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Behavioral and Brain Sciences Behavioral and Brain Sciences

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Infants' representations of causation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 May 2011

Stephen A. Butterfill
Stephen A. Butterfill
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Warwick, Coventry, CV4 7AL, United Kingdom. s.butterfill@warwick.ac.ukhttp://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/philosophy/people/faculty/butterfill/
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Abstract

It is consistent with the evidence in The Origin of Concepts to conjecture that infants' causal representations, like their numerical representations, are not continuous with adults', so that bootstrapping is needed in both cases.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 34 , Issue 3 , June 2011 , pp. 126 - 127
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2011

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References

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