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Rationalism or Revelation?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 September 2013

Robert Grafstein  and
Darrell Dobbs
Robert Grafstein
Affiliation:
University of Georgia
Darrell Dobbs
Affiliation:
Marquette University
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Abstract

Are there appropriate limits to the application of rational choice in political decision making? Does rationalism in politics lead to absolutism? Is there a “pressing threat” to liberal democracy “posed by the irreverent conviction of the hegemony of reason”? In the June 1987 issue of this Review, Darrell Dobbs drew lesson from Homer's epic poem, the Odyssey, to argue the limits of rationalism in politics. In this Controversy, Robert Crafstein argues that Dobbs's case against rationalism is not proved. In turn, Dobbs holds to his construction of the relevance of Odysseus' nod to sacred values.

Type
Controversies
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 82 , Issue 2 , June 1988 , pp. 579 - 587
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1988

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