¹ Tōkyō, Maruzen, 1889. Prince Itō had been in charge of the small group which actually drafted the Meiji Constitution.

² I have given a detailed account of these developments in “The Constitution and Current Japanese Politics,” Far Eastern Survey, Vol. 25, pp. 49–58 (April 1956)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³ In fact, the Socialists and their allies gained a sufficient number of seats in the Upper House election of July 8, 1956 to prevent the passage of any bill of constitutional revision for at least the next three years.

⁴ See, for example, Gayn, Mark, Japan Diary (New York, 1948)Google Scholar; SCAP, Government Section, Political Reorientation of Japan (Washington, 1950), 2 vols.Google Scholar; McNelly, Theodore H., Domestic and International Influences on Constitutional Revision in Japan, 1945–1946 (Unpublished doctoral dissertation at Columbia University, 1952)Google Scholar; U. S. Department of State, The Far Eastern Commission (Department of State Publication 5138; Washington, 1953)Google Scholar; Wildes, Harry Emerson, Typhoon in Tokyo (New York, 1954)Google Scholar; Quigley, Harold S. and Turner, John E., The New Japan, Government and Politics (Minneapolis, 1956)Google Scholar; and a work by the former chief of the Government Section, Whitney, Courtney, MacArthur His Rendezvous with History (New York, 1956)Google Scholar. The Royal Institute of International Affairs has published a recent and authoritative contribution to this list by Borton, Hugh in Jones, F. C., Borton, Hugh and Pearn, B. R., The Far East, 1942–1946 (London and New York 1955)Google Scholar.

⁵ See Political Reorientation, Vol. 2, pp. 413–15Google Scholar; and Jones, Borton and Pearn, op. cit., pp. 506–07, for the texts of these official exchanges.

⁶ Italics added.

⁷ Political Reorientation, Vol. 2, pp. 622–23Google Scholar.

⁸ Ibid., Vol. 2, p. 423. Italics added.

⁹ Ibid., Vol. 1, p. 90.

¹⁰ Ibid., Vol. 1, p. 91.

¹¹ See Tatsuo, Satō, “Nihonkoku Kempō Seiritsushi,” Jurisuto, No. 81 (May 1, 1955), p. 6 Google Scholar; McNelly, op. cit., p. 48; and Jones, Borton and Pearn, op. cit., pp. 327–28. An allegedly accurate version of Konoe's suggestions appears in the Mainichi Shimbun for December 21, 1945.

¹² The English texts of both of these are given in Political Reorientation, Vol. 2, pp. 617–21Google Scholar, together with the text of an unofficial but more complete draft which was “leaked to” and published by the Mainichi Shimbun on February 1, 1946 (pp. 611–16)Google Scholar. This last is generally regarded as accurate.

¹³ The following materials are particularly notable: 1) Toshiyoshi, Miyazawa and Isao, Satō, “MacArthur Kempō Sōan Kaisetsu [A Commentary on the MacArthur Draft Constitution],” Kokka Gakkai Zasshi, Vol. 68, Nos. 1 and 2 (Sept. 1954), pp. 1–6 and 1–37 Google Scholar. The authors, stimulated by the earlier publication of an incomplete and somewhat garbled text by Dr. Watanabe Tetsuzō, here publish for the first time the official text of the original draft constitution prepared by SCAP and handed to the Japanese representatives on February 13, 1946. Both the original English version and the official Japanese translation are given. 2) Tatsuo, Satō, “Nihonkoku Kempō Seiritsushi [History of the Formulation of the Japanese Constitution]” Jurisuto, Nos. 81 (May 1, 1955)Google Scholar +. Nineteen sizeable instalments of this marathon article had appeared in the columns of Jurisuto between May 1, 1955 and February 1, 1956, the last issue available to the writer. More are yet to come. The author was Chief of the First Section of the Cabinet Bureau of Legislation in early 1946, and, after February 26, served as Minister Matsumoto's chief assistant in drafting and revising the several Japanese versions of the constitution produced by the Government. He also conducted much of the vital liaison with SCAP on this matter. His opportunities for first-hand observation and for obtaining reliable information about the constitution were practically unparalleled. In general his story is carefully presented, consistent with what facts have been established, straightforward and plausible. 3) Tatsuo, Satō, “Nihonkoku Kempō Tanjōki [A Record of the Birth of the Japanese Constitution],” Toki no Hōrei, Nos. 169 (May 3, 1944)Google Scholar +. This series, by the same author, had gone through fifteen installments, with more to come, by October 13, 1955, the last issue available to the writer. It is a less technical and more popularized version of essentially the same materials.

¹⁴ Political Reorientation, Vol. 1, p. 102 Google Scholar. For a more detailed account of this development, see below, pp. 992 ff.

¹⁵ The text of these three points is given in Political Reorientation, Vol. 1, p. 102 Google Scholar. See also Jones, Borton and Pearn, op. cit., p. 330.

¹⁶ U. S. Department of State, The Far Eastern Commission (Far Eastern Series 60; Washington, 1953), p. 44 Google Scholar. The Far Eastern Advisory Commission was the inter-Allied agency initially charged with making recommendations on the implementation of the Japanese surrender terms.

¹⁷ See Theodore H. McNelly, cited above, note 4, p. 43. Dr. McNelly claims that certain individuals in the Political Adviser's Office were working closely with the Konoe group on constitutional revision, and that this angered General MacArthur and induced him to order the Political Adviser's Office to cease its operations in this connection, thus leaving the field to the Government Section. See also Jones, Borton and Pearn, op. cit., p. 328.

¹⁸ Far Eastern Commission, Secretary-General, Activities of the Far Eastern Commission, February 26, 1946–July 10, 1947 (Washington, 1947), pp. 37–38. Italics addedGoogle Scholar.

¹⁹ See U. S. Department of State, The Far Eastern Commission, op. cit., pp. 43–65; and Jones, Borton and Pearn, op. cit., p. 351.

²⁰ See, for example, the Washington Post for September 20 and 23, 1945, or the New York Times for December 31, 1945 and January 1 and 2, 1946.

²¹ The writer is indebted to Professor Borton for information on this score.

²² The Department of State has made available to the writer at least a sizeable portion of the text of those sections of SWNCC-228 entitled “Conclusions,” “Facts Bearing on the Problem” and “Discussion.” There are additional sections, but these have not been available for examination. With the exception of a brief and partial summary of the conclusions in the State Department report, The Far Eastern Commission, op. cit., p. 45, this would seem to be the first time that this information has been released.

²³ These points are summarized in Section 7 of the “Discussion” part of SWNCC-228 in the following language: “To have lasting value and hence to be most effective, the constitutional and administrative reforms necessary to correct the defects in Japan's governmental system should be initiated and carried into effect by the Japanese Government out of a desire to eliminate elements of the national structure which have brought Japan to its present pass and to comply with the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration. Failing such spontaneous action by the Japanese, the Supreme Commander should indicate the reforms which this Government considers necessary before it can consider a ‘peacefully inclined and responsible government’ to have been established in Japan, a condition of the Occupation forces' withdrawal. Only as a last resort should a formal instruction be issued to the Japanese Government specifying in detail the reforms to be effected.”

²⁴ The complete text of this interesting memorandum is given in Political Reorientation, Vol. 2, pp. 622–23Google Scholar. It is not known whether this advice was initiated by General Whitney or previously solicited by SCAP.

²⁵ The words of the memorandum were: “It is my opinion that the word ‘order’ in the charter of the Allied Council is used in the sense of compulsion and would not embrace a mere approval by you of constitutional reform measures submitted to you by the Japanese Government, although your action in approving the same would be subject to review by the FEC under the general review authority of its charter.” Op. cit., p. 623.

²⁶ Major General Courtney Whitney, MacArthur, His Rendezvous with History (New York, 1956), p. 247. Italics addedGoogle Scholar.

²⁷ See Political Reorientation, vol. 1, p. 102 Google Scholar.

²⁸ One account claims that General Whitney began his statement with the words: “Ladies and gentlemen, this is an historic occasion. I now proclaim you a constitutional assembly.” See Gayn, Mark, Japan Diary (New York, 1948), p. 126 Google Scholar; or Wildes, H. E., Typhoon in Tokyo (New York, 1954), p. 44 Google Scholar.

²⁹ Political Reorientation, Vol. 1, pp. 102–05Google Scholar; see also McNelly, op. cit., pp. 155–68; Gayn, op. cit., pp. 126–29; Wildes, op. cit., pp. 41–46; and Whitney, op. cit., pp. 246–62.

³⁰ Wildes, op. cit., p. 44.

³¹ Political Reorientation, Vol. 1, p. 105 Google Scholar.

³² McNelly, op. cit., p. 161; Wildes, op. cit., p. 44; and Whitney, op. cit., p. 250.

³³ Political Reorientation, Vol. 1, p. 105 Google Scholar. The change seems to have involved the deletion of a provision forbidding any amendment to the constitution “impairing or altering the provision of the bill of rights.” Ibid. p. 104.

³⁴ Satō Tatsuo, op. cit., note 11 above, Jurisuto, No. 82 (May 15, 1955), p. 13.

³⁵ The following account is based primarily on the detailed version given by Satō Tatsuo in the two series of articles cited in footnote 13, and on the Government Section's and General Whitney's own versions in their respective works already cited. Mr. Satō was not himself present at the meeting of February 13, but he claims to base his account of it on Minister Matsumoto's own written summary of what was said, on conversations with Matsumoto, and on the stenographic records of recent discussions of this meeting by other actual participants and a number of well-informed Japanese before the Liberal Party's Constitutional Investigation Committee. See Jurisuto, op. cit., No. 82, p. 12. See also Quigley and Turner, op. cit., pp. 118–20.

³⁶ Political Reorientation, Vol. 1, p. 105 Google Scholar.

³⁷ Whitney, op. cit., pp. 250–52.

³⁸ Satō, Jurisuto, No. 82, p. 13; Tokino Hōrei, No. 170, p. 15.

³⁹ Ibid. Italics added.

⁴⁰ General Whitney estimates the time as “about an hour.” Op. cit., p. 251.

⁴¹ Ibid.,

⁴² If such a statement was made, one cannot refrain from wondering by virtue of what authority or prescience General Whitney could thus commit the still nonexistent FEC to the approval of a document it had never seen.

⁴³ Mr. Satō is very specific about the wording of this alleged threat, even to the extent of supplying the English phrase “person of the Emperor” in its kana equivalent.

⁴⁴ Jurisuto, No. 82, p. 14.

⁴⁵ A Japanese text of the MacArthur Draft (in the Foreign Ministry's translation of the original English version) is given in Jurisuto, No. 82, pp. 14–18. English and Japanese versions are also available in T. Miyazawa and I. Satō, op. cit., note 13 above, pp. 1–37 of separately paged appendix.

⁴⁶ See p. 986, above.

⁴⁷ An English translation of this is available in Political Reorientation, Vol. 2, pp. 625–30Google Scholar. The original Japanese text is in Jurisuto, No. 83, (June 1, 1955) pp. 12–16.

⁴⁸ The Japanese representatives seem to have been quite willing to proceed at a more decorous pace, but Mr. Satō claims that they were informed about 6 P.M. on March 4 that General Whitney, with the imminence of the general election in mind, wanted immediate results and was prepared to wait till midnight for a firm draft, and, if this was not long enough, until 6 A.M. Under such pressure, the exhausted Japanese, abandoned after the first half-hour by their leader, Matsumoto—who claimed to be ill—had no choice but to continue through the night. After Matsumoto's early departure, the Japanese seem to have been represented principally, if not entirely, by Shirasu Jirō (confidential secretary to the Foreign Minister), Satō Tatsuo (of the Cabinet Bureau of Legislation), and Hasegawa Genkichi and Obata Kunryō (two officials from the Foreign Ministry). At least sixteen officers of the Government Section plus a number of Nisei translators and interpreters were arrayed against this small group. General Whitney appeared only after the work was completed late in the afternoon of March 5 and then only to express his great pleasure at the nature of the results—a sentiment which, as Satō wryly says, was hardly shared by the Japanese. Both he and General MacArthur, however, were in constant indirect communication with the negotiators. They received, and apparently approved of, each article as it emerged from the meeting at the Government Section, as did Minister Matsumoto also. General MacArthur had approved the entire draft by 5:30 P.M., March 5—about the same time as the Emperor did. See Whitney, op. cit., pp. 254–55.

⁴⁹ An English version of this draft is printed in Political Reorientation, Vol. 2, pp. 631–36Google Scholar. The Japanese text may be found in Jurisuto, No. 86 (July, 15 1955), pp. 52–56.

⁵⁰ Satō in Jurisuto, No. 88 (August 15, 1955), p. 34.

⁵¹ SCAP, Summation of Non-Military Activities, March 1946, p. 18 Google Scholar.

⁵² Political Reorientation, Vol. 2, p. 657 Google Scholar.

⁵³ Ibid., p. 660.

⁵⁴ See Jones, Borton and Pearn, op. cit., p. 341.

⁵⁵ See McNelly, op. cit., pp. 226–27.

⁵⁶ At SCAP's insistence, the April 17, 1946 and subsequent drafts of the new constitution were written in ordinary Japanese. This occurred after the general election of April 10, however.

⁵⁷ It was widely claimed in Washington, D. C. at this time that both the Department of State and the Far Eastern Commission strongly disapproved of this plan and were urging some more specific consultation of Japanese public opinion with respect to the constitution, perhaps in the form of a special constitutional assembly or referendum. See Jones, Borton and Pearn. op. cit., p. 342.

⁵⁸ The English text is printed in Political Reorientation, Vol. 2, pp. 637–42Google Scholar.

⁵⁹ The English text is available ibid., pp. 643–48. Technically this took the form of a bill of total amendment to the Meiji Constitution. To avoid charges of illegality or the occurrence of a constitutional interregnum, SCAP was most insistent that the procedure of amendment specified in Article 73 of the Meiji Constitution be literally followed. Whether in fact it was so followed rests primarily upon whether or not under the Meiji Constitution the Diet had the power to amend an Imperial project of constitutional amendment. Japanese legal authorities are in disagreement on this matter. For SCAP's views, see Dr. Oppler's memorandum to the Government Section, ibid., pp. 662–66.

⁶⁰ A list of these changes may be found in Satō Isao, Kempō Kaisei no Keika [The Development of Constitutional Revision], Tōkyō, Nippon Hyōronsha, 1947, pp. 349–57. See also McNelly, op. cit., pp. 332–39.

⁶¹ Political Reorientation, Vol. 1, p. 111 Google Scholar. What degree of positive influence or control was involved in this “checking” is hard to say. The Government Section does not seem to have been displeased with any of the results.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ See, for example, Toki no Hōrei, No. 178 (Aug. 3, 1955), p. 18, or Satō Isao, op. cit., p. 193.

⁶⁴ The text is in Activities of the Far Eastern Commission, February 26, 1946–July 10, 1947. Department of State Publication 2888 (Washington, 1947), pp. 65–66 Google Scholar.

⁶⁵ Ibid., pp. 65–68, and Political Reorientation Vol. 1, p. 111 Google Scholar and Vol. 2, pp. 661 and 667–68.

⁶⁶ See McNelly, op. cit., pp. 203–05.

⁶⁷ For a more detailed account of this, see the present writer's “The Constitution and Current Japanese Politics,” in the Far Eastern Survey, vol. 25, No. 4 (April 1956), pp. 49–58 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁶⁸ The Socialist Party has formally declared that it will not participate in the work of this Committee, despite the fact that its establishment was specifically authorized by the Diet in early 1956. The Japan Times, August 11, 1956.

⁶⁹ See, for example, Mainichi Shimbun for December 20, 1955, or the New York Times for March 20, 1956.