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Default knowledge, time pressure, and the theory-theory of concepts

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 June 2010

Thomas Blanchard
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ 08901-1107. tblanchard@philosophy.rutgers.edu

Abstract

I raise two issues for Machery's discussion and interpretation of the theory-theory. First, I raise an objection against Machery's claim that theory-theorists take theories to be default bodies of knowledge. Second, I argue that theory-theorists' experimental results do not support Machery's contention that default bodies of knowledge include theories used in their own proprietary kind of categorization process.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010

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