¹ Darrouy, Luis Merino, Evolutión del Poder Ejecutivo en Chile (Santiago, Chile, 1949), p. 67Google Scholar. The period covered here is 1866–1924. The term “parliamentary,” as employed in Chile, has reference to the French-continental form of government, rather than the British.

² In a letter of February 22, 1950, to the writer, José Maza, a Senator and one of the principal framers of the constitution, reported as evidence of stagnation the fact that during the transition period just prior to the adoption of the 1925 constitution, it was necessary to pass numerous decree-laws in order to bring the statutes governing political, educational, administrative and other matters up to date.

³ The Chilean President, however, was assigned a six-year term without immediate reëligibility.

⁴ Arturo Alessandri Palma, main force behind the 1925 constitution and twice President of Chile, in an interview, December 13, 1949.

⁵ This article does not deal with the detailed history since 1925, but is concerned primarily with recent phases of the González Videla administration.

⁶ The “administrative” cabinets generally served for short periods as “caretaker” groups pending the formation of another “political” cabinet. The second administrative one, during part of February, 1950, was labeled by the delightfully irreverent humorists of Santiago as the “Coca Cola,” or the “pausa que refresca,” cabinet.

⁷ Interview with Alessandri, December 18, 1949. Other leaders, such as Dr. Eduardo Cruz Coke of the Conservative Social Christian party and Juvenal Hernández, Rector of the University of Chile and prominent presidential possibility for 1952, made the same observation to the writer. Others, especially labor leaders, believed that Latin American personalismo (whether in the executive mansion or in political groups) has gone far beyond gallicismo in this respect.

⁸ The starred parties have the largest delegations. The directional terms, of course, can give only a rough approximation of the parties' position and cannot precisely apply to all members of them. An anomaly in the Senate is the continued presence of two Communists whose 1945–1953 terms are being allowed to expire. (See subsequent analysis of the Communist party.)

⁹ A number of well-placed observers, some of them members of the prominent German colonies in the southern Chilean cities, told the writer in January, 1950, that Nazi tendencies had become dormant, not extinct.

¹⁰ In an interview with the writer, January, 1950. Nominally, Jaime Larraín, moderately wealthy and of aristocratic social standing, is the leader, but Ibáñez has a wider influence within and outside of the party.

¹¹ See below pp. 456–457, for a discussion of the role of Ibáñez in relation to the Communist party.

¹² Echaíz, René León, Evolución de los Partidos Políticos Chilenos (Santiago, Chile, 1939), pp. 33 ffGoogle Scholar.

¹³ This conclusion is based upon interviews which the writer held in January and February, 1950, with several leaders of the Falange, including Bernardo Leighton (several times a minister and assigned the education portfolio in February, 1950), Eduardo Frei (a distinguished young Senator) and Tomás Reyes (party president).

¹⁴ Eduardo Cruz Coke, a former presidential candidate (with evident, if undeclared, 1952 aspirations) and a prominent Senator, in an interview, February, 1950, made the comparison vis-à-vis the European Christian Socialist parties but did not concede any basic difference in outlook between his party and the Falange, adding that the Social Cristianos are merely more cautious. However, “anti-Cruz Cokistas” in that party are markedly more conservative than the physician.

¹⁵ See below, p. 459.

¹⁶ Juvenal Hernández (see note 7) is one of the leading exponents of this general view.

¹⁷ The Confederación de Trabajadores de Chile (CTCh), which represents a little over half of organized labor, is split into Communist and non-Communist wings. The former is somewhat stronger. The latter includes some Radicales and others, as well as socialists. Most labor leaders deplore the political orientation of the unions, which deëmphasizes their service function for the workers and provides a major obstacle to their attaining greater unity. The other unions are mainly small craft and individual industry groups.

¹⁸ Although the Socialists claim him as their primary precursor, the Communists have disowned him. Prior to his suicide in 1924 (attributed by some to disillusionment and cynicism following his return to Chile after a trip to Russia), his ideas, according to the Communists, had reached the point of a “democratic bourgeois” outlook; while Recabarren had done much for the labor movement, his modified thinking was “checking the revolutionary development of the proletariat.” Senator Elías Lafertte, prominent Communist and labor leader, in an interview, February, 1950.

¹⁹ The Trotskyites also had one Deputy and one Senator in 1932.

²⁰ Frei, Eduardo, Historia de los Partidos Políticos (Santiago, Chile, 1949), p. 232Google Scholar.

²¹ See Stevenson, John Reese, The Chilean Popular Front (Philadelphia, 1942)Google Scholar, for an excellent brief treatment of this period. The subject of Communism in Chile is dealt with rather intensively by Blasier, S. Cole, “Chile: A Communist Battleground,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 65, p. 353 (Sept., 1950)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²⁸ The writer discovered no documentary evidence of financial support for the party from Russia or international Communism, or of official connection. However, Communist speeches and literature contain frequent references to the official international “line,” whether relating to U. S. “imperialism,” Communist China, or other topics. The party's political organization and newspaper, El Siglo (prior to their abolition), were in a much easier financial position than those of other Leftist groups, a fact which could not be attributed to party dues. Chilean Communist leaders made a number of visits to the U.S.S.R. and Comintern agents came to Chile upon occasion before 1943.

²³ Leaders of the Conservador (Social Cristiano) party, the Falange and the two Socialist parties reported this goal to the writer in interviews in January and February, 1950.

²⁴ See following paragraphs for other aspec+s of this decision.

²⁵ Although disclaiming presidential ambitions for 1952, Ibáñez revealed interest in a possible “draft” in an interview with the writer in November, 1949. Galo González, the Communist party's secretary-general in hiding, when quizzed about Ibáñez, said that his party judges men by their present attitude, rather than by their past. The party values the expressions of Ibáñez in favor of “democracy,” but feels that certain “reactionary elements” in his entourage have prevented him from definitely joining the “democratic ranks.” Democracia, Santiago, May day edition of April 29, 1950.

²⁶ See note 17.

²⁷ The President has stressed the value of this policy in making it more difficult for the Communists to carry on their publications and other propaganda activity and in complicating their efforts to infiltrate and dominate work units in the coal mines and elsewhere (in an interview with the writer, May 25, 1950); and the frequent Communist protests against these “anti-democratic” restrictions attest to their nuisance value. However, even leaders of Rightist parties have conceded that Communists, while ousted from union posts and sometimes deported to remote parts of the country, have not lost all of their influence in the labor movement.

²⁸ Stevenson, op. cit.

²⁹ This thesis was developed in a presidential speech in November, 1949, before the Osorno agricultural and industrial exposition; text in El Mercurio (Santiago), Nov. 5, 1949.

³⁰ Ibid. The threat was arising mainly in the coal mines and in rural areas, in which the party was rapidly organizing labor units; it was profiting from its strategically placed ministers—agriculture, lands and colonization, and public works. A prominent Socialist leader and professor expressed the opinion to the writer, in October, 1949, that the decision to suppress the party was also due to the unfavorable reaction of capital interests in the United States to a “red regime” in Chile.

³¹ The only qualification was that congressional terms were allowed to expire; the party was thus able to maintain a nuisance force of 15 Deputies until 1949 and of two Senators until 1953. The third Senator, the famous poet, Pablo Neruda, eventually lost his seat in 1949 as a result of his continued absence from Chile. Over 26,000 names of “officially affiliated” Communists were stricken from the electoral register. Although the party's influence had been much more widespread than this figure implies, it has been contended by many critics of the government that non-Communists were included in the group. Official party newspapers and other forms of expression also were prohibited. In practice, however, the new laws had little meaning because of the springing into life of unofficial parties and organs of Communist line, at the same time that clearly non-Communist Leftist expression was somewhat restricted under the provisions of a rather indiscriminate “Defense of Democracy” law passed in 1948 and of executive emergency decrees. Although not repealed, these measures were quite modified in the spring of 1950. Meanwhile, the Communist party leadership has remained mainly underground; the Senators, although renowned labor battlers, are not top party strategists.

³² Chile; Land and Society (New York, 1936)Google Scholar. Translated by the University of Chile Press, this study is generally highly regarded, although with some reservations by the more conservative, in Chilean intellectual circles.

³³ A considerable increase in civil service pay, however, while defensible in terms of the previous decline in the economic position of civil servants, provided a considerable inflationary factor. The minister, Vial, resigned in order to seek the senatorship vacated by the death of Arturo Alessandri in August. He was succeeded by another Social Cristiano, Rucio Yrarrázabal, a man of less force and ambition. The resignation of Vial was generally considered a victory for the President, who distrusted Vial's political aspirations.

³⁴ This tentative assessment is based partly on nonpartisan academic sources in Chile, which the writer is not free to identify. The Confederatión de Empleados Parliculargs de Chile, headed by young, personable, dynamic Edgardo Maass, had achieved wide publicity and apparent popularity in February and March. Although influential in the cabinet change, Maass sought to remain nonpartisan and keep his group free from political entanglements. He was unable, however, to influence the new cabinet or the direction of its policies to any considerable extent.

³⁵ Another internal difficulty, not confined to Chile, is the widespread lack of discipline in personal habits such as extravagant buying of luxury foodstuffs and other nonessential consumption goods and gambling by people of sharply limited income. Many Chilean economists and other technicians, as well as foreign observers, comment on the impact of such practices on the economy.

³⁶ A study in 1949 by the Economic Commission for Latin America (CEPAL) of the United Nations Economic and Social Council revealed that 25 per cent of Chile's cultivated land had become mechanized, compared with only 18 per cent in Argentina and 15 per cent in Mexico. Mechanization, however, could be extended in Chile by only 25 per cent more, as compared with 50 per cent additional in the other two.

³⁷ Estimate by Directión General de Estadistica, Santiago. Such indices and other statistics in Chile are not technically flawless, but the figure gives an approximate indication. The index has not shifted appreciably during 1950.

³⁸ The Chilean peso has declined from 12 United States cents in the late 1920's to 1.66 in early 1950 at the official rate, and about one cent in the uncontrolled market.

³⁹ A few of the basic projects, especially hydroelectric power and petroleum extraction, are almost entirely or completely under state ownership. The “mixed” enterprise, however, is the most typical. In the early years of the CORFO some loans were extended to private companies to permit their expansion, but this type of development has been reduced to a very small scale. In the last few years the CORFO has concentrated on the large, long-range projects, beyond the financial means of private enterprise.

⁴⁰ They also contend that governmental policy has given further encouragement to already strong monopolistic interests. One of the leading members of the dominant Popular Socialist wing told the writer that his party endorses the basic socialist tenet of public ownership and operation of the major segments of the economy, but that such a goal is not attainable in an undeveloped country dependent on United States credits for its expansion. Left-wing elements also devote much attention to the subject of continued foreign “exploitation” of most of Chile's mineral wealth, but space limitations do not permit an analysis of the large subject.

⁴¹ While these charges are probably exaggerated for political purposes, such shortcomings are almost inevitable in any new and relatively large agency of this type and, in the opinion of the writer, do exist, although perhaps on a lesser scale than in the first years of the CORFO.

⁴² The doubt is a legitimate one entertained by those of other political complexion as well and considered seriously by CORFO officials. Long-range prospects cannot be entirely foreseen, but they seemed adequate to the official planners in Santiago and the reviewing officials of the lending banks in Washington.

⁴³ Space limitations preclude an analysis of the difficult housing, education, health and other social problems, and of the government's efforts to deal with some phases of them. These questions are briefly examined in Pinto, Francisco, Seguridad Social Chilena (Santiago, 1950)Google Scholar; and they, as well as the contributions and shortcomings of the CORFO, will be considered in the writer's monograph on the government of Chile.