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International Institutions and Issue Linkage: Building Support for Agricultural Trade Liberalization



This article explains how the institutional context of international negotiations influences their outcomes. I argue that issue linkage counteracts domestic obstacles to liberalization by broadening the negotiation stakes. Institutions bolster the credibility of the linkage to make it more effective. I test the argument in the agricultural sector, which has been among the most difficult sectors for governments to liberalize. Statistical analysis of U.S. negotiations with Japan and the EU from 1970 to 1999 indicates that an institutionalized linkage between agricultural and industrial issues encourages agricultural liberalization in both Japan and Europe. Through case studies of key negotiations, I first examine why countries choose to link issues, then show how the linkage changes interest group mobilization and shifts the policy process to promote liberalization.


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Assistant professor of Politics and International Affairs, Princeton University. Address: Bendheim Hall, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544 (


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International Institutions and Issue Linkage: Building Support for Agricultural Trade Liberalization



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