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Dual-processing explains base-rate neglect, but which dual-process theory and how?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 October 2007

Jonathan St. B. T. Evans  and
Shira Elqayam
Jonathan St. B. T. Evans
Affiliation:
Centre for Thinking and Language, School of Psychology, University of Plymouth, Plymouth PL4 8AA, United Kingdomjevans@plymouth.ac.uk
Shira Elqayam
Affiliation:
School of Applied Social Sciences, Faculty of Health and Life Sciences, De Montfort University, Leicester LE1 9BH, United Kingdom. selqayam@dmu.ac.ukhttp://www.plymouth.ac.uk/pages/dynamic.asp?page=staffdetails&id=jevans&size=l
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Abstract

We agree that current evolutionary accounts of base-rate neglect are unparsimonious, but we dispute the authors' account of the effect in terms of parallel associative and rule-based processes. We also question their assumption that cueing of nested set relations facilitates performance due to recruitment of explicit reasoning processes. In our account, such reasoning is always involved, but usually unsuccessful.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 30 , Issue 3 , June 2007 , pp. 261 - 262
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2007

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