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Conscious access overflows overt report

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 March 2008

Claire Sergent
Affiliation:
Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience & Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience, Institute of Neurology, University College London, London WC1N3AR, United Kingdom. csergent@fil.ion.ucl.ac.ukhttp://www.icn.ucl.ac.uk/Research-Groups/awareness-group/g.rees@fil.ion.ucl.ac.ukhttp://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/~grees
Geraint Rees
Affiliation:
Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience & Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience, Institute of Neurology, University College London, London WC1N3AR, United Kingdom. csergent@fil.ion.ucl.ac.ukhttp://www.icn.ucl.ac.uk/Research-Groups/awareness-group/g.rees@fil.ion.ucl.ac.ukhttp://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/~grees

Abstract

Block proposes that phenomenal experience overflows conscious access. In contrast, we propose that conscious access overflows overt report. We argue that a theory of phenomenal experience cannot discard subjective report and that Block's examples of phenomenal “overflow” relate to two different types of perception. We propose that conscious access is more than simply readout of a pre-existing phenomenal experience.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2008

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