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Group Influence and the Policy Process in the Soviet Union*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

Joel J. Schwartz  and
William R. Keech
Joel J. Schwartz
Affiliation:
University of North Carolina
William R. Keech
Affiliation:
University of North Carolina
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Extract

It has become widely recognized that Soviet officials do not formulate public policy in a vacuum, and that, indeed, their deliberations take into account in some fashion the needs and demands of various elements of the society. Further, it has been observed that social groups of various types play a noticeable, if only rudimentary role in articulating interests to the top of the hierarchy. In fact one author has gone so far as to assert that communist policy-making results from a “parallelogram of conflicting forces and interests.” While such viewpoints are now far more widely accepted than in the early fifties, relatively little effort has been devoted to illustrating or illuminating how Soviet public policy in general or even a given Soviet policy can be importantly affected by group activity.

We propose here to make a contribution in that direction. Using the Educational Reform Act of 1958 as an exemplary case, we intend to show how and through what process groups can affect policy outcomes, and by identifying circumstances under which this takes place to generate some hypotheses about when such influence is most likely to recur. In their excellent analysis of Soviet policy formation, Professors Brzezinski and Huntington identify what they call “policy groups,” which come closest of any nongovernmental groups to participating in policy formation. These groups, such as the military, industrial managers, agricultural experts and state bureaucrats.

Type
Research Article
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 62 , Issue 3 , September 1968 , pp. 840 - 851
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1968

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References

1 Skilling, H. Gordon, “Interest Groups and Communist Politics,” World Politics, 18 (April 1966), p. 449 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

2 Brzezinski, Zbigniew and Huntington, Samuel P., Political Power: U.S.A./U.S.S.R. (New York, 1963), p. 196 Google Scholar.

3 Khrushchev's, statement can be found in XIII S”ezd vsesoiuznogo leninskogo kommunislicheskogo souiza molodezhi: stenograficheskii otchet (Moscow 1959), pp. 278–282 Google Scholar.

4 See, for example, Bueva, L., “Tvorcheskii trud- osnova kommunisticheskogo vospitaniia molodezhi,” Kommunist, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Feb., 1961), p. 53 Google Scholar; and also Komsomol' skaia pravda, March 2, 1956; February 10, 1957.

5 See XIII S'ezd. op. cit., p. 280. See also Pavlov, S., “Sovetskaia molodezh' v bor'be za kommunizm,” Kommunist, Vol. 36, No. 4 (03, 1960), p. 63 Google Scholar.

6 DeWitt, Nicholas, Education and Professional Employment in the USSR (Washington, 1961), p. 140 Google Scholar.

7 In his speech to the XIII Komsomol Congress, Khrushchev noted that “last year higher educational institutions were able to accept 400,000 new students, half of them for full time study.—. However, at least 700,000 secondary school graduates failed to gain admission last year to higher or technical schools and between 1953–1956 about 2,200,000 failed to gain admission” XIII S”ezd, op. cit., p. 278.

8 Ibid, p. 282.

9 Pravda, September 21, 1958.

10 XIII S”ezd, op. cit., p. 280.

11 See, for example, DeWitt, op. cit., p. 15.

12 For a refutation of the labor deficit thesis see “Facts and Figures,” Bulletin of Radio Free Europe, September 22, 1958.

13 See Pravda, September 21, 1958.

14 For a text of the law see Spravochnik partiinogo rabotnika (Moscow, 1959), pp. 517–533 Google Scholar.

15 For an analysis of this point see an article by Mehnert, Klaus in Die Welt, 07 18, 1959 Google Scholar.

16 The actual law left this point unclear but later developments indicated that just as many children—about a third of the total—would attend full time high schools as had been the case before the reform. See Bernstein, Thomas “Soviet Educational Reform,” (M. A. Thesis, Columbia University, 1962), p. 111 Google Scholar, and articles in The New York Times, September 2, 1959; Wall Street Journal, June 29, 1960.

17 Instead of the two to three days released time from work as suggested by Khruschchev, students in evening schools received only one additional free day for study. See Shebanova, A. I., “O l'gotakh dlia lits sovmeshchaiushchikh rabotu s obucheniem,” Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo Vol. 30 (11, 1960), pp. 99–102 Google Scholar.

18 This point was made by the Soviet Minister of higher education and was reflected in the final law. See Eliutin, V. P., “Soveshchanie rabotnikov vysshei shkoly,” Vestnik vysshei shkoly, Vol. 16, No. 10 (10, 1958), p. 9 Google Scholar.

19 Literaturnaia gazeta, August 30, 1958.

20 For examples of such arguments see Literaturnia gazeta, June 26, 1958; December 20, 1958; Pravda, September 24, 1958; October 17, 1958; November 19, 1958. Kondrat'ev, K Ia and Shi'lov, P.A. “O nekotorykh voprosakh universitetskogo obrazovaniia,” Vestnik vysshei shkoly, Vol. 16, No. 10 (10, 1958), pp. 17–23 Google Scholar.

21 See Pravda, November 30, 1958; December 2 1958; Literaturnaia gazeta, December 20, 1958.

22 For a scathing criticism of managerial attitudes toward juvenile workers see the lead editorial in Pravda, September 25, 1957.

23 There is some evidence that the opposition was far greater than one would gather from simply reading the official press. For example, relatively few parental criticisms found their way into print. But during 1963–64 when the first author of this paper was conducting interviews in the Soviet Union, it was learned that a very large number of urban middle class parents had strongly criticized Khrushchev's proposals at “PTA” meetings held during the reform debate period. Similarly, Professor William Johnson of the University of Pittsburgh told the same author that opposition among educational officials was far more widespread than the official press revealed. Professor Johnson was in the Soviet Union at the time of the debate and is known to have extensive contacts with Soviet educators.

24 Neustadt, Richard, Presidential Power (New York, 1964)Google Scholar.

25 For an analysis of the reform with this type of implication see Burg, David, “Some thoughts on the Soviet educational reform,” Bulletin, 6 (03, 1959), 32–36 Google Scholar.

26 Brzezinski and Huntington, op. cit., p. 145.

27 See for example, Linden, Carl A., Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership 1957–1964 (Baltimore, 1966)Google Scholar.

28 See XIII S”ezd, op. cit., p. 282.

29 See Conflict and Decision-Making in Soviet Russia (Princeton, 1965), p. 17–18 Google Scholar.

30 For an analysis of these amendments see Schlesinger, Rudolph, “The Educational Reform,” Soviet Studies, 10 (04, 1959), 432–444 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

31 See Brzezinski and Huntington, op. cit., pp. 267, 269–283, 295–300.

32 Bernstein, op. cit., p. 119. See also Brzezinski and Huntington, p. 214.

33 In this instance, many political leaders may have been especially inclined to “believe” these arguments. As primary members of the new class, Communist Party cadres had good reason to support the educational status quo. They were among the chief beneficiaries of the existing system. Their children enjoyed advantageous access to full-time secondary and higher education. There is no question that such cadres hoped to perpetuate the provision of such education for their children. Khruschhev's proposals surely must have caused consternation among party cadres which other top party leaders would readily have been conscious of. In this respect the party itself was probably an important constituent pressure group which reinforced the doubts Khrushchev's colleagues had about the widsom of his proposals.

34 For a view of government as problem solving and adapting to environments in which communications play a crucial role, see Deutsch, Karl W., The Nerves of Government (New York, 1963)Google Scholar.

35 See Ploss, op. cit., pp. 61, 84, 286, for other examples and a discussion of changes in the scope of conflict in the Soviet Union. See also Scattschneider, E. E., The Semisovereign People (New York, 1960)Google Scholar, for a discussion of the impact of other kinds of changes in patterns of conflict in the United States.

36 Op. cit., p. 198.

37 Ibid., pp. 193, 240–252.

38 Ibid., p. 270.

39 Bauer, Raymond A., Inkeles, Alex and Kluckhohn, Clyde, How the Soviet System Works (New York, 1956), p. 98 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

40 See Eckstein, Harry, Pressure Group Politics (Stanford, 1960)Google Scholar.

41 Dispersion of decision making can assume a “personalized” as well as an institutional form. Instead of separation of powers between executive legislative, and judicial groups one may find a separation of powers between leaders at the top of an outwardly monolithic political structure. See Ploss op. cit., p. 286. On the relationship between group influence and a diffusion of power see Eckstein, Harry, “Group Theory and the Comparative Study of Pressure Groups,” Comparative Politics edited by Eckstein, Harry and Apter, David (New York, 1963), p. 396 Google Scholar.

42 Op. cit., pp. 20–21.

43 This condition of “pluralistic ignorance” is discussed in Bauer and others, op. cit., p. 263.

44 Easton, David “The Analysis of Political Systems” Comparative Politics: Notes and Readings edited by Macridis, Roy C. and Brown, Bernard E. (Homewood, 1964), pp. 94–95 Google Scholar.

45 “Group Theory and the Comparative Study of Pressure Groups,” Comparative Politics, op. cit., p. 395.

46 For an interesting suggestive article on the growth of pluralism in Russian society see Roberts, Henry L., “The Succession to Khrushchev in Perspective,” Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, 28 (04, 1965), 2–12 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

47 We are identifying here a difference of degree. As Eckstein notes, pressure groups have become very active and significant in the postwar political systems of Britain, France, etc., for similar reasons. “One rather obvious reason for this development is the growth of the social service state- of positive government regulating, planning, directing, or entirely drawing into itself all sorts of social activities. This trend has given social groups a greater stake in politics and therefore mobilised them to a much greater extent while making government increasingly dependent on the collaboration and advice, technical or otherwise, of the groups,” Comparative Politics op. cit., p. 395.

48 See Eisenstadt, S. N., The Political Systems of Empires (New York 1963)Google Scholar, for a suggestive analysis of the role of skill groups in historical bureaucratic empires.

49 See Tucker, Robert C., “On the Study of Comparative Communism,” World Politics, 19 (01, 1967), 242–257 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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