide a peaceful order and other public goods that increase productivity. Whenever an autocrat expects a brief tenure, it pays him to confiscate those assets whose tax yield over his tenure is less than their total value. This incentive plus the inherent uncertainty of succession in dictatorships imply that autocracies will rarely have good economic performance for more than a generation. The conditions necessary for a lasting democracy are the same necessary for the security of property and contract rights that generates economic growth.

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This list contains references from the content that can be linked to their source. For a full set of references and notes please see the PDF or HTML where available.

Robert L. Carniero 1970. “A Theory of the Origin of the State.” Science 169:733–38.

Edgar Kiser , and Yoram Barzel . 1991. “Origins of Democracy in England.” Journal of Rationality and Society 3:396

David A. Lake 1992. “Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War.” American Political Science Review 86:2437.

Peter Murrell , and Mancur Olson . 1991. “The Devolution of Centrally Planned Economies.” Journal of Comparative Economics 15:239–65.

Mancur Olson . 1986. “A Theory of the Incentives Facing Political Organizations: Neo-corporatism and the Hegemonic State.” International Political Science Review 7:165–89.

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American Political Science Review
  • ISSN: 0003-0554
  • EISSN: 1537-5943
  • URL: /core/journals/american-political-science-review
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