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Does functionalism really deal with the phenomenal side of experience?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 November 2002

Riccardo Manzotti  and
Giulio Sandini
Riccardo Manzotti
Affiliation:
LIRA-Lab, DIST, University of Genova, 16145 Genova, Italymanzotti@lira.dist.unige.itsandini@dist.unige.it http://manzotti.lira.dist.unige.it http://www.lira.dist.unige.it
Giulio Sandini
Affiliation:
LIRA-Lab, DIST, University of Genova, 16145 Genova, Italymanzotti@lira.dist.unige.itsandini@dist.unige.it http://manzotti.lira.dist.unige.it http://www.lira.dist.unige.it
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Abstract

Sensory motor contingencies belong to a functionalistic framework. Functionalism does not explain why and how objective functional relations produce phenomenal experience. O'Regan & Noë (O&N) as well as other functionalists do not propose a new ontology that could support the first person subjective phenomenal side of experience.

Type
Brief Report
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 24 , Issue 5 , October 2001 , pp. 993 - 994
Copyright
© 2001 Cambridge University Press

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