Hostname: page-component-cb9f654ff-kl2l2 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2025-08-07T10:19:33.366Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Information Provision, Voter Coordination, and Electoral Accountability: Evidence from Mexican Social Networks

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 March 2019

ERIC ARIAS Open the ORCID record for ERIC ARIAS [Opens in a new window] ,
PABLO BALÁN Open the ORCID record for PABLO BALÁN [Opens in a new window] ,
HORACIO LARREGUY Open the ORCID record for HORACIO LARREGUY [Opens in a new window] ,
JOHN MARSHALL Open the ORCID record for JOHN MARSHALL [Opens in a new window]  and
PABLO QUERUBÍN Open the ORCID record for PABLO QUERUBÍN [Opens in a new window]
ERIC ARIAS*
Affiliation:
College of William and Mary
PABLO BALÁN*
Affiliation:
Harvard University
HORACIO LARREGUY*
Affiliation:
Harvard University
JOHN MARSHALL*
Affiliation:
Columbia University
PABLO QUERUBÍN*
Affiliation:
New York University
*
*Eric Arias, Assistant Professor, Department of Government, College of William and Mary, eric.arias@wm.edu.
†Pablo Balán, Graduate Student, Department of Government, Harvard University, pbalan@g.harvard.edu.
‡Horacio Larreguy, Associate Professor, Department of Government, Harvard University, hlarreguy@fas.harvard.edu.
**John Marshall, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Columbia University, jm4401@columbia.edu.
††Pablo Querubín, Associate Professor, Department of Politics, New York University, pablo.querubin@nyu.edu.
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

How do social networks moderate the way political information influences electoral accountability? We propose a simple model in which incumbent malfeasance revelations can facilitate coordination around less malfeasant challenger parties in highly connected voter networks, even when voters update favorably about incumbent party malfeasance. We provide evidence from Mexico of this mechanism by leveraging a field experiment in a context where the provision of incumbent malfeasance information increased support for incumbent parties, despite voters continuing to believe that challengers were less malfeasant than incumbents. Combining this experiment with detailed family network data, we show that—consistent with the model—the increase in incumbent party vote share due to information provision was counteracted by coordination around less malfeasant challengers in precincts with greater network connectedness. Individual-level data further demonstrate that networks facilitated explicit and tacit coordination among voters. These findings suggest that networks can help voters coordinate around information to help remove poorly performing politicians.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 113 , Issue 2 , May 2019 , pp. 475 - 498
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 2019 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable

Footnotes

We thank Francisco Cantú, Donghyun Danny Choi, Anirvan Chowdhury, Juan Dodyk, Thad Dunning, Ryan Enos, Fran Hagopian, Bhumi Purohit, Shanker Satyanath, Alastair Smith, Daniel Smith, David Stasavage, Yuhua Wang, and Xiang Zhou, and seminar participants at APSA, Berkeley, Harvard, MIT, and MPSA for valuable feedback. The experimental component of this study was financed by the EGAP Metaketa initiative, and was approved by the Harvard Committee on the Use of Human Subjects (15-1068) and the New York University Committee on Activities Involving Human Subjects (15-10587). Replication files are available at the American Political Science Review Dataverse: https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/8IWRBI.

References

REFERENCES

Abrams, Samuel, Iversen, Torben, and Soskice, David. 2011. “Informal Social Networks and Rational Voting.” British Journal of Political Science 41 (2): 229–57.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Adida, Claire, Gottlieb, Jessica, Kramon, Eric, and McClendon, Gwyneth. 2017. “Breaking the Clientelistic Voting Equilibrium: The Joint Importance of Salience and Coordination.” Working Paper.Google Scholar
Alatas, Vivi, Banerjee, Abhijit, Chandrasekhar, Arun G., Hanna, Rema, and Olken, Benjamin A.. 2016. “Network Structure and the Aggregation of Information: Theory and Evidence from Indonesia.” The American Economic Review 106 (7): 1663–704.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Alt, James E., Jensen, Amalie, Larreguy, Horacio, Lassen, David D., and Marshall, John. 2017. “Contagious Political Concerns: Identifying Unemployment Information Shock Transmission Using the Danish Population Network.” Working Paper.Google Scholar
Ames, Barry, Baker, Andy, and Smith, Amy Erica. 2016. “Social Networks in the Brazilian Electorate.” In The Oxford Handbook of Political Networks, eds. Victor, Jennifer Nicoll, Lubell, Mark, and Montgomery, Alexander H.. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 855–74.Google Scholar
Angelucci, Manuela, De Giorgi, Giacomo, Rangel, Marcos, and Rasul, Imran. 2009. “Village Economies and the Structure of Extended Family Networks.” Berkeley Electronic Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy 9 (1): Article 19.Google Scholar
Arias, Eric, Larreguy, Horacio A., Marshall, John, and Querubín, Pablo. 2019. “Priors Rule: When Do Malfeasance Revelations Help and Hurt Incumbent Parties?” Working Paper.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Auditoría Superior de la Federación. 2014. “Informe del Resultado de la Fiscalización Superior de la Cuenta Pública 2012.” Audit Summary Report.Google Scholar
Banerjee, Abhijit V., Kumar, Selvan, Pande, Rohini, and Su, Felix. 2011. “Do Informed Voters Make Better Choices? Experimental Evidence from Urban India.” Working Paper.Google Scholar
Belausteguigoitia, Imanol. 2007. “La Influencia de la Familia en las Organizaciones Familiares Mexicanas.” Dirección Estratégica 21 (Marzo–Mayo).Google Scholar
Bernheim, B. Douglas. 1994. “A Theory of Conformity.” Journal of Political Economy 102 (5): 841–77.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bidwell, Kelly, Casey, Katherine, and Glennerster, Rachel. 2017. “Debates: Voting and Expenditure Responses to Political Communication.” Working Paper.Google Scholar
Bond, Robert M., Fariss, Christopher J., Jones, Jason J., Kramer, Adam D. I., Marlow, Cameron, Settle, Jaime E., and Fowler, James H.. 2012. “A 61-Million-Person Experiment in Social Influence and Political Mobilization.” Nature 489 (7415): 295–8.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Cantú, Francisco. 2014. “Identifying Electoral Irregularities in Mexican Local Elections.” American Journal of Political Science 58 (4): 936–51.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Chandrasekhar, Arun G., and Lewis., Randall 2016. “Econometrics of Sampled Networks.” Working Paper.Google Scholar
Chong, Alberto, De La O, Ana L., Karlan, Dean, and Wantchekon, Leonard. 2015. “Does Corruption Information Inspire the Fight or Quash the Hope? A Field Experiment in Mexico on Voter Turnout, Choice, and Party Identification.” The Journal of Politics 77 (1): 55–71.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Collier, Paul, and Vicente, Pedro C.. 2014. “Votes and Violence: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Nigeria.” Economic Journal 574 (124): 327–55.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cruz, Cesi, Labonne, Julien, and Querubín, Pablo. 2017. “Politician Family Networks and Electoral Outcomes: Evidence from the Philippines.” The American Economic Review 107 (October): 3006–37.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
De La O, Ana L., and Martel García, Fernando. 2015. “Can Intrastate Accountability Reduce Local Capture? Results from a Field Experiment in Mexico.” Working Paper.Google Scholar
DellaVigna, Stefano, List, John A., Malmendier, Ulrike, and Rao, Gautam. 2016. “Voting to Tell Others.” The Review of Economic Studies 84 (1): 143–81.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Duarte, Raul, Finan, Frederico, Larreguy, Horacio, and Schechter, Laura. 2018. “Networks, Information and Vote Buying.” Working Paper.Google Scholar
Dunning, Thad, Grossman, Guy, Humphreys, Macartan, Hyde, Susan, McIntosh, Craig, and Nellis, Gareth. 2019. Information, Accountability, and Cumulative Learning: Lessons from Metaketa I. New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Enikolopov, Ruben, Makarin, Aleksey, and Petrova, Maria. 2016. “Social Media and Protest Participation: Evidence from Russia.” Working Paper.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Feddersen, Timothy J. 2006. “Rational Choice Theory and the Paradox of Not Voting.” The Journal of Economic Perspectives 18 (1): 99–112.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ferraz, Claudio, and Finan, Frederico. 2008. “Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effects of Brazil’s Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 123 (2): 703–45.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Finan, Frederico, and Schechter, Laura. 2012. “Vote-Buying and Reciprocity.” Econometrica 80 (2): 863–82.Google Scholar
Fujiwara, Thomas, and Wantchekon, Leonard. 2013. “Can Informed Public Deliberation Overcome Clientelism? Experimental Evidence from Benin.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 5 (4): 241–55.Google Scholar
Gerber, Alan S., Green, Donald P., and Larimer, Christopher W.. 2008. “Social Pressure and Voter Turnout: Evidence from a Large-Scale Field Experiment.” American Political Science Review 102 (1): 33–48.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Larreguy, Horacio A., Marshall, John, and Snyder, James M. Jr. 2018. “Publicizing Malfeasance: How Local Media Faciliates Electoral Sanctioning of Mayors in Mexico.” Working Paper.Google Scholar
Larson, Jennifer M. 2017. “Networks and Interethnic Cooperation.” The Journal of Politics 79 (2): 546–59.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Larson, Jennifer M., and Lewis., Janet I. 2017. “Ethnic Networks.” American Journal of Political Science 61 (2): 350–64.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Larson, Jennifer M., Nagler, Jonathan, Ronen, Jonathan, and Tucker, Joshua. 2017. “Social Networks and Protest Participation: Evidence from 130 Million Twitter Users.” Working Paper.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lawson, Chappell, and Greene, Kenneth F.. 2014. “Making Clientelism Work: How Norms of Reciprocity Increase Voter Compliance.” Comparative Politics 47 (1): 61–85.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lohmann, Susanne. 1993. “A Signaling Model of Informative and Manipulative Political Action.” American Political Science Review 87 (2): 319–33.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Magaloni, Beatriz. 2006. Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and Its Demise in Mexico. New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McClendon, Gwyneth H. 2014. “Social Esteem and Participation in Contentious Politics: A Field Experiment at an LGBT Pride Rally.” American Journal of Political Science 58 (2): 279–90.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McKenzie, David, and Rapoport, Hillel. 2010. “Self-Selection Patterns in Mexico–U.S. Migration: The Role of Migration Networks.” The Review of Economics and Statistics 92: 811–21.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Medina, Luis Fernando. 2007. A Unified Theory of Collective Action and Social Change. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Morris, Stephen, and Shin, Hyun Song. 2002. “Social Value of Public Information.” The American Economic Review 92 (5): 1521–34.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Nickerson, David W. 2008. “Is Voting Contagious? Evidence from Two Field Experiments.” American Political Science Review 102 (1): 49–57.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Putnam, Robert D., Leonardi, Robert, and Nanetti, Raffaella Y.. 1993. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Ramirez Ortiz, María Guadalupe, Caballero Hoyos, José, and Ramírez-López, María Guadalupe. 2004. “The Social Networks of Academic Performance in a Student Context of Poverty in Mexico.” Social Networks 26: 175–88.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sabau García, María Luisa, and Jovane, Ana. 1994. Estampas de la Familia Mexicana. México: Impresora Formal, S.A. de C.V.Google Scholar
Schaffer, Joby, and Baker, Andy. 2015. “Clientelism as Persuasion-Buying: Evidence from Latin America.” Comparative Political Studies 48 (9): 1093–126.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sinclair, Betsy. 2012. The Social Citizen: Peer Networks and Political Behavior. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sinclair, Betsy, McConnell, Margaret, and Green, Donald P.. 2012. “Detecting Spillovers in Social Networks: Design and Analysis of Multi-Level Experiments.” American Journal of Political Science 56 (4): 1055–69.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Steinert-Threlkeld, Zachary C. 2017. “Spontaneous Collective Action: Peripheral Mobilization during the Arab Spring.” American Political Science Review 111 (2): 379–403.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Woodruff, Christopher, and Zenteno, Rene. 2007. “Migration Networks and Microenterprises in Mexico.” Journal of Development Economics 82: 509–28.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Supplementary material: Link

Arias et al. Dataset

Dataset

https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/8IWRBI
Link
Supplementary material: PDF

Arias et al. supplementary material

Online Appendix

Download Arias et al. supplementary material(PDF)
PDF 415.5 KB
Submit a response

Comments

No Comments have been published for this article.