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Concepts versus conceptions (again)1

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 June 2010

Georges Rey
Georges Rey
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742. georey@earthlink.net http://sites.google.com/site/georgesrey
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Abstract

Machery neglects the crucial role of concepts in psychological explanation, as well as the efforts of numerous “externalists” of the last 40 years to provide an account of that role. He rightly calls attention to the wide variation in people's epistemic relations to concepts – people's conceptions of things – but fails to appreciate how externalist and kindred proposals offer the needed stability in concepts themselves that underlies that variation.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 33 , Issue 2-3 , June 2010 , pp. 221 - 222
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010

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Footnotes

1.

This commentary summarizes my longer review of Machery's book available at: http://ndpr.nd.edu, http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=16608, which readers should consult for more detail. It and other relevant material of mine are also available at: http://sites.google.com/site/georgesrey.

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