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Context selection and the frame problem

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Commentary on SperberDan and WilsonDeirdre (1987) Précis of Relevance: Communication and cognition. BBS 10:697–754.

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 May 2011

D. L. Chiappe  and
A. Kukla
D. L. Chiappe
Affiliation:
Division of Life Sciences, Scarborough College, University of Toronto, Scarborough, Ontario M1C 1A4, Canada. danilo@psych.utoronto.ca
A. Kukla
Affiliation:
Division of Life Sciences, Scarborough College, University of Toronto, Scarborough, Ontario M1C 1A4, Canada. danilo@psych.utoronto.ca
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Abstract

Sperber and Wilson (1987) have criticised Fodor's (1983) pessimistic view about the possibility of a science of central systems. Fodor's pessimism stems from the holistic nature of central systems – people can access anything that they know when engaging in belief fixation. It is argued that Sperber and Wilsons theory of how relevance is realized during verbal comprehension fails to elucidate this crucial aspect of central processes. Their claims about how a context is selected are shown to presuppose the ability to realize relevance.

Information

Type
Continuing Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 19 , Special Issue 3 , September 1996 , pp. 529 - 530
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1996

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References

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