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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 September 2013
A significant result of the report “Toward A More Responsible Two-Party System” has been the marked growth of interest in the American party system. It is nevertheless true that our knowledge about the way in which party systems function is far from complete. An area promising fruitful research and presenting many hypotheses susceptible of systematic inquiry is that of the role of party organizations in the legislative process.
It is the purpose of this article to examine the legislative role of political parties in the Pennsylvania General Assembly; more precisely, to measure their influence in the formation of the state's public policies in one session of the legislature. The most recent completed session at the time of this study was that of 1951—the longest session in state history.
In order to evaluate the impact of party upon legislation, the concept of a “party vote” has been used. This is merely an operating definition by which to measure differences in party attitudes on questions subjected to roll-call votes on the floor. The assumption was made that the interests of the parties can be established best by analyzing the voting behavior of their membership. Questions to which partisan significance is attached will find the parties aligned against each other.
1 Committee on Political Parties of the American Political Science Association, “Toward A More Responsible Two-Party System,” this Review, Vol. 44 (Sept., 1950, Supp.)Google Scholar.
2 The Pennsylvania House of Representatives has 208 members; the Senate has 50. Republicans held large majorities in both houses in the 1951 session: 120 to 87 (one vacancy) in the House and 30 to 20 in the Senate.
3 For a study which considers this in the Illinois legislature, see Keefe, William J., “Party Government and Lawmaking in the Illinois General Assembly,” Northwestern University Law Review, Vol. 47, pp. 55–71 (March, 1952)Google Scholar. This article also examines the early study of this subject by Lowell, A. Lawrence, “The Influence of Party upon Legislation in England and America,” American Historical Association, Annual Report, 1901, Vol. I, pp. 321–543Google Scholar. Two other recent studies which examine party politics in Congress are Turner, Julius, Party and Constituency: Pressures on Congress (Baltimore, 1951)Google Scholar; and Key, V. O. Jr., Southern Politics in State and Nation (New York, 1949)Google Scholar.
4 The amount of party voting in the House, over that of the Senate, is not as great as it appears. Sixty of the 142 House party votes were on Democratic-sponsored resolutions to discharge committees from further consideration of bills. There was practically no debate on these and all were defeated in summary fashion by straight party votes.
5 A problem of classification resulted when party votes might reasonably be placed in more than one category. For example, House Democrats—in the minority—sponsored a large number of resolutions to discharge bills from committee. In debate they contended that the vote to be taken in each instance was actually a vote on the bill itself, for it was only through this parliamentary procedure that it could be brought to the floor. Conversely, Republicans maintained that the vote on a motion to discharge a committee had no relation to the substantive merit of the bill, but rather was a move to circumvent proper committee action. All of these discharge motions were defeated in straight party votes. The question involved in classifying the subject matter of these votes lay in whether to call them party votes on a matter relating to the legislative process—the position of the committee system—or to consider them in terms of the substantive provisions of the bills. The rule used here was to classify them as discharge motions if at a later date they were reported to the floor (indicating approval by Republican committee majorities), but if never reported, to classify them according to the bills' provisions. It need hardly be observed that in all but a few cases the bills were never reported.
6 One of the proposed amendments took away the right of the chairmen of standing committees to vote except in the case of a tie vote. Under existing rules, the Speaker appoints both a chairman and a vice-chairman for each standing committee. Both have the right to vote, and they are in addition to the regular number of committee members. (Hence the majority party membership is greater than the party ratio in the House as a whole.) Another amendment provided that the committee ratio would have to be the same as the ratio in the House. Still another proposed change would have provided that any two committee members could request a roll-call vote in the committee, and that the minutes showing the vote would be “made available for public examination.” To reduce the power of committee chairmen, an amendment provided that a majority of the members of a committee, two-thirds being present, could demand the immediate consideration of any bill or resolution which had been referred to the committee. Another proposed change advanced by the minority party provided that committee members could make public decisions taken in committee (although not what was said). The remaining important amendment would have reduced the number of votes required to discharge a committee from consideration of a bill from 105 to 85. (The Democratic membership was 87.)
7 These two both came on challenges by Senate Democrats to rulings from the chair. On a day late in the session when the Senate was working beyond midnight, Senate Democrats attempted to have a “committee of three” appointed for the purpose of calling Western Union to ascertain the correct time. The presiding officer ruled, and was sustained in a party vote, that the legislative day had not changed and that the Senate could therefore continue with that day's calendar. Democrats also appealed the right of the presiding officer to vote on the ruling which he had made. His right to vote was sustained in another party vote.
8 Pittsburgh Post Gazette, January 1. 1951.
9 Generally regarded as the strongest interest group in support of the income tax bill was the Pennsylvania State Education Society. According to the Democratic minority leader, Pennsylvania school teachers had been “deluded” by PSEA leadership into actively pressuring for it in the belief that a salary increase hinged on its passage.
10 An interesting insight into House-Senate relations dealing with the passage of the bill was that, following it, House Republicans moved to recommit the corporate net income tax bill to committee. In making this motion, the Republican majority leader noted that “Any program not including a broad base tax will of necessity involve more than an additional one per cent tax on corporate income.” Since Senate Republicans least wanted this, there would be some pressure for them to accept the income tax bill.
11 Most of the Democratic objection to the “package” centered on this bill. They contended that it was much more than a bill to accelerate collection, some of its provisions having the effect of greatly increasing corporation taxes. The Democratic minority leader held the view that it would bring in more revenue than the income tax bill. Generally, estimates were that it would bring in $61,000,000 in corporate net income taxes that would ordinarily be collected in the 1953 biennium. Actually the bill amounted to deferring resolution of the tax issue until the 1953 session. (In that session a sales tax was put through on party-line votes with 100 per cent of the Democrats in both houses opposing it.)
12 The Democratic amendments which lost were the following: one which restored the power of the Mayor to appoint the members of the Urban Redevelopment Authority and kept the membership at five; one which restored the existing system of appointing the members of the Housing Authority—two members being appointed by the Mayor, two by the City Controller (a Democrat), with the fifth member chosen by the other four; and one which vested the power of appointing Housing Authority members in the Mayor alone (a Republican at that time) and reduced the number of members from seven to five.
13 Constitutional amendments providing for this had been approved at the election.
14 Senate Democrats had earlier threatened to block all appropriation bills if the Republicans passed the bill as originally introduced. Appropriation bills require a two-thirds vote (34) of all members elected for passage in the Senate. Since there were only 30 Republicans, Democratic support was essential. This fact, incidentally, probably accounts for the scarcity of party votes on appropriation measures. Bipartisan support will nearly always be needed to pass an appropriation bill and it may be surmised that many bills lacking this simply do not come up for a vote.
15 A reading of the debate on the bill suggests that it would principally affect Scranton and its annexed 24th ward. The sponsor of the bill at no time advanced any reasons for its introduction. Speculation was that it was introduced at the request of former Democratic officeholders in the township who wanted to get back in power, or that the Republican party in Scranton wanted to see the township withdraw from the city since it had a preponderant Democratic registration. Altogether, there were three party votes on the bill in the Senate. It is interesting that the Governor vetoed it although its passage was due almost entirely to Republican votes in both houses.
16 Legislative Journal, June 25, 1951, p. 3465Google Scholar.
17 Representative of these bills are the following: bills to forbid employers from charging prospective employees fees for medical examinations, to amend the Labor Anti-Injunction Act, to require certain factories to employ a physician and a nurse, to eliminate the right of an employer to request an election, to prohibit discrimination in employment on account of age, to permit employees to leave work for a period up to two hours without loss of pay in order to vote, to prohibit the working of women for more than six consecutive days without at least one day of rest, and to provide that one member of the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission shall be a representative of organized labor.
18 The effect of the amendment was to place compensation on a day-base plan. More employees who work less than a full week would be eligible for benefits. The major Pennsylvania labor unions had endorsed the amendment.
19 It made any total disability or death which could be traced to silicosis compensible; prior to the amendment the disability or death had to be due solely to silicosis. A Republican opponent of the amendment contended that this would practically give health insurance to miners. Democrats pointed out that the courts had frequently not upheld claims for compensation because of the “solely” provision.
20 Some of the objectives of these bills may be noted: to increase benefits, to increase the periods in which claims may be made, to further define “unemployment,” to increase the compensation paid to illegally employed minors, and to change the law regarding allowance for dependents.
21 As stated before, 34 votes are needed in the Senate to pass appropriation bills and there were only 30 Republicans.
22 Among them were the following: a bill to increase the overtime pay of state employees; a resolution providing for the Joint State Government Commission to study the functioning of the administrative departments and make recommendations for reorganizing in order to achieve greater economies; a bill to create a new state agency, the Pennsylvania Consumer Commission; and bills to require that the Workmen's Compensation Board, the State Welfare Commission, and the State Board of Public Assistance each have a representative of organized labor. As in nearly all party votes, the Democrats lost on the resolutions.
23 The main effects of these amendments would have been to place public school teachers on the same basis as teachers in state-supported colleges and universities with respect to their meeting the bill's requirements, and to change the oath provision to the same as the one taken by the legislators. On final passage, majorities in both houses supported the bill: 97 per cent of the House Republicans and 79 per cent of the Democrats, 100 per cent of the Senate Republicans and 63 per cent of the Democrats.
24 The original Republican version provided for appointment of the Sheriff by the Board of Judges. The Common Pleas Judges later held a meeting and asked to be “taken out of politics.” The point is not made here that city-county consolidation would not be in the “public interest,” as opposed to the “party interest,” but that the original provisions of the consolidation plan, coming after the city election won by the Democrats, were at variance with the best interests of Philadelphia Democrats. This fact appears clearly in the Senate debate. Legislative Journal, December 13, 1951, p. 6202Google Scholar.
25 Undoubtedly the biggest party issue in the first part of the session concerned the Attorney General, who had first received his appointment under the previous Administration. Governor Fine contended that the Attorney General could serve without Senate confirmation until the end of the session. Party voting occurred when Senate Democrats blocked other appointments because they were not allowed to vote on confirmation of the Attorney General. Eventually the stalemate was resolved when he resigned. According to newspaper accounts, Democratic bitterness was traced to 1938 when the same individual, Attorney General under the Democratic Earle Administration, brought about a grand jury investigation of the Administration.
26 Of course, the public is affected too if on the outcome of these particular decisions rested better or worse, more responsible or less responsible state government; but to trace such effects to the proposed rules changes which were the subject of these party votes would be difficult indeed.
27 A partial explanation for this high degree of unanimity is the constitutional provision that no bill can become law or no resolution be adopted without a roll-call vote on final passage. Thus, the great number of bills of minor character (many of them amendatory) which are introduced and passed each session receive at least one floor roll-call vote even though no opposition to them has developed at any stage in the legislative process.
28 It is true, of course, that the role of party in the legislative process extends beyond that which can be shown by the analysis of membership voting behavior on the floor. Certain party operations do not readily lend themselves to statistical measurement; for example, the party contribution to organizing the legislature, formulating its rules of operation, providing its leadership, assuming responsibility for the conduct of government, and, in the case of the minority party, clarifying policy, suggesting alternatives, and providing a check on the party in power.
It should also be pointed out that voting which took place in the committees of the legislature is not considered in this study. Aside from the task which would be involved in recording and analyzing committee voting, it would be impossible anyway in Pennsylvania, since committee records are not open to public examination. In any event, there is reason to believe that there is no important difference in the amount of party voting which takes place in committee as compared to that on the floor. The chief power residing with the majority party in committee is to refuse to report bills and resolutions which it opposes. However, any bill that is of real importance to the minority party can be made the subject of a discharge motion and a roll-call vote will have to be taken on it on the floor, thus indicating the attitudes of the parties on the bill. The Democrats offered nu-merous discharge motions in the 1951 session. The point of this is that party attitudes which would go undetected because of committee secrecy are brought to light on the floor through attempts—nearly always unsuccessful—to force committees to report bills.
