¹ Kingsley, J. Donald, Representative Bureaucracy (Yellow Springs, Ohio. The Antioch Press, 1944).Google Scholar

² E.g. Van Riper, Long and Warner (American), Kelsall and Bottomore (British). Their published research is referred to in detail in other footnotes that follow.

³ See Kingsley, op. cit., 282–283, for the social harmony argument; and the second half of the chapter “The New Aristocracy” for the working class representation argument.

⁴ Warner, et al., The American Federal Executive (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963), p.5.Google Scholar

⁵ For example, the Western critics would be interested in the proportionate representation of economic classes while an Indian politician would lay stress on representation by caste, region and language.

⁶ Concerning the two modes of reference, see Parsons, Talcott, The Social System (London: Tavistock, 1952), 63–65.Google Scholar

⁷ For the gradual introduction of the middle class element in British administration, see Kingsley, op. cit., Chapter Seven. For Prussia, see Rosenberg, H., Bureaucracy, Autocracy and Aristocracy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958).Google Scholar

⁸ This paragraph is based upon Riper, Paul Van, History of the United Stales Civil Service (Evanston: Row, Peterson & Co., 1958), Chapter 3.Google Scholar

⁹ Such elementary rationality—i.e. taking into account specific ability for the duties of a specific post—is shown in traditional Australian public service definitions of fitness or efficiency in the respective State and Commonwealth Public Services Acts. But good sense has mitigated its literal application.

¹⁰ For the two famous speeches of Macaulay, see Speeches—Parliamentary and Miscellaneous by Rt. Hon. Thomas Babington Macaulay (London: Clarke Beeton & Co.), p. 183, Vol. I for the speech of 1863, pp. 267–273, Vol. II, for the speech of 1855.

¹¹ Re the efforts of kings to gain greater control of bureaucracies in bureaucratic empires, see Eisenstadt, S.N., The Political Systems of Bureaucratic Empires (The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), Chapter 10 particularly pp. 278–279.Google Scholar

¹² For an early advocacy of selection by performance, see Shamasastry, , Kautilya's Arthasastra, p. 13Google Scholar and chapter X for details of tests.

¹³ In this regard, aristocrats, imperialists and communists are all the same in trying to recruit members of a given class for key administrative positions on grounds of political reliability.

¹⁴ The argument becomes stronger, the greater the power of the civil service.

¹⁵ Kelsall, R. K., Higher Civil Servants in Britain (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1955), pp. 189–193.Google Scholar

¹⁶ Van Riper, op. cit., pp. 549–559.

¹⁷ Norton E. Long, ‘Bureaucracy and Constitutionalism,’ this Review, 46 (1952), 808–818.

¹⁸ For further details and references regarding the Indian arguments see Subramaniam, V., “Graduates in the Public Service—A Comparative Study of Attitudes,” Public Administration (London), 35, 377–378.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Long, op. cit.; see in particular the latter half of the article.

²⁰ Re the several differences in attitudes and customs of the middle and working classes, see Hodges, Harold M. Jr., Social Stratification: Class in America, (Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman, 1964)Google Scholar, the two chapters on Values and Behaviour, and the chapter on Social Class and Social Intimacy. Regarding lack of class sympathies among successful men from the lower classes, see Maurice Duverger, Political Parties, Chapter III, Section III, and Robinson, Kenneth, “Selection and the Social Background of the Administrative Class,” Public Administration (London), 35, 388.Google Scholar All this evidence is impressionistic and Hodges produces no evidence about deviants to rebut this impression.

²¹ For a version of the hostage theory see Speeches and Writings of Mohammed Iqbal, Speech in the Punjab Legislative Council, July 19, 1927.

²² For hierarchy and the inhibition of free communication see Blau, and Scott, , Formal Organizations (San Francisco: Chandler, 1962), 121–124.Google Scholar

²³ For the original argument and detailed references, see Parker, R. S. and Subramaniam, V., “Public and Private Administration,” (section II) International Review of Administrative Sciences, Brussels, Vol. XXX, No. 4.Google Scholar

²⁴ I am processing material for a book entitled Social Composition of Public Bureaucries to be published M/S Longman Green in a series under the general editorship of J. W. Grove. The present paper is a preview of the general argument of the book.

²⁵ Please see Table 1 for details. The sources for the figures for different countries are as follows:

For Denmark, —Stjernquist, Henry, “Centraladministrationens Embedsmaend 1848–1946”, Centraladminisirationen 1848–1948, Ministerialforeningen, Copenhagen, 1948.Google Scholar

For Turkey—Dodd, C. H., “The Social and Educational Background of Turkish Officials.” Middle Eastern Studies, London, Vol. I, p. 271.Google Scholar

For U.S.A.—Warner et al, op. cit., p. 321.

For Great Britain—R. K. Kelsall, op. cit., pp. 150–51.

For France—Bottomore, T. B., “Le Mobilité Sociale dans la Haute Administration Française,” Cahiers Internationaux Sociologie, Vol. XII, Sommaire, p. 169.Google Scholar

The Indian figures are based on my own research.

²⁶ Regarding the evolution of the Indian middle class, see Misra, B. B., The Indian Middle Classes (London: Oxford University Press, 1961).Google Scholar

²⁷ The table is based on my researches to be published by the Government of India. The table tallies with evidence available elsewhere about social mobility. The sons of the lower middle class and working class make easy entry into the less coveted and lower services—as for example the Executive Class in U.K., but their sons find it easier to enter the more prestigious services. It seems to take two generations to bridge the distance between working class and the higher civil services.

²⁸ For summaries of I. Q. surveys, see N. Eysenck, Uses and Abuses of Psychology (Pelican); Vernon, P. E., Intelligence and Attainment Tests (University of London Press, 1960)Google Scholar; and Miner, John B., Intelligence in the United States (Springer, N. Y. 1957).Google Scholar It would appear from Miner, op. cit., pp. 78–84 and Carter, C. O., Human Heredity (Pelican), pp. 132–135Google Scholar, that I.Q. increases proportionately with social class, but this I.Q. is based somewhat heavily on verbal ability.

²⁹ The distribution of university education among the middle class and the working class and its bearing on civil service recruitment has been discussed by Kelsall, op. cit., Kingsley, op. cit., pp. 146–147 and Bottomore, op. cit. It seems that the opportunity for university education for the middle class boy was about 35 times that for the working class boy in Britain according to Kingsley and about three to four times in the U.S.A. according to Hodges, op. cit., pp. 260–261. In other Western countries the ratio might be in between the two, whereas in India, it may be well over 100.

³⁰ For some evidence of the competition-proneness of the middle class vis-á-vis the working class, see Hodges, op. cit., p. 265.

³¹ Hancock, W. K., Australia (1930 edn.), p. 142.Google Scholar

³² As against the enthusiasm of Norton E. Long, Van Riper has doubts about the expor-tability of representative bureaucracy and would anyway treat it as only one of several possible devices to ensure democratic administration: op. cit., p. 559.