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Lake, David A. 2017. Why Does Ethnicity Increase in Salience as Political Order Decays?. Ethnopolitics, Vol. 16, Issue. 1, p. 82.
Mitchell, Sara McLaughlin 2017. Dangerous bargains with the devil? Incorporating new approaches in peace science for the study of war. Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol. 34, Issue. 1, p. 98.
Salehyan, Idean 2017. New Directions in the Study of Ethnopolitics. Ethnopolitics, Vol. 16, Issue. 1, p. 60.
Bormann, Nils-Christian and Hammond, Jesse 2016. A Slippery Slope: The Domestic Diffusion of Ethnic Civil War. International Studies Quarterly, p. sqw031.
Gibler, Douglas M. 2016. Combining Behavioral and Structural Predictors of Violent Civil Conflict: Getting Scholars and Policymakers to Talk to Each Other. International Studies Quarterly, p. sqw030.
Ogutcu-Fu, Sema Hande 2016. Outside the Battlefield. Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 69, Issue. 3, p. 403.
Olson Lounsbery, Marie 2016. Foreign Military Intervention, Power Dynamics, and Rebel Group Cohesion. Journal of Global Security Studies, Vol. 1, Issue. 2, p. 127.
Prorok, Alyssa K. 2016. Leader Incentives and Civil War Outcomes. American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 60, Issue. 1, p. 70.
Uzonyi, Gary and Wells, Matthew 2016. Domestic institutions, leader tenure and the duration of civil war. Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol. 33, Issue. 3, p. 294.
CEDERMAN, LARS-ERIK HUG, SIMON SCHÄDEL, ANDREAS and WUCHERPFENNIG, JULIAN 2015. Territorial Autonomy in the Shadow of Conflict: Too Little, Too Late?. American Political Science Review, Vol. 109, Issue. 02, p. 354.
Dowd, Caitriona 2015. Actor proliferation and the fragmentation of violent groups in conflict. Research & Politics, Vol. 2, Issue. 4, p. 205316801560789.
Griffiths, Ryan D. 2015. Between Dissolution and Blood: How Administrative Lines and Categories Shape Secessionist Outcomes. International Organization, Vol. 69, Issue. 03, p. 731.
Nieman, Mark David 2015. Statistical Analysis of Strategic Interaction with Unobserved Player Actions: Introducing a Strategic Probit with Partial Observability. Political Analysis, Vol. 23, Issue. 3, p. 429.
Park, Sunhee and Hendry, David J. 2015. Reassessing Schoenfeld Residual Tests of Proportional Hazards in Political Science Event History Analyses. American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 59, Issue. 4, p. 1072.
Warren, T. Camber and Troy, Kevin K. 2015. Explaining Violent Intra-Ethnic Conflict. Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 59, Issue. 3, p. 484.
Bakke, Kristin M. 2014. Help Wanted?. International Security, Vol. 38, Issue. 4, p. 150.
Fazal, Tanisha M. and Griffiths, Ryan D. 2014. Membership Has Its Privileges: The Changing Benefits of Statehood. International Studies Review, Vol. 16, Issue. 1, p. 79.
Krause, Peter 2014. The Structure of Success: How the Internal Distribution of Power Drives Armed Group Behavior and National Movement Effectiveness. International Security, Vol. 38, Issue. 3, p. 72.
Seymour, Lee J.M. 2014. Why Factions Switch Sides in Civil Wars: Rivalry, Patronage, and Realignment in Sudan. International Security, Vol. 39, Issue. 2, p. 92.
Thomas, Jakana 2014. Rewarding Bad Behavior: How Governments Respond to Terrorism in Civil War. American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 58, Issue. 4, p. 804.
Why do states make concessions to some self-determination movements but not others? This article explores the role of the internal characteristics of these movements, demonstrating that their internal structures play a major role in determining which groups get concessions. Using new data on the structure of self-determination movements and the concessions they receive, I evaluate whether states respond to internally divided movements by trying to “divide and conquer” or “divide and concede.” Consistent with the latter approach, I find that internally divided movements receive concessions at a much higher rate than unitary ones and that the more divided the movement is the more likely it is to receive concessions. Yet, concessions to unitary movements appear to work better to settle these disputes. This suggests that states use concessions not only as a tool to resolve disputes, but also as part of the bargaining process.
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