Hostname: page-component-cb9f654ff-rkzlw Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2025-08-04T14:05:15.433Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

A Grammar of Institutions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 September 2013

Sue E. S. Crawford  and
Elinor Ostrom
Sue E. S. Crawford
Affiliation:
Creighton University
Elinor Ostrom
Affiliation:
Indiana University, Bloomington
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

The institutional grammar introduced here is based on a view that institutions are enduring regularities of human action in situations structured by rules, norms, and shared strategies, as well as by the physical world. The rules, norms, and shared strategies are constituted and reconstituted by human interaction in frequently occurring or repetitive situations. The syntax of the grammar identifies components of institutions and sorts them into three types of institutional statements: rules, norms, and shared strategies. We introduce the grammar, outline methods for operationalizing the syntax, apply the syntax to an analysis of cooperation in collective dilemma situations, and discuss the pragmatics of the grammar for analyses of behavior within complex institutional settings.

Information

Type
Articles
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 89 , Issue 3 , September 1995 , pp. 582 - 600
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1995

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable

References

Andreoni, James. 1989. “Giving with Impure Altruism: Applications to Charity and Ricardian Equivalence.” Journal of Political Economy 97:447–58.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Axelrod, Robert. 1981. “The Emergence of Cooperation among Egoists.” American Political Science Review 75:306–18.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Axelrod, Robert. 1986. “An Evolutionary Approach to Norms.” American Political Science Review 80:1095–111.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ayers, Ian, and Braithwaite, John. 1992. Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Regulation Debate. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bendor, Jonathan, and Mookherjee, Dilip. 1990. “Norms, Third-Party Sanctions, and Cooperation.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 6:33–63.Google Scholar
Black, Max. 1962. Models and Metaphors. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bourdieu, Pierre. 1977. Outline of a Theory of Practice. New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Braybrooke, David. 1987. Philosophy of Social Science. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.Google Scholar
Braybrooke, David. 1994. “The Logic of Political Discussion: An Introduction to Issue-Processing.” Presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago.Google Scholar
Burke, Kenneth. 1969. A Grammar of Motives. Berkeley: University of California Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Calvert, Randall. 1992. “Rational Actors, Equilibrium, and Social Institutions.” University of Rochester. Typescript.Google Scholar
Chomsky, Noam. 1957. Syntactic Structures. The Hague: Mouton.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Chomsky, Noam. 1965. Aspects of the Theory of Syntax. Cambridge: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Coleman, James S. 1987. “Norms as Social Capital.” In Economic Imperialism, ed. Radnitzky, Gerard and Bernholz, Peter. New York: Paragon.Google Scholar
Coleman, James S. 1988. “Free Riders and Zealots: The Role of Social Networks.” Sociological Theory 6:52–57.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Collett, Peter. 1977. “The Rules of Conduct.” In Social Rules and Social Behaviour, ed. Collett, Peter. Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield.Google Scholar
Commons, John R. 1968. Legal Foundations of Capitalism. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.Google Scholar
Cooter, Robert D. 1993. “Structural Adjudication and the New Law Merchant: A Model of Decentralized Law.” University of California, Berkeley. Typescript.Google Scholar
DiMaggio, Paul J., and Powell, Walter W.. 1991. Introduction to The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, ed. Powell, Walter W. and DiMaggio, Paul J.. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Ellickson, Robert C. 1991. Order without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Elster, Jon. 1989a. The Cement of Society: A Study of Social Order. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Elster, Jon. 1989b. Solomonic Judgements: Studies in the Limitations of Rationality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Etzioni, Amitai. 1988. The Moral Dimension: Towards a New Economics. New York: Free Press.Google Scholar
Frank, Robert H. 1988. Passions within Reason. New York: Norton.Google Scholar
Frey, Bruno S. 1994. “How Intrinsic Motivation Is Crowded Out and In.” Rationality and Society 334–52.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ganz, Joan Safran. 1971. Rules: A Systematic Study. The Hague: Mouton.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gibbard, Allan. 1990. Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Giddens, Anthony. 1979. Central Problems in Social Theory. Berkeley: University of California Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Giddens, Anthony. 1984. The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration. Berkeley: University of California Press.Google Scholar
Greif, Avner, Milgrom, Paul, and Weingast, Barry. 1990. “The Merchant Gild as a Nexus of Contracts.” Stanford University. Typescript.Google Scholar
Harré, R. 1974. “Some Remarks on ‘Rule’ as a Scientific Concept.” In Understanding Other Persons, ed. Mischel, Theodore. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.Google Scholar
Harsanyi, John C. 1967–1968. “Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players.” Management Science 14:159–82, 320–34, 486–502.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hayek, Friedrich A. von. 1945. “The Use of Knowledge in Society.” American Economic Review 35:519–30.Google Scholar
Hayek, Friedrich A. von. 1967. “Notes on the Evolution of Rules of Conduct.” In Studies in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics, ed. von Hayek, Friedrich A.. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Heritage, John. 1984. Garfinkel and Ethnomethodology. Cambridge: Polity.Google Scholar
Hilpinen, Risto, ed. 1971. Deontic Logic: Introductory and Systematic Readings. Dordrecht: Reidel.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hilpinen, Risto. 1981. New Studies in Deontic Logic: Norms, Actions, and the Foundations of Ethics. Dordrecht: Reidel.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hirschman, Albert O. 1985. “Against Parsimony: Three Easy Ways of Complicating Some Categories of Economic Discourse.” Economics and Philosophy 1:16–19.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hohfeld, Wesley N. 1913. “Some Fundamental Legal Concepts as Applied in the Study of Primitive Law.” Yale Law Journal 23:16–59.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hurwicz, Leonid. 1994. “Institutional Change and the Theory of Mechanism Design.” Academia Economic Papers 22:1–26.Google Scholar
Kerr, Norbert L. N.d. “Does My Contribution Really Matter? Efficacy in Social Dilemmas.” In European Review of Social Psychology, vol. 7, ed. Stroebe, W. and Hewstone, M.. Chichester: Wiley.Google Scholar
Kerr, Norbert L., Garst, Jennifer, Gerard, Donna A., and Harris, Susan E.. 1994. “That Still, Small Voice: Commitment To Cooperate as an Internalized Versus a Social Norm.” Michigan State University. Typescript.Google Scholar
Kiser, Larry L., and Ostrom, Elinor. 1982. “The Three Worlds of Action: A Metatheoretical Synthesis of Institutional Approaches.” In Strategies of Political Inquiry, ed. Ostrom, Elinor. Beverly Hills: Sage.Google Scholar
Knack, Stephen. 1992. “Civic Norms, Social Sanctions, and Voter Turnout.” Rationality and Society 4:133–56.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Knight, Jack. 1992. Institutions and Social Conflict. New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kreps, David M. 1990. “Corporate Culture and Economic Theory.” In Perspectives on Positive Political Economy, ed. Alt, James E. and Shepsle, Kenneth A.. New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Kreps, David M., Milgrom, Paul, Roberts, John, and Wilson, Robert. 1982. “Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma.” Journal of Economic Theory 27:245–52.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ledyard, John. 1995. “Is There a Problem with Public Goods Provision?” In The Handbook of Experimental Economics, ed. Kagel, John and Roth, Alvin. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Levi, Margaret. 1988. Of Rule and Revenue. Berkeley: University of California Press.Google Scholar
Levi, Margaret. 1990. “A Logic of Institutional Change.” In The Limits of Rationality, ed. Cook, Karen Schweers and Levi, Margaret. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Lewis, David K. 1969. Convention: A Philosophical Study. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
McGinnis, Michael D. 1993. “Heterogeneity of Interpretation: Rule Repertoires, Strategies, and Regime Maintenance.” Presented at the conference on Heterogeneity and Collective Action, Indiana University, Bloomington.Google Scholar
Mansbridge, Jane. 1990. “Expanding the Range of Formal Modeling.” In Beyond Self-interest, ed. Mansbridge, Jane. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Mansbridge, Jane. 1994. “Public Spirit in Political Systems.” In Values and Public Policy, ed. Aaron, Henry J., Mann, Thomas E., and Taylor, Timothy. Washington: Brookings Institution.Google Scholar
March, James G., and Olsen, Johan P.. 1989. Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics. New York: Free Press.Google Scholar
Margolis, Howard. 1991. “Self-Interest and Social Motivation.” In Individuality and Cooperative Action, ed. Earley, Joseph E.. Washington: Georgetown University Press.Google Scholar
Menger, Karl. 1963. Problems in Economics and Sociology. Trans. Nock, Francis J.. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.Google Scholar
Meyer, John W., and Rowan, Brian. 1991. “Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony.” In The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, ed. Powell, Walter W. and Dimaggio, Paul J.. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Milgrom, Paul R., North, Douglass C., and Weingast, Barry R.. 1990. “The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs.” Economics and Politics 2:1–23.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Myerson, Roger B. 1991. Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
North, Douglass C. 1981. Structure and Change in Economic History. New York: Norton.Google Scholar
North, Douglass. 1986. “The New Institutional Economics.” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 142:230–37.Google Scholar
North, Douglass. 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance. New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Oakerson, Ronald J., and Parks, Roger B.. 1988. “Citizen Voice and Public Entrepreneurship: The Organizational Dynamic of a Complex Metropolitan County.” Publius 18:91–112.Google Scholar
Offe, Claus, and Wiesenthal, Helmut. 1980. “Two Logics of Collective Action: Theoretical Notes on Social Class and Organizational Form.” Political Power and Social Theory 1:67–115.Google Scholar
Olson, Mancur. 1991. “The Role of Morals and Incentives in Society.” In Individuality and Cooperative Action, ed. Earley, Joseph E.. Washington: Georgetown University Press.Google Scholar
Orbell, John M., Kragt, Alphons J. van de, and Dawes, Robyn M.. 1991. “Covenants without the Sword: The Role of Promises in Social Dilemma Circumstances.” In Social Norms and Economic Institutions, ed. Koford, Kenneth J. and Miller, Jeffrey B.. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.Google Scholar
Ostrom, Elinor. 1986. “An Agenda for the Study of Institutions.” Public Choice 48:3–25.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ostrom, Elinor, Gardner, Roy, and Walker, James. 1994. Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ostrom, Vincent. 1980. “Artisanship and Artifact.” Public Administration Review 40:309–17.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ostrom, Vincent. 1986. “A Fallabilist's Approach to Norms and Criteria of Choice.” In Guidance, Control, and Evaluation in the Public Sector, ed. Kaufmann, Franz K., Majone, Giandomenico, and Ostrom, Vincent. Berlin: Gruyter.Google Scholar
Ostrom, Vincent. 1987. The Political Theory of a Compound Republic: Designing the American Experiment. 2d rev. ed. San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies Press.Google Scholar
Ostrom, Vincent. 1991. The Meaning of American Federalism: Constituting a Self-Governing Society. San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies Press.Google Scholar
Ostrom, Vincent. 1995. The Vulnerability of Democracies. Indiana University, Bloomington. Typescript.Google Scholar
Plott, Charles R. 1986. “Rational Choice in Experimental Markets.” Journal of Business 59:301–27.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Popper, Karl R. 1967. “Rationality and the Status of the Rationality Principle.” In Le fondements philosophiques des systems economiques, ed. Classen, E. M.. Paris: Payot.Google Scholar
Riker, William. 1980. “Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions.” American Political Science Review 74:432–46.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rowe, Nicholas. 1989. Rules and Institutions. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schank, Roger C., and Abelson, Robert P.. 1977. Scripts, Plans, Goals, and Understanding: An Inquiry into Human Knowledge Structures. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.Google Scholar
Schauer, Frederick. 1991. Playing by the Rules. Oxford: Clarendon.Google Scholar
Schelling, Thomas C. 1978. Micromotives and Macrobehavior. New York: Norton.Google Scholar
Schotter, Andrew. 1981. The Economic Theory of Social Institutions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Searle, John R. 1969. Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language. London: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shepsle, Kenneth A. 1975. “Congressional Committee Assignments: An Optimization Model with Institutional Constraints.” Public Choice 22:55–78.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shepsle, Kenneth A. 1979. “Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models.” American Journal of Political Science 23:27–59.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shepsle, Kenneth A. 1989. “Studying Institutions: Some Lessons from the Rational Choice Approach.” Journal of Theoretical Politics 1:131–47.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shepsle, Kenneth A., and Weingast, Barry R.. 1984. “When Do Rules of Procedure Matter?” Journal of Politics 46:206–21.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shepsle, Kenneth A., and Weingast, Barry R.. 1987. “The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power.” American Political Science Review 81:85–104.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shimanoff, Susan B. 1980. Communication Rules: Theory and Research. Beverly Hills: Sage.Google Scholar
Sugden, Robert. 1986. The Economics of Rights, Co-operation, and Welfare. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.Google Scholar
Taylor, Michael. 1987. The Possibility of Cooperation. New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Tsebelis, George. 1989. “The Abuse of Probability in Political Analysis: The Robinson Crusoe Fallacy.” American Political Science Review 83:77–91.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tsebelis, George. 1991. “The Effect of Fines on Regulated Industries: Game Theory Versus Decision Theory.” Journal of Theoretical Politics 3:81–101.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tyler, Tom R. 1990. Why People Obey the Law. New Haven: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
Udéhn, Lars. 1993. “Twenty-Five Years with The Logic of Collective Action.” Acta Sociologica 36:239–61.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ullmann-Margalit, Edna. 1977. The Emergence of Norms. Oxford: Clarendon.Google Scholar
von Wright, Georg H. 1951. “Deontic Logic.” Mind 60:58–74.Google Scholar
von Wright, Georg H. 1963. Norm and Action: A Logical Enquiry. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.Google Scholar
von Wright, Georg H. 1968. “The Logic of Practical Discourse.” In Contemporary Philosophy, ed. Klibansky, Raymond. Florence, Italy: La Nuova Italia Editrice.Google Scholar
Weber, Max. 1947. The Theory of Social and Economic Organization. Trans. Henderson, A. M. and Parsons, Talcott. New York: Free Press.Google Scholar
Weiss, Richard M. 1991. “Alternative Social Science Perspectives on ‘Social Dilemma’ Laboratory Research.” In Social Norms and Economic Institutions, ed. Koford, Kenneth J. and Miller, Jeffrey B.. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.Google Scholar
Weissing, Franz J., and Ostrom, Elinor. 1991a. “Irrigation Institutions and the Games Irrigators Play: Rule Enforcement without Guards.” In Game Equilibrium Models II: Methods, Morals, and Markets, ed. Selten, Reinhard. Berlin: Springer-Verlag.Google Scholar
Weissing, Franz J., and Ostrom, Elinor. 1991b. “Crime and Punishment.” Journal of Theoretical Politics 3:343–49.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Weissing, Franz J., and Ostrom, Elinor. 1993. “Irrigation Institutions and the Games Irrigators Play: Rule Enforcement on Government- and Farmer-managed Systems.” In Games in Hierarchies and Networks, ed. Scharpf, Fritz W.. Boulder: Westview.Google Scholar
Williamson, Oliver E. 1985. The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting. New York: Free Press.Google Scholar
Submit a response

Comments

No Comments have been published for this article.