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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 September 2013
When the British parliament passed a vote extending the life of the existing house of commons, whose duration would otherwise have terminated in January, 1916, their action attracted little attention and aroused but slight opposition. The forces of the empire, engaged in a desperate war, must not be dissipated by an appeal to the people, with the consequent evils of electioneering. Yet to the student of politics this action has a profound interest. One of the cardinal features of the legislation of 1911 had been the quinquennial duration of parliament—a provision which, as the debates show, was essential to the whole compromise. Yet in an unforeseen crisis, the legislature by its own resolution could provide an extension of its life, and thus postpone the date of accountability to the people. No political measure could furnish so striking a test of the flexibility of the British system, its adaptibility to emergencies, and its reliance upon a practically omnipotent legislature.
In this paper we shall trace the principal statutes which limit the parliamentary term and the intervals between parliamentary sessions. There are five such laws, each bearing a date full of significance in English constitutional history. The first three statutes, passed in 1641, 1664, and 1694, were triennial acts, though in different senses; the fourth statute, passed in 1716, was the familiar septennial act under which parliaments were so long regulated; the last permanent legislation on the subject was the parliament act of 1911 fixing a five-year maximum duration, and it still remains law though temporarily suspended in 1916.
1 4 Ed. III, c. 14. The quotation comprises nearly the entire statute.
2 36 Ed. III, c. 10.
3 The Short Parliament, which met in April, 1640, had been abruptly dissolved after three weeks of bickering with the king over grievances. In a lengthy declaration justifying the dissolution, the king complained of the “undutiful and seditious carriage” of the parliamentary leaders, denounced their manner of bargaining and contracting for the remedy of grievances by refusing supplies, and expressed a deep repugnance towards their insistent demands for reducing the revenues and curtailing the prerogatives of the crown. This speech of the king serves as a fair statement of the vital issue between him and the parliament. Parliamentary Debates, II, p. 573.
4 As to the English abhorrence for an intermission of parliament, we may note the practice by which the same royal proclamation dissolves one parliament and summons its successor, the king, with the advice of his ministers, determining the dates of the dissolution and the next assembling. On this point Frederick Harrison writes: “The mediaeval rules about dissolutions and elections, with the obsolete jealousy of the crown which forces both into one royal proclamation, cause nothing but trouble and serve no useful end. The superstition that the British constitution, like nature, ‘abhors a vacuum,’ and insists on the formula—Le Parlement est mort—Vive le Parlement!—is hardly worthy of the twentieth century.” Realities and Ideals, p. 259.
5 The act is dated February 15, 1641. Statutes of the Realm, V. 54; 16 Car. I, c. 1.
6 The reference here is to the acts of Edward III's reign, above mentioned.
7 Note that the act did not provide for triennial elections, nor did it limit the duration of parliament. It was concerned with the frequency of parliamentary sessions.
8 Commons Journal, II, pp. 58, 60, 70.
9 This bill originally provided that if in every year the king had not issued writs for the elections before the first Tuesday in Lent, the returns were to be made without the usual intervention of the crown. This would have meant annual elections, as well as annual parliaments, and Charles would never have consented to such a measure. See Gardiner, , History of England from the Accession of James I to the outbreak of the Civil War, 1603–1642, IX, pp. 252–253.Google Scholar
10 Parliamentary History, IX, pp. 170–171. (The speech is dated January 25.)
11 Commons Journal, II, pp. 85–86.
12 Parliamentary History, IX, pp. 178–182.
13 Charles's conciliatory attitude can hardly be regarded as anything more than an indication of his helplessness. He was too much of a Stuart to acquiesce in so radical a measure without extreme reluctance, yet his position was so weak that at least temporary conciliation was the only course possible. It is interesting to compare this rather complacent speech of Charles with his vigorous proclamation in 1629 on the memorable occasion of his dissolution of parliament. Then he had declared: “We have showed by our frequent meeting our people our love to the use of parliament; yet the late abuse having for the present driven us un wittingly out of that course, we shall account it presumption for any to prescribe any time with us for parliament.” There is no reason to believe that the king's intentions, as indicated by this speech, had been altered by 1641.
14 Commons Journal, II, p. 87.
15 16 Car. I, c. 7.
16 The ultra-royalist character of Charles II's Long Parliament should not be overemphasized. According to the important Anglican writers of the period, as for instance Clarendon, the insignificance of the opposition in this “cavalier” and “servile” parliament would seem a plausible justification for many of the extreme measures passed, particularly against non-conformists. But taking this view we are at a loss to explain a peculiar fact revealed in the records—namely, that the votes on all the important government measures show a strong opposition which at times exceeded a third of the total membership of the commons. For an example of Clarendon's reference to the numerical strength of the Presbyterian party, see Clarendon's, Life (Oxford ed., 1759), p. 153Google Scholar, and compare Abbott, W. C., The long parliament of Charles II, English Historical Review, XXI, pp. 21–56.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
17 Fletcher, C. R. L., An Introductory History of England, 1660–1792, pp. 1–2.Google Scholar
18 An unsuccessful attempt to effect the repeal was made in the first parliament of Charles II. On April 3, 1662 the proposition for unconditional repeal was discussed, and a repeal bill was ordered to be brought in, a committee of three being directed to prepare the bill. The only open opposition was a vigorous speech in the commons by Vaughan, who later became speaker of the lower house. He was surprised at the haste with which the repeal was being rushed through. The triennial act seemed to him salutary, and the “non-sitting of parliaments” would, he feared, produce mischievous results. In place of an unconditional repeal he would propose a compromise bill which would retain the provision for triennial parliaments, but remove such clauses in the existing act as were thought to be disrespectful to the king. The suggestion was not acted upon at the time, and the session closed with the triennial act still nominally in force. Commons Journal, VIII, p. 395; Calendar of State Papers, Dom. 1661–2, p. 330.
19 Parliamentary Debates, IV, pp. 290–291; Lords Debates, I, pp. 67 fol.
20 Hallam, , Constitutional Hist., I, p. 515.Google ScholarFletcher, , (Introductory Hist. of Eng., III, p. 20)Google Scholar a careful though vivid writer, in stating that the triennial act was repealed in 1664 “in order to prevent the necessity of a new parliament being called every three years” fails to add that this involved a misconception of the provisions of the act of 1641. An act may be “triennial” in several senses. It may provide triennial elections with or without annual parliaments, or it may fix a maximum triennial duration, or it may simply set a three-year period as the longest interval between parliaments. It was the last of these courses that was followed in the triennial act of 1641. It did not require a new parliament every three years. It dealt not with the duration of parliaments, but merely with their frequency.
21 The debates are not reported in Hansard, nor in Chandler's Commons, and do not seem to have been memorable. According to Pepys there were many in the commons displeased with the bill, though they dared not say much. By the same authority we learn of three vigorous speeches against the bill. Mr. Prin compared the bill to “the idol whose head was of gold and his body and legs of different metal,” and it cannot be denied that the measure contained contradictory elements. Sir Richard Temple spoke “very discontentful words in the House about the bill.” Also Vaughan, who in 1662 had opposed the repeal, now declared himself “in a speech of an hour and a half with great reason and eloquence against the repealing of the bill ‥‥ but with no success.” There are indications that under the surface there ran a rather strong current of opinion against the bill. On the day of its passage Pepys exclaims: “But Lord, to see how the best things are not done without some design, for I perceive all these gentlemen that I was with today were against it.” He then suggests that it was passed to satisfy the king, “and should he demand anything else, I believe they would give it him.” Pepys, , Diary, March 26, 28, 1664.Google Scholar
22 Commons Journal, VIII, p. 537.
23 16 Car. II, c. 1.
24 Lyddal, , in the debate on the septennial bill in the commons, referred to this as a “very remarkable preamble.” Parliamentary Debates, VII, p. 311.Google Scholar
25 This is the reported wording. The king probably meant to say the very opposite. Chandler's, Commons, I, pp. 75–76.Google Scholar
26 January 12, 1693.
27 Macaulay, , Hist. of Eng., (1856 ed.) IV, 274.Google Scholar
28 Shrewsbury's bill had provided for annual parliaments, but this provision was given up, and instead it was enacted that a parliament should be held once in three years at the least. This change from annual to triennial sessions might seem to signify more than it does. It was probably thought that annual parliaments were sufficiently assured by the mutiny act, and the appropriation clauses in the yearly bills of supply. In that case, this clause of the triennial act was without much significance. See Hallam, , Constitutional History, II, p. 202.Google Scholar
29 Historical Manuscripts Commission, Report, XIV, pt. vi, pp. 299–302. The editorial comment in this report is worth quoting: “Comparing this bill with the acts of 1640 (new style, 1641) and 1664, it is interesting to note how the different senses in which each of them was ‘triennial’ reflects the prevailing political feeling of the time. The act of Charles I provided for the yearly holding of parliament, and was triennial in that it compelled the assembling of parliament if not summoned for three years. That of the Restoration left the king's hands free as to annual sessions, and was triennial in ‘beseeching’ him to summon parliament at least once in three years. The present bill, while reverting to annual sessions, is triennial only in limiting the duration of parliament to three years, thus being directed to an abuse of power not by the crown, but by parliament itself.” Ibid., preface, p. xv.
30 Macaulay, , Hist. of Eng. (1856 ed.), IV, p. 274.Google Scholar
31 One of the speakers in favor of the bill was Lord Halifax, a malcontent Tory who had formerly been one of the king's ministers, but had become identified with the opposition. “Is this a parliament, or a party?” he asked. “If the first, why fear another? If the last, is there anything to be said for it?” He considered it strange “to fear that for which the revolution was princially undertaken.” The bill seemed to him the only remedy against two serious evils—the evil of governing without a parliament, and that of modeling a standing parliament. As to the argument that new experiments were unseasonable while the war lasted, it was baseless, for was not the true constitution of England to be called a new experiment? A war and a parliament which seemed agreed to continue one another furnished, indeed, a precedent for any king. In answer to the contention that the enactment of the bill would justify the scandal of corruption in the existing parliament, he declared that nothing would support the scandal so much as the continuation of the parliament. He ingeniously remarked that in many minds the only reason for keeping this parliament would be that the government might not be put to the repeated expense of making new friends. (For the original notes, of which the above is a paraphase, see Foxcroft, , Life and Letters of Savilie, II, p. 162.Google Scholar)
32 Temple's secretary, sent to present the statesman's views to the king, was Jonathan Swift, then a young man of about twenty-five years. As described by Macaulay, this is a fascinating incident in Swift's early life.
33 In the first attempt, which was made in the commons, the bill, after passing its third reading without division, was defeated on the final vote by an unexpected temporary ascendancy of the opponents of the measure. Lord Monmouth (Whig) then brought in practically the same bill in the lords. It was passed and sent to the commons, but animosity against the patrician order prevailed, and the bill was rejected, 197 to 127. Commons Journal, X, p. 40. (December 22, 1693.)
34 On November 19, seven days after the opening of the session, the commons ordered Mr. Harley to prepare a bill for the frequent meeting and calling of parliaments. It was carried with dispatch through both houses. It first reading in the house of commons occurred November 22; its passage, December 13. On the 18th the lords gave it their concurrence without amendment, and it was submitted, together with the bill for the grant of tunnage, to the king for his assent. Commons Journal, II, p. 172, 187.
35 Commons Journal, II, p. 193. (December 22, 1694.)
36 6&7 Will. & Marry, c. 2.
37 Parliamentary Debates, VII, pp. 294–295.
38 I Geo. I, Stat. 2, c. 38.
39 Fiiled in by the lords after debate.
40 Upon the question of commitment the lords debated for five hours, and another debate of two hours arose when the bill was reported from committee. The Earls of Dorset and Ilay and the Duke of Newcastle gave the most significant speeches for the bill, while Lords Trevor, Buckingham, Aylesford and Nottingham opposed the measure. Parl. Deb., VII, pp. 299–307. After the bill passed the upper house some of the Lords who dissented from its provisions presented a written protest, setting forth the reasons for their opposition. Ibid., p. 306. In the house of commons the most notable speech was that of the Tory Shippen, against the bill. Ibid., pp. 312–321.
41 An unsuccessful attempt was made in 1734 to repeal the septennial act. Aside from this the opposition to the measure has been insignificant. One of the demands of the Chartists was for annual parliaments, i.e., annual parliamentary elections. Disraeli in his early career favored triennial parliaments. “I wished to break the strength of the Whigs by frequent elections, and by frequent appeals to a misgoverned people; therefore I advocated a recurrence to those triennial parliaments which it was once the proud boast of the Tories to advocate.” Monypenny, , Life of Disraeli, I, p. 283.Google Scholar
42 In the preamble the ultimate purpose of reforming the house of lords was avowed, but this was an indefinite postponement of a policy upon which enlightened sentiment had been focusing for years.
43 See A. L. P. Dennis, The Parliament Act of 1911. American Political Science Review, VI, pp. 194–215, 386–408.
44 Asquith, in 21 H. C. Deb., 5th ser., c. 1749.
45 16 H. C. Deb., 5th ser., cc. 1493–1526.
46 16 H. C. Deb., 5th ser., c. 1526.
47 9 H. L. Deb., 5th ser., cc. 6–7. July 3, 1911.
48 29 H. C. Deb., 5th ser., cc. 999, 1094–1095.
49 The expedient of having the soldiers vote in the field seems not to have been considered at this time though it was debated in the following August. Many of the States, during our Civil War, had legislation on this subject. State constitutions often had to be amended as regards the manner and place of voting for state officers, but regarding presidential electors and congressmen the state legislatures could act. Either the ballot-box was taken to the soldier in the field, or someone in the home precinct cast the vote by proxy. Where there was no legislation on the subject, soldiers were sometimes furloughed to vote at home. Congress, of course, could pass a uniform law touching the matter as regards national elections, and indeed a provision permitting soldiers on duty on the Mexican border to vote in the November elections was presented this year as an amendment to the army appropriation bill, but the amendment failed, and absent soldiers may vote only where state laws permit it. On August 22, 1916, Lord Salisbury introduced in the British parliament a bill to permit soldiers at the front and in hospitals to vote, but the military leaders disapproved of the policy, and the government felt that the existing time was no occasion for such a fundamental alteration of the constitution. See Benton, J. H., Voting in the Field, A Forgotten Chapter of the Civil War. (Boston, 1915.)Google Scholar
50 Lord Lansdowne in the House of Lords. 20 H. L. Deb., 5th ser., c. 844.
51 For examples of such protests, see London Daily Times, Dec. 4. 1915, p. 9; Dec. 9, p. 9; Dec. 10, p. 9 and p. 12. For Carson's, views, see Times, Dec. 13, p. 9.Google Scholar
52 Parliament and Registration Act. 1916, 5 & 6 Geo. V, ch. 100. 27 Jan. 1916. Section 2 of the Act continued in force the existing register of electors until parliament should provide special registers, or otherwise direct. The intention of the government was to provide special registers in time for the next general election, enabling soldiers and sailors to qualify and be allocated to particular constituencies. Provision was made in Section 3 for compensating Irish officers for temporary loss of emoluments. For the debates see 76 H. C. Deb., 5th ser., cc. 1946–2028; 77, cc. 59–87, 520–536; 20 H. L. Deb, 5th ser., cc. 819–850; 931–945.
53 It may be of value to note recent action in other countries touching wartime elections. The parliamentary election of December 19, 1915 in Greece showed how unrepresentative an election (even in a neutral state) can be in the midst of a war. The followers of Venizelos absented themselves from the heavily-guarded polling places, and less than a third of the normal vote was cast. To avoid an election in 1916 in Canada, the British North America Act was recently amended so as to extend the term of the Dominion Parliament one year. This was done in response to an address from the Canadian to the British Parliament. (An Act to amend the British North American Act, 1867.—1 June 1916. 6 & 7 Geo. V, cap. 19.) In France there will be no elections either to the Senate or to the Chamber of Deputies until the close of the war. The law reads: Les opérations-de revision des listes électorales pour l'année 1915 sont ajournées jusqu'à la cessation des hostilités. Pendant la même période et jusqu'à ce qu'une loi spéciale ait autorisé la convocation des collèges électoraux, il ne sera procédé à aucune élection législative départementale, communale ou consulaire. Journal official de la republique française, Dec. 25, 1914, p. 9338. Furthermore in 1915, the elections of various local and colonial officers of the French government were suspended until a date to be set after the war. Journal Officiel, pp. 113, 2147, 2430, 3794, 7031. Moreover, in 1915, acts of the British parliament had been passed to render unnecessary the reëlection of members of the house of commons on acceptance of office (5 and 6 Geo. V, ch. 50), and to postpone elections of local authorities (5 and 6 Geo. V, ch. 76).
54 My chief source for this recent legislation is the London Daily Times.
55 London Weekly Times, July 3, 1911, p. 8.
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