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The Political Economy of the Tariff Cycle

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

James Cassing ,
Timothy J. McKeown  and
Jack Ochs
James Cassing
Affiliation:
University of Pittsburgh
Timothy J. McKeown
Affiliation:
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
Jack Ochs
Affiliation:
University of Pittsburgh
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Abstract

How can protectionism and “free” trade succeed one another? Our answer focuses on the changing balance of private actors' political demands. These actors acquire interests in tariff policies because their assets are spatially concentrated, and trade in these assets is subject to various limitations. Actors in regions experiencing no new investment in an established industry (“old” regions) have interests that sometimes differ from those in regions where there is new investment. We show that old regions have no reason to be involved in tariff politics at business cycle peaks; during troughs, whether a state becomes more or less protectionist depends, ceteris paribus, on the relative political strength of old import-competing and old exporting interests. If old import-competing industries outweigh the old exporters, then protection will tend to increase at the trough and decrease at the peak of a business cycle; the opposite result occurs when old exporters are more influential.

Type
Articles
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 80 , Issue 3 , September 1986 , pp. 843 - 862
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1986

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