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Information Asymmetries and Simultaneous versus Sequential Voting

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

Rebecca B. Morton  and
Kenneth C. Williams
Rebecca B. Morton
Affiliation:
University of Iowa
Kenneth C. Williams
Affiliation:
Michigan State University
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Abstract

Sequential voting takes place when some voters make choices with knowledge of earlier decisions in the same election. Historically, voting in U.S. presidential primaries is sequential, but recent primaries have been “front-loaded” into the early weeks of the season. We explore sequential voting in drawn-out primaries and simultaneous voting in front-loaded ones theoretically and use laboratory elections to examine our predictions empirically. We find evidence that in sequential voting later voters can use early outcomes to infer information about candidates and make choices that better reflect their preferences. The ability of later voters to infer information increases with higher levels of risk aversion and information provided on early outcomes. We discover that when a moderate candidate is largely unknown, information aggregation in sequential voting can increase the probability s/he will win, which supports the contention of policymakers that sequential voting can lead to different electoral outcomes.

Type
Articles
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 93 , Issue 1 , March 1999 , pp. 51 - 67
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1999

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