Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-mlc7c Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-10T11:46:49.313Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Observations on Latin American Constitutionalism*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 December 2015

James L. Busey
James L. Busey*
Affiliation:
University of Colorado, Colorado Springs, Colorado
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

Scholars are in substantial agreement that Latin American constitutionalism leaves much to be desired.

First, there is the wide gap between constitutional formulations and actual political practice. No one would contend that any constitution, Latin American or otherwise, corresponds exactly to reality. There are provisions in the United States Constitution which are no better observed than are those of the Latin American documents. Even so, there can be little doubt that the gulf between theory and reality is far wider in much of Latin America than it is in many other parts of the world. Though many provisions of other constitutions do not correspond to actual political practice, Latin American stipulations on significant principles of government are often so much at variance with reality as to be totally misleading for the description of their political systems. Professor Martin C. Needler puts it quite bluntly:

Quite clearly, many constitutional provisions are honored only in the breach; and yet great stress is placed upon constitutional forms and procedures, even where these mask political realities quite discordant with their intent.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Americas , Volume 24 , Issue 1 , July 1967 , pp. 46 - 66
Copyright
Copyright © Academy of American Franciscan History 1967

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

*

Drawn from a paper presented at the annual conference of the Rocky Mountain Council for Latin American Studies, April 1, 1966, at El Paso, Texas.

References

1 Blanksten, George I., “Constitutions and the Structure of Power,” Chapter 9 in Davis, Harold Eugene, Government and Politics in Latin America (New York: Ronald, 1958), p. 228.Google Scholar

2 In the case of the United States, the doctrine of implied powers as well as grants-in-aid and other devices have broadened the scope of federal legislation beyond constitutional recognition. The powers of the President extend far beyond the parsimonious statement in Article II. The practice of judicial review to determine the constitutionality of legislation is nowhere mentioned in the Constitution and has brought the judiciary into realms, such as apportionment of state legislatures, which were probably undreamed of by John Marshall, founder of the doctrine. Contrary to Article IV, full faith and credit is not always given in each state to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other state; nor are persons escaping from confinement necessarily delivered up by one governor upon request of another. The people, contrary to Amendment II, do not have an unlimited right to keep and bear arms. Despite Amendment IV, many trials are anything but speedy. Despite Amendment X, there is serious question whether the states have successfully reserved all the powers not delegated to the Congress. The electoral college does not work at all as intended (Article II and Amendment XII). “Equal protection of the laws,” for which provision is made in Amendment XIV, has only recently begun to receive effective support. Section 2 of the same Amendment XIV, which provides that there shall be a reduction in representation in Congress for those states that arbitrarily deny the right to vote, never has been enforced; and many persons wonder whether there has been enforcement of Amendment XIV, Section 3, which provides that no senator or representative may hold office if he has “given aid and comfort to the enemies “of the Constitution of the United States. Amendment XV, on non-abridgement of the vote because of” race, color, or previous condition of servitude,” is only now beginning to enjoy some respect. It seems quite likely that Amendment XXII, which limits the elected President to two terms, will be repealed as soon as a popular, charismatic, demagogic, irresponsible individual finds it convenient to run for a third term.

3 Needier, Martin C., Latin American Politics in Perspective (Princeton: Van Nostrano, 1963), p. 124.Google Scholar

4 Stokes, William S., Latin American Politics (New York: Crowell, 1959), pp. 458–459 Google Scholar. Very much the same points are made by Lloyd Mecham, J., “Latin American Constitutions—Nominal and Real,” Journal of Politics, 21 (May, 1959), 258–275 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and by Fitzgibbon, Russell H., “Constitutional Development in Latin America: A Synthesis,” American Political Science Review, 39 (June, 1945), 511–522.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

5 Stokes, Latin American Politics, p. 458.

6 Cereceda, Raúl, Las instituciones políticas en America Latina (Bogota: Oficina Internacional de Investigaciones Sociales de la Federación Internacional de los Institutos Católicos de Investigaciones Sociales y Socio-religiosas [FERES], 1961), pp. 85–86 Google Scholar.

7 Ravines, Eudocio, America Latina (2nd ed.; Buenos Aires: Editorial Claridad, 1956), p. 46.Google Scholar

8 Alexander, Robert J., Latin-American Politics and Government (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), pp. 12–13 Google Scholar.

9 Stated by Mecham, “Latin American Constitutions. . .” p. 258 as being 186. Since then, there have been new constitutions in Bolivia, Brazil, Dominican Republic, Ecuador El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Venezuela.

10 Stokes, Latin American Politics, p. 457. On this point, also see Edelman, Alexander T., Latin American Government and Politics (Homewood, 111.: The Dorsey Press, 1965), pp. 375–377 Google Scholar.

11 Needier, Latin American Politics in Perspective, p. 124.

12 Cereceda, Las instituciones políticas . . ., p. 86.

13 Blanksten, “Constitutions . . ., ” p. 228; Edelman, Latin American Government and Politics, pp. 377–379; Needier, Latin American Politics in Perspective, p. 123; and Stokes, Latin American Politics, pp. 460–464.

14 Fitzgibbon, “Constitutional Development . ., ” p. 521.

15 Stokes, Latin American Politics, p. 459.

16 Gomez, R.A., Government and Politics in Latin America (rev. ed.: New York: Random House, 1964), p. 24.Google Scholar

17 Poblete, Renato and Segundo, J.L., J., S., “La variable política,” Revista interamericana de ciencias sociales, 2 (Número especial, 1963), pp. 276–277.Google Scholar

18 Cereceda, Las instituciones políticas . . ., p. 55.

19 These and several other such elements are summarized in Busey, James L., Latin American Political Guide (11th ed.; El Paso: Texas Western College Press, 1967), pp. 2–4 Google Scholar; Gomez, Government and Politics in Latin America, pp. 7–23; and numerous other sources. Relevant bibliographies on this may be found, among other places, in Busey, James L., Latin America: Political Institutions and Processes (New York: Random House, 1965), pp. 175–178 Google Scholar; Gomez, Government and Politics in Latin America, pp. 118–119. Works in Spanish and Portuguese on this problem are too numerous for mention here. See bibliographies in Cereceda, Las instituciones políticas ..., pp. 28–29, 41–42, 51, 71, 83–84, et passim; and in Poblete and Segundo, “La variable política,” pp. 297–311.

20 Cereceda lists the unfavorable elements as including (1) deep social cleavages which intensified disagreement on constitutional form, (2) caudillismo, and (3) weak economic foundations. Las instituciones políticas ..., pp. 53–54.

21 In his book-monograph, Notes on Costa Rican Democracy (Boulder: University of Colorado Press, 1962), Part II, “Causal Elements,” pp. 47–72 and “Epilogue,” pp. 73–78Google Scholar, this writer analyzes the rôles of land monopoly and land distribution in affecting the success of democracy and stability in Costa Rica.

22 Pierson, William W. and Gil, Federico G., Governments of Latin America (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1957), p. 108.Google Scholar

23 Mecham, “Latin American Constitutions . . ., ” pp. 274–275.

24 The British North America Act, 1867, is available in MacGregor Dawson, R., The Government of Canada (4th ed.; rev. by Ward, Norman; Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963), pp. 543–578 Google Scholar. The same book contains a commentary, Chapters 4–7, pp. 61–150, especially p. 62. Other useful sources on this question would include MacGregor Dawson, R., Democratic Government in Canada (rev. by Dawson, W.F.; Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1957), Chapter II, pp. 17–24 Google Scholar; Fox, Paul (ed.), Politics: Canada (Toronto: McGraw-Hill of Canada, 1962), Parts 3 and 4, pp. 50–98 et passim Google Scholar; Lajoie, Paul Gérin, Constitutional Amendment in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1950)Google Scholar; Lederman, W.R., The Courts and the Canadian Constitution (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, Ltd., The Carleton Library No. 16, 1964)Google Scholar; Mackay, Robert A., The Unreformed Senate of Canada (rev. ed.; Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, Ltd., The Carleton Library No. 6, 1963)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Saywell, John T., The Office of Lieutenant-Governor (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1957)Google Scholar.

26 This writer has prepared a paper on this, entitled “Agents of Brazilian Instability in the Light of Canadian Experience,” presented at Conference of the Western Political Science Association, Victoria, B.C., March 19, 1965; Western Political Quarterly, forthcomingGoogle Scholar.

26 Alexander, Latin-American Politics and Government, p. 10; Edelman, Latin American Government and Politics, pp. 372–373; Gomez, Government and Politics in Latin America, p. 28; and substantially all other authors on the subject.

27 Needier, Latin American Politics in Perspective, p. 125.

28 Argentina, especially Articles 67 and 86 on powers of Congress and President; Brazil, Article 5, on the powers of the Union, et passim; Mexico, Article 73 on powers of Congress, 89 on powers of the President, 27 and 28 on property, 115–121 which limit powers of states as well as prescribe forms for municipal government, and 3, 23, and 130 on federal control over education, labor, social security, and religion; Venezuela, especially Article 136 on “competence of the national power” and 190 on powers of the President, et passim.

29 Brazil, Constitution of 1946, Article 5; 1967, Article 8.

30 Busey, Latin America . . ., pp. 133–134 and 149–150.

31 Alexander, Latin-American Politics and Government, pp. 11–12; Needier, Latin American Politics in Perspective, p. 127. This point has been made by many writers, but not all its implications have been examined.

32 Busey, Notes . . ., pp. 38–44 et passim. See also, the bibliography in same, for further reading on Costa Rican government and politics; and, same writer, “The Presidents of Costa Rica,” The Americas, 18 (July, 1961), 55–70.

33 Interview with D. Ricardo Castro Beeche, director, La Nación, San José, Costa Rica, May 20, 1959.Google Scholar

34 Alexander, Latin-American Politics and Government, p. 15.

35 It is not always easy to obtain original copies of the constitutions of the various republics of Latin America. The next best thing to do is to secure them from the Pan American Union, Washington, D.C. The Pan American Union supplies copies of most of the constitutions of the Americas, but (except for the U. S. document) in English translation. There is a very large Spanish and Portuguese literature on Latin American constitutionalism, but much of it is quite formalized and lacking in sufficient realistic comment. In addition to the sources that have been mentioned in this paper, one would want to list the following, inter alia: Alberdi, Juan Bautista, Bases (Buenos Aires and Santa Fé, Argentina, 1963)Google Scholar; same author, Obras selectas (Buenos Aires, 1920); Arce, José, La constitución argentina en la teoría y en la práctica (Buenos Aires, 1961)Google Scholar; Arosemena, Justo, Estudios constitucionales sobre los gobiernos de la América Latina (2 vols.; Paris, 1878)Google Scholar; Blanksten, George I., Ecuador: Constitutions and Caudillos (Berkeley, 1951)Google Scholar; Harriet, F. Campos, Historia constitucional de Chile (Santiago, 1956)Google Scholar; Eyzaguirre, Jaime, Historia constitucional de Chile (Santiago, 1962)Google Scholar; Fourţoul, José Gil, Historia constitucional de Venezuela (2nd ed.; 2 vols.; Caracas, 1954)Google Scholar; Gallardo, Ricardo, Las constituciones de la república federal de Centro América (Madrid, 1958)Google Scholar; Goytia, Víctor F., Las constituciones de Panamá (Madrid, 1954)Google Scholar; Espiell, Héctor Gros, Las constituciones del Uruguay (Madrid, 1956)Google Scholar; Instituto de Estudios Políticos, Brand, T.áo (ed.), Las constituciones de los Estados Unidos del Brasil (Madrid, 1958)Google Scholar; Instituto de Estudios Políticos, Lejarza, Emilio Alvárez (ed.), Las constituciones de Nicaragua Google Scholar; James, Herman G., The Constitutional System of Brazil (Washington, D.C, 1923)Google Scholar; Lozada, S.M., La constitución nacional anotada (Buenos Aires, 1961)Google Scholar; Mendes, Fernando H. de Almeida, (ed.), Constituições do Brasil (4th ed.; São Paulo, 1963)Google Scholar; Morales, José, Las constituciones de México (México, D. F., 1957)Google Scholar; Pareja, José, Las constituciones del Perú (Madrid, 1954)Google Scholar; Arava Rodríguez, A., Génesis constitucional de la República Oriental del Uruguay (Montevideo, 1955)Google Scholar; Carneiro, Celso Soares, Constituição do Brasil (Rio de Janeiro, 1962)Google Scholar; Trigo, Félix, Las constituciones de Bolivia (Madrid, 1959)Google Scholar; de la Villa, M. de Helguera, , Constituciones vigentes de la república mexicana (2 vols.; Mexico, D. F., 1962)Google Scholar.