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Correlating mind and body

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 February 2010

T. J. Lioyd-Jones
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Kent, Canterbury, Kent CT2 7LZ, U.K.t.j.lloyd-jones@ukc.ac.uk
N. Donnelly
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Kent, Canterbury, Kent CT2 7LZ, U.K.t.j.lloyd-jones@ukc.ac.uk
B. Weekes
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Kent, Canterbury, Kent CT2 7LZ, U.K.t.j.lloyd-jones@ukc.ac.uk

Abstract

Gray's integration of the different levels of description and explanation in his theory is problematic: (1) The introduction of consciousness into his theorising consists of the mind-brain identity assumption, which tells us nothing new. (2) There need not be correlations between levels of description. (3) Gray's account does not extend beyond “brute” correlation. Integration must be achieved in a principled, mutually constraining way.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1995

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