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A Pragmatic Method for Evaluating Election Schemes through Simulation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

Robert F. Bordley*
Affiliation:
General Motors Research Labs

Abstract

This article combines ideas from ethics, social choice, and political theory to develop a simulation method for assessing the desirability of different voting schemes in different situations. I use the method to evaluate six well-known election systems. My results are intuitive. I find that approval voting seems to be a good voting scheme for mass elections.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1983

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