¹ For discussions of the Inter-Nation Simulation focusing on methodology see Snyder, Richard C., “Some Perspectives on the Use of Experimental Techniques in the Study of International Relations,” in Guetzkow, Haroldet al., Simulation in International Relations: Developments for Research and Teaching (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1963)Google Scholar; Verba, Sidney, “Simulation, Reality and Theory in International Relations,” World Politics, 16, (1964), 490–521CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Singer, J. David, “Date-Making in International Relations,” American Behavioral Scientist, 10 (1965), 68–81Google ScholarPubMed; and Brody, Richard A., “Some Systematic Effects of the Spread of Nuclear Weapons Technology: A Study Through Simulation of a Multi-Nuclear Future,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 7 (1963), 663–753. pp. 668–687CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

² For the most inclusive single-volume discussion of the Inter-Nation Simulation, see Guetzkow, Harold, Alger, Chadwick F., Brody, Richard A., Noel, Robert C. and Synder, Richard C., Simulation in International Relations: Developments for Research and Teaching (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1963)Google Scholar. For the closest thing to a published survey of the assumptions of the Inter-Nation Simulation see the chapters by Guetzkow in this volume.

³ Morgenthau, Hans J., Politics Among Nations, 3rd ed. (New York, 1961)Google Scholar.

⁴ Kaplan, Morton A., System and Process in International Politics (New York; 1957)Google Scholar.

⁵ Snyder, Richard C., Bruck, H. W. and Sapin, Burton, Foreign Policy Decision-Making (New York, 1962)Google Scholar.

⁶ North, Robert C., Holsti, Ole R. and Brody, Richard A., “Perception and Action in the Study of International Relations: The 1914 Crisis,” paper for the International Yearbook of Political Behavior Research, 1964Google Scholar.

⁷ Pool, Ithiel de Sola and Kessler, Allan, “The Kaiser, the Tzar, and the Computer: Information Processing in a Crisis,” The American Behavioral Scientist, (1965), 31–38Google Scholar.

⁸ Singer, J. David, “The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations,” in Knorr, Klaus and Verba, Sidney (eds.), The International System (Princeton, 1961), pp. 77–93Google Scholar.

⁹ It is commonly but erroneously assumed that the Inter-Nation Simulation is focused primarily on the dynamics of decision-making since the most controlled and concretized part of the simulation is the national decision-making process. However, Guetzkow's discussion of the possibilities of the Inter-Nation Simulation for research and development of theories is focused on hypotheses regarding the interaction of states: e.g., see Guetzkow et. al., op. cit., pp. 33–36; see also Snyder, Richard C. and Robinson, James A., National and International Decision-Making (New York, 1961), p. 35Google Scholar.

¹⁰ Weber, Max, “Politics as a Vocation,” Essays in Sociology, edited by Gerth, Hans and Mills, C. Wright (New York, 1958), p. 84Google Scholar.

¹¹ Lasswell, Harold D., Psychopathology and Politics (New York, 1960), pp. 261–263Google Scholar.

¹² For a discussion of the theoretical position on the nature of the influence flow between Validators and Decision-makers see infra, p. 565.

¹³ Synder, Brack, and Sapin, op. cit., p. 158.

¹⁴ For a discussion of the Inter-Nation Simulation conception of national security as expressed by the VSns see infra, p. 573 and Guetzkow et al., op. cit., pp. 44–45.

¹⁵ Most writers classify goals in categories of national security, economic interests and the values based on national character, tradition and ideology. The following list is arranged in an ordering based on the ratio of national security and economic interest values on the one hand, to values based on national character, tradition and ideology on the other, The authors appearing first have placed greater emphasis on national security and economic interest in relation to the other values. All writers, however, do assign some role to the three categories of values. Strausz-Hupé, Robert and Possony, Stefan T., International Relations (New York, 1962), p. 563Google Scholar; London, Kurt, How Foreign Policy is Made (New York, 1950), p. 13Google Scholar; Frankel, Joseph, The Making of Foreign Policy (London, 1963), p. 131Google Scholar; Haas, Ernst B. and Whiting, Allan S., Dynamics of International Relations (New York, 1956), p. 59Google Scholar; and Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin, op. cit., pp. 156–159.

¹⁶ See Robert C. Noel, “Evolution of the Inter-Nation Simulation,” in Guetzkow et al., op. cit., pp. 100–101 for a discussion of game culture; and Harold Guetzkow, “Structured Programs and Their Relation to Free Activity Within the Inter-Nation Simulation,” in ibid., pp. 133–134, for a discussion of the development of “esteem” in the simulation.

¹⁷ See Noel, op. cit., pp. 88, 100 and 105 for a discussion of attempts to control the types of individuals participating in the simulations and the results from such attempts. Also, see a recent study by Driver, Michael J., A Structural Analysis of Aggression, Stress, and Personality in an Inter-Nation Simulation (Lafayette: Paper No. 97, Institute for Research in the Behavioral, Economic and Management Sciences, Purdue University, 1965)Google Scholar.

¹⁸ E.g., Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin, op. cit., pp. 6, 7, 63, 88, 89, 100, 102.

¹⁹ At this point, it might be useful to note that the sharp operational dichotomy between economic/security values and non-economic/security values which exists in the Inter-Nation Simulation might be a result of the technical difficulties inherent in creating non-economic/security values in the Validator/Decision-maker relationship. It would necessitate a significant increase in the complexity of operating the simulation since non-economic/security values would not be subject to the quantitative manipulations now employed in the Inter-Nation Simulation Validator process. However, explorations in this development are now being undertaken by Charles F. Hermann of Princeton University and by myself at Wayne State University.

²⁰ E.g., see Cohen, Bernard C., The Political Process and Foreign Policy (Princeton, 1957)CrossRefGoogle Scholar for a discussion of the broad range of values brought to bear on American policy-makers in the negotiations and signing of the Japanese Peace Treaty.

²¹ The Decision-makers may take certain measures to lessen the effect of the Validator, but it involves the expenditures of force capability and increases the chances of a successful revolution if that revolution ever breaks out. Although some of the Decision-makers have employed these measures for a period of time, it represents a tool of coercion which Decision-makers would rather not use except in emergencies. For a discussion of this see Guetzkow et. al., op. cit., p. 49.

²² Morgenthau, Hans, The Dilemmas of Politics (Chicago, 1958), p. 304Google Scholar.

²³ Hilsman, Roger, “Congressional-Executive Relations and the Foreign Policy Consensus,” this Review, 52 (1958), 725–745Google Scholar.

²⁴ Cohen, op. cit., p. 285.

²⁵ Haas and Whiting, op. cit., pp. 32–35.

²⁶ Snyder et al., op. cit., pp. 156–160.

²⁷ Frankel, op. cit., pp. 70–83; and London, op. cit., pp. 39–52.

²⁸ E.g., Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin, op. cit., p. 93; and Wright, Quincy, The Study of International Relations (New York, 1955), p. 170Google Scholar.

²⁹ Haas and Whiting, op. cit., pp. 27–8; and Frankel, op. cit., pp. 86–177.

³⁰ London, op. cit., pp. 7–10; and Strausz-Hupé and Possony, op. cit., p. 10.

³¹ Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin, op. cit., p. 176, greatly emphasize the impact of organizational roles on decision-making.

³² The simulators have experimented with an “aspiring decision-maker” (Noel, op. cit., p. 43), but have not included that role in the basic structure of the simulation.

³³ E.g., Key, V. O. Jr., Public Opinion and American Democracy (New York, 1961), pp. 455–457Google Scholar.

³⁴ E.g., “realists” like Morgenthau, , Dilemmas, p. 333Google Scholar; and commentators like Lippmann, Walter, The Public Philosophy (New York, 1956), pp. 945–947Google Scholar, have maintained that foreign policy should be under the control of a relatively autonomous elite. Of course, this normative position does not imply the actual conditions. However, one could argue that the practice of states in the contemporary era is such that questions of “national interest” are often beyond partisan politics.

³⁵ For the importance of history in the realist tradition see Thompson, Kenneth W., Political Realism and the Crisis of World Politics (Princeton, 1960), pp. 58–60, 6–10CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³⁶ E.g., in a simulation observed by the author in November, 1964, at Northwestern University, a state (Eastern European) which started out firmly in what would be analogous to the Soviet bloc suddenly switched to the analogue of the American bloc because in the context of the simulation it was more profitable, especially in terms of satisfying the Validators. The reaction of vested interest and habitual thinking which would hinder such a move in the referent world did not seem to be operating in the simulate world.

³⁷ Sprout, Harold and Sprout, Margaret, Foundations of International Politics (New York; 1963), pp. 287–291, 303–315Google Scholar; Boulding, Kenneth E., “National Images and International Systems,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 3: 120–151CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³⁸ The absence of conditions for a subversive or civil war situation in the simulation is in part a technical difficulty although this difficulty could be partially transcended through the use of a new unit of military capability.

³⁹ The following have emphasized the importance of this type of warfare: Strausz-Hupé, Robertet al., Protracted Conflict (New York, 1963), p. 42Google Scholar; Kissinger, Henry A., Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (Garden City, 1958), p. 43Google Scholar; Kennedy, John F., “Nature of Conflict,” in To Turn the Tide, Edited by Gardner, John W. (New York, 1962), p. 68Google Scholar; and Taylor, Maxwell D., The Uncertain Trumpet (New York, 1960), pp. 130–180Google Scholar.

⁴⁰ E.g., Kahn, Herman, Thinking About the Unthinkable (New York, 1962), pp. 41–84Google Scholar.

⁴¹ E.g., Morgenthau, , Politics Among Nations, p. 376Google Scholar; Singer, J. David, Deterrence, Arms Control, and Disarmament Columbus, Ohio, 1962), pp. 31–38Google Scholar; and Sprout and Sprout, op. cit., pp. 51–68.

⁴² For an explanation of terminology see Kahn, op. cit., p. 63.

⁴³ Osgood, op. cit., pp. 234–284; Kissinger, , Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York, 1957), pp. 114–145Google Scholar; Acheson, Dean, Power and Diplomacy (Cambridge, Mass., 1958), pp. 46–56CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Aron, Raymond, On War (Garden City, 1959)Google Scholar.

⁴⁴ Halperin, Morton H., Limited War in the Nuclear Age (New York, 1963), p. 4Google Scholar.

⁴⁵ Schelling, Thomas C., The Strategy of Conflic (New York, 1963), pp. 53–80Google Scholar.

⁴⁶ Secretary McNamara has argued that the communist actions in South Vietnam represent a “test and a challenge of will and purpose” to the United States: New York Times, February 8, 1965. For a similar position see Rostow, W. W., View from the Seventh Floor (New York, 1964), p. 43Google Scholar.

⁴⁷ For a discussion of the way in which the calculation of VSns affects national security and international stability see infra, p. 574.

⁴⁸ From observation of the simulation and examination of related materials, the author feels that a great deal of action and strategy is focused on the question of membership in blocs—so much so that it cannot be explained merely in terms of keeping Validators satisfied.

⁴⁹ Observation of the simulation as well as examination of the simulation newspaper reveals that the threat of getting aid from the other bloc is present.

⁵⁰ E.g., Morgenthau, Hans, “Four Paradoxes of Nuclear Strategy,” this Review, 58 (1964), pp. 23–35Google Scholar; Steel, Ronald, The End of Alliance (New York, 1964), p. 34Google Scholar. Those who make the “trip-wire” rationale of NATO, which is not a criticism but a defense, still imply that the alliance is not primarily valuable as a means of adding to American military strength. For an example of the latter rationale see Snyder, Glen H., “Deterrence by Denial and Punishment,” in Bobrow, Davis B. (ed.), Components of Defense Policy (Chicago, 1965), pp. 213–216Google Scholar.

⁵¹ See Liska, George, Nations in Alliance (Baltimore, 1962), pp. 117–141Google Scholar, for a discussion of the elements of political control as a complement to the military value of alliances; Herz, John H., International Politics in the Atomic Age (New York, 1962), pp. 134–143, 174–176Google Scholar and Kissinger, Henry A., The Troubled Partnership (New York, 1965), p. 228–234Google Scholar.

⁵² Snyder, op. cit., p. 215; Liska, op. cit., p. 30; Herz, op. cit., p. 119; Osgood, Robert F., “NATO: The Entangling Alliance,” in Stoessinger, John G. and Westin, Alan F. (eds.), Power and Order (New York, 1964), pp. 66–102Google Scholar, and Kissinger, , The Troubled Partnership, p. 11Google Scholar.

⁵³ E.g., Nitze, Paul, “Coalition Policy and the Concept of World Order,” in Wolfers, Arnold (ed.), Alliance Policy in the Cold War (Baltimore, 1959), pp. 15–30Google Scholar; Fulbright, J. W., Old Myths and New Realities (New York, 1964), pp. 79–108Google Scholar; and Strausz-Hupé, Robert, Kinter, William R. and Possony, Stefan T., A Forward Strategy for America (New York, 1961), p. 42Google Scholar.

⁵⁴ A full discussion of the role of the simulation's international organization appears infra, p. 576.

⁵⁵ Cf. Morgenthau, , Dilemmas, p. 274Google Scholar, who considers diplomacy a technique of “accommodating conflicting interests.” While the concept of interest is often used by Morgenthau and other realists to mean “power interests,” they sometimes allow the term to stand for a large variety of interests not directly related to power politics. See also Thompson, op. cit., p. 42.

⁵⁶ This has already been pointed out in the discussion of the role of Validator values in the national decision-making process. See supra, p. 563.

⁵⁷ Ikle, Fred Charles, How Nations Negotiate (New York, 1964), p. 122Google Scholar; Cohen, op. cit., pp. 6, 28; Schelling, op. cit., pp. 29–30; and SirNicolson, Harold, Diplomacy (New York, 1964), pp. 41–54Google Scholar.

⁵⁸ I am not maintaining that there are no specific issues in the simulation but that the degree of specificity may not be great enough to provide a context for the international bargaining process.

⁵⁹ See Schelling, op. cit., pp. 22–34; and Ikle, op. cit. pp. 7–22, 59–75, 26–42.

⁶⁰ The operational code of the simulation newspaper is to publish releases by the national Decision-makers if they are newsworthy. Although the exact criteria of newsworthiness have not been explicitly stated, it is assumed that the Editor relies on his sense of relevance. Information on this subject was provided in a memorandum written by II. Roger Majak.

⁶¹ E.g., compare the essays in Whitton, John B. (ed.), Propaganda and the Cold War (Washington, 1963)Google Scholar. While some of the writers (Whitton and Murray Dyer) emphasize the importance of propaganda as a tool of American foreign policy, others like George Allan and, to a lesser degree, Allan Dulles are more skeptical.

⁶² E.g., Sprout, Harold and Sprout, Margaret, Foundations of International Politics (New York, 1963), pp. 145, 151Google Scholar; Haas and Whiting, op. cit., p. 200; Morgenthau, op. cit., p. 338; Strausz-Hupé, Kintner and Possony, op. cit., pp. 253–285; and Jordan, Alexander T., “Political Communication: The Third Dimension of Strategy,” Orbis (Fall, 1964), 670–685Google Scholar.

⁶³ E.g., see Hilsman, Roger, “Intelligence and Policy-Making in Foreign Affairs,” in Rosenau, James N. (ed.), International Politics and Foreign Policy (New York, 1961), pp. 209–220Google Scholar.

⁶⁴ Modelski, George, A Theory of Foreign Policy (New York, 1962), p. 15Google Scholar; and Dulles, Allen, The Craft of Intelligence (New York, 1963), pp. 237–255Google Scholar, where he argues that free societies are at a distinct disadvantage in protecting themselves from intelligence research.

⁶⁵ Triska, Jan F. and Finley, David D., “Soviet-American Relations—A Multiple Symmetry Model,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 9 (1965), 37–54CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁶⁶ Each state is given a generation rate for converting BC's into FC's and CS's as well as for regenerating BC's. Since the generation rates are varied for each state as well as each type of conversion, certain states have advantages in producing the various commodities. For a discussion of the operation of this factor see Guetzkow et. al., op. cit., p. 55.

⁶⁷ E.g., Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, Sprout and Sprout, op. cit., and Organski, A. F. K., World Politics (New York, 1960)Google Scholar found it unnecessary to treat the role of economic interdependence on the political behavior of states. Even an economically-oriented theorist like Organski treats economic interdependence only in terms of the social and economic functions of the United Nations (p. 394).

⁶⁸ E.g., Myrdal, Gunnar, Beyond the Welfare State (New Haven, 1960), pp. 23–29Google Scholar.

⁶⁹ E.g., Claude, Inis Jr., Swords into Plowshare (New York, 1964), pp. 344–367Google Scholar; Goodspeed, Stephan S., The Nature and Function of International Organization (New York, 1959), p. 505–506Google Scholar; and Haas, Ernst B., Beyond the Nation-State (Stanford, 1964), pp. 459–497Google Scholar.

⁷⁰ E.g., Organski, op. cit., p. 394; and Levi, Werner, Fundamentals of World Organization (Minneapolis, 1950), p. 89–149Google Scholar.

⁷¹ I am not asserting that no work has been done on the technical question of the importance of international trade to the economies of states but that few theorists concerned with international politics have examined the question of whether or not the decision-makers of nations have an image of international economic interdependence which affects the type of political decisions they make. The discussions that have come closest to this issue (but do not directly confront it) are those dealing with the effect of economic sanctions on political behavior: e.g., Taubenfeld, Rita Falk and Taubenfeld, Howard J., “The ‘Economic Weapon’: The League and the United Nations,” in Proceedings of the American Society of International Law (Washington, 1964), pp. 183–205Google Scholar.

⁷² Organski, op. cit., p. 154–155. Also see Morgenthau, Hans J., “Preface to a Political Theory of Foreign Aid,” in Goldwin, Robert A. (ed.), Why Foreign Aid? (Chicago, 1963), pp. 70–90Google Scholar.

⁷³ There are a number of different writers who hold this position with different slants to their rationalizations. However, they all dwell on the long-run pay-off. Cf. Milikan, Max F. and Rostow, W. W., A Proposal: Key to An Effective Foreign Policy (New York, 1957), p. 10Google Scholar; Liska, George, The New Statecraft: Foreign Aid and American Foreign Policy (Chicago, 1960), pp. 221–229Google Scholar; Strausz-Hupé, Kintner and Possony, op. cit., pp. 187–199; and Jackson, Barbara Ward, “Foreign Aid: Strategy or Stopgap?” Foreign Affairs, 41 (1962), 90–104CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁷⁴ E.g., Edward C. Banfield, “American Foreign Aid Doctrines,” in Goldwin, op. cit., pp. 10–32.

⁷⁵ It is useful to discuss the international system from the model of a domestic political system, especially if that model is highly generalized. For a helpful suggestion along this line see Alger, Chadwick F., “Comparison of International Politics,” this Review, 57 (1963), 406–420Google Scholar, where he suggests that the Coleman-Almond model of developing nations might be applied to the analysis of the international system; and Talcott Parsons, “Order and Community in the International System,” in Rosenau, op. cit., pp. 120–130. Also see Kelsen, Hans, Principles of International Law (New York, 1952), pp. 13–18Google Scholar, for a discussion of international law in this framework.

⁷⁶ E.g., Morgenthau, , Politics Among Nations, pp. 110–166Google Scholar; Strausz-Hupé and Possony, op. cit., pp. 40–146; Sprout and Sprout, op. cit., pp. 136–139, 181–191; Organski, op. cit., pp. 112–147; Russett, Bruce M., Trends in World Politics (New York, 1965), p. 2Google Scholar; and Wright, op. cit., pp. 139–145; Lerche, Charles O. Jr., and Said, Addul A., Concepts of International Politics (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1963), pp. 64–68Google Scholar; and Carleton, William G., The Revolution in American Foreign Policy (New York, 1963), p. 12Google Scholar.

⁷⁷ Although there are abstract definitions of the concept of power such as Morgenthau's statement that power is “A psychological relation between those who exercise it and those over whom it is exercised,” (Politics Among Nations, p. 29), and there are sophisticated discussions on how to measure power (Russett, op. cit., pp. 2–6, and Jones, Stephen B., “The Power Inventory and National Strategy,” World Politics, 4 (1954), 421–452)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, there have been no adequate theoretical schemes to relate criteria or elements of power to the ability to achieve objectives or to exercise political control. The simulation structure does not provide the scheme, either. However, it leaves the relationship of criteria or elements of power and the operational significance of power open so that the patterns of action which eventually emerge may provide the theoretical groundwork for the more rigorous development of the concept.

⁷⁸ The general distinction between the great and small powers can be found in almost all of the international relations literature. However, the importance of government structure in patterning state behavior is a theoretical issue on which there is still controversy. There is the pure power theory (e.g., Organski, op. cit., p. 300–305), which states that the distribution of power is the prime determinant of state behavior and the more ideologically-oriented writings of Strausz-Hupé, Kintner and Possony, op. cit., pp. 27–44. The practice of newspapers and political leaders to divide the world between “Communist” and “Free” is also based on the assumption that ideology and government structure are a source of differentiating state types.

⁷⁹ Organski, op. cit., pp. 326–337. Organski's terms “satisfied” and “dissatisfied” correspond very closely to the traditional ideas of revisionist and status quo. E.g., Carr, E. H., The Twenty Years Crisis (London, 1954), pp. 103–105Google Scholar. Singer, J. David, “The Political Science of Human Conflict,” in McNeil, Elton B. (ed.), The Nature of Human Conflict B. (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1965), pp. 142–144Google Scholar. There have been some attempts in certain of the simulation runs to place certain personality types into specific roles. In this way, the simulators have tried to have greater control over the types of actors which indicated an attempt to develop a more specific set of categories for types of states. Also, see Driver, op. cit., pp. 24–44.

⁸⁰ Many of the initial simulations were set up in a bi-polar structure. This includes the simulation used for the Brody study on the proliferation of nuclear weapons (Brody, op. cit.). However, the more recent simulations have employed the three-bloc system.

⁸¹ Rosecrance, Richard N., Action and Reaction in World Politics (Boston, 1963), pp. 210–211Google Scholar and Kaplan, op. cit., pp. 36–43.

⁸² For discussion of the calculations of VSns see Guetzkow et al., op. cit., pp. 126–127. The ratio effect between the two major blocs applies only for the calculation of VSns for the two mass blocs. The VSns of the neutral states is calculated on the basis of the ratio between the state's strength and the strength of the other neutrals. The basic assumption, according to Terry Nardin, a collaborator in the Inter-Nation Simulation, is that perceived national security is a function of the nation's strength relative to the strength of nations in the same range of power.

⁸³ The question of the credibility of deterrence in the simulation is directly related to certain premises about the attitudes of the participants and the requirements for deterrence. Since there is no fear of devastation or death in the simulation, does the question of the credibility of threats arise? If so, does it structure the broad range of activities which shape the referent world?

⁸⁴ Strausz-Hupé and Possony, op. cit., p. 532; Carr, op. cit., p. 112; and Organski, op. cit., pp. 56–57.

⁸⁵ For a presentation of the policy-maker's conception of the generalized concept of security see Fulbright, op. cit., pp. 47–78. On the concept of security in American Foreign Policy see Crabb, Cecil V. Jr., American Foreign Policy in the Nuclear Age (New York, 1965), pp. 1–3Google Scholar. For a theoretical approach using the generalized concept of security see Haas and Whiting, op. cit., pp. 61–64.

⁸⁶ Carr, op. cit., p. 112; Herz, op. cit., pp. 231–243; see also Rapaport, Anatol, Strategy and Conscience (New York, 1964), pp. 105–109Google Scholar for a discussion of the implications of this type of attitude.

⁸⁷ Boulding, Kenneth E., Conflict and Defense (New York, 1962), pp. 34–35Google Scholar; Rappoport, Anatol, Fights, Games and Debates (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1960), pp. 31–46Google Scholar.

⁸⁸ Wolfers, Arnold, Discord and Collaboration (Baltimore, 1962), p. 218Google Scholar.

⁸⁹ For a discussion of the role of credibility and deterrence see infra, p. 575. Also, for a research experiment dealing with problems of stability and nuclear weapons using simulation see Brody, op. cit.

⁹⁰ The writers who see the bi-polar structure contributing to international instability can be divided into two groups: (1) those who think that the bi-polar structure itself cannot last and (2) those who feel that even if it does last, it is inherently unstable. The former group includes Morgenthau, , Politics Among Nations, pp. 360–361Google Scholar; Wolfers, op. cit., p. 127; and Rosecrance, op. cit. pp. 212–215. The latter includes Kaplan, , “Bi-Polarity in a Revolutional World,” in Kaplan, Morton (ed.)., The Revolution in World Politics (New York, 1962), pp. 262–266Google Scholar; Deutsch, Karl W. and Singer, J. David, “Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability,” World Politics, 16 (1964), 390–407CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Wright, op. cit., p. 143; Herz, op. cit, pp. 109–166. Generally, the position that a United Europe or a strong neutral bloc will contribute to international stability is advocated by persons speaking as a political representative of a nation following a policy based on their force idea (France, India, UAR, etc.). For a group of writings by these figures, see Clemens, Walter C. Jr., (ed.), World Perspectives on International Politics (Boston, 1965), pp. 178–200 and 238–250Google Scholar. For an examination of the various effects of the non-Western areas on international stability see the essays in Martin, Laurence W. (ed.), Neutralism and Non-Alignment (New York, 1962)Google Scholar; and Burton, J. W., International Relations: A General Theory (Cambridge, Eng., 1965)Google Scholar. For a discussion of the role of Europe as a third force see Liska, George, Europe Ascendent: The International Politics of Unification (Baltimore, 1964), pp. 106–107 and 150–162Google Scholar.

⁹¹ In a private letter to the author dated June 25, 1965.

⁹² Parsons, Talcott, “Polarization of the World and the International Order,” in Wright, Quincy, Evan, William M. and Deutsch, Morton (eds.), Preventing World War III (New York, 1962), pp. 310–332Google Scholar.

⁹³ Clemens, op. cit., pp. 13–20. Also see Waltz, Kenneth N., “The Stability of a Bi-Polar World,” Daedalus (Summer, 1964), 881–910Google Scholar.

⁹⁴ Schelling, op. cit., p. 89; Rapoport, op. cit., pp. 75, 110–124; and Kaplan, , System and Process in International Relations, pp. 181–187Google Scholar.

⁹⁵ Halperin, op. cit., pp. 1–30; Ole R. Holsti, Richard A. Brody and Robert C. North, “The Management of International Crisis: Affection and Action in American-Soviet Relations, October 1962,” in Studies in International Conflict and Integration (Stanford, mimeo.).

⁹⁶ E.g., Fulbright, op. cit., pp. 55, 61; and President Kennedy's “American University Speech,” June, 1964.

⁹⁷ For a discussion of this conception of international law see Coplin, William D., “International Law and Assumptions of the International System,” World Politics, 17 (1965), 615–35CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁹⁸ Most of those writers on international politics who de-emphasize the role of international law in politics are “realists.” Usually reacting from what they term “legalism” in American foreign policy, the realists maintain that “rigid legal norms” could never enable the United States to achieve its objectives. For a discussion of this point see Thompson, op. cit., pp. 60–61; Kennan, George F., American Diplomacy 1900–1950 (Chicago, 1951), p. 95Google Scholar; and Morgenthau, , Politics Among Nations, p. 275Google Scholar (in spite of the fact that he cautions against too much skepticism toward international law).

⁹⁹ Writers on international law who have most closely approached this position are De Visscher, Charles, Theory and Reality in Public International Law (Princeton, 1957), pp. 71–95Google Scholar; and Niemeyer, Gerhart, Law Without Force (Princeton, 1941), pp. 134–207Google Scholar.

¹⁰⁰ E.g., Richard A. Falk, “World Law and Human Conflict,” in McNeil, op. cit., pp. 227–248; Barkun, Michael, “Conflict Resolution Through Implicit Mediation,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 8 (1964), 121–31CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Fischer, Roger, “Fractionating Conflict,” in Fischer, Roger (ed.), International Conflict and Behavioral Science, (New York, 1964), pp. 91–110Google Scholar.

¹⁰¹ The lack of specifity was discussed supra, p. 569. For a treatment of the aspect of international law mentioned above see William D. Coplin, The Functions of International Law (In press).102

¹⁰² Morgenthau, , Politics Among Nations, p. 480Google Scholar; Goodspeed, op. cit., p. 605; and Levi, op. cit., pp. 3–44.

¹⁰³ Kelsen, Hans, The Law of the United Nations (New York, 1950)Google Scholar; Claude, op. cit., p. 23; and Goodspeed, op. cit., pp. 10–13.

¹⁰⁴ Chadwick F. Alger, “Decision-Making Theory and Human Conflict,” in McNeil, op. cit., pp. 250–271 and Bloomfield, Lincoln P., The United Nations and U. S. Foreign Policy (Boston, 1960), p. 120Google Scholar.

¹⁰⁵ Stoessinger, John G., The Might of Nations (New York, 1965)Google Scholar; Bloomfield, op. cit., pp. 56–63; and Claude, op. cit., pp. 285–302.

¹⁰⁶ For a treatment of the United Nations as an arena for great power competition see Bloomfield, op. cit., pp. 105–134 and Amitai Etzioni, “International Prestige and Peaceful Competition,” in Wright, Evan and Deutsch, op. cit., pp. 226–246.

¹⁰⁷ For a discussion of the socialization function of the United Nations see Alger, Chadwick F., “United Nations Participation as a Learning Experience,” The Public Opinion Quarterly, 27 (1963), 411–426CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Alger also has worked on the Inter-Nation Simulation at Northwestern University. See also the suggestion of Quincy Wright, op. cit., p. 211.

¹⁰⁸ For this reason, the Inter-Nation Simulation and man-computer simulations in general may be considered way-stations on the path to all-computer simulations. The latter development depends on the evolution of computer techniques in simulating the various aspects of human behavior (cognitive, affective, etc.). If this argument be accepted, the role of man-computer simulations of international relations like the Inter-Nation Simulation can be viewed as contributing to the development of the all-computer international relations simulation by aiding in the creation of explicit variables and hypotheses.