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On Dimensionalizing Roll Call Votes in the U.S. Congress

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

Keith T. Poole ,
Howard Rosenthal  and
Kenneth Koford
Keith T. Poole
Affiliation:
Carnegie Mellon University
Howard Rosenthal
Affiliation:
Carnegie Mellon University
Kenneth Koford
Affiliation:
University of Delaware
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Abstract

Two related issues have developed in the scale analysis of voting in the U. S. Congress. One is methodological; it concerns the appropriate dimensionalizing model. The other is more substantive, entailing interpretation of the extent to which voting dimensions carry an ideological component. Kenneth Koford contributed to consideration of these issues in his research note, “Dimensions in Congressional Voting,” in the September 1989 issue of this Review. In this controversy, his claims are challenged vigorously by Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal. In turn, Koford defends his argument that “much roll call voting in Congress does not fit a single dimension.”

Type
Controversies
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 85 , Issue 3 , September 1991 , pp. 955 - 976
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1991

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