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Massive modularity is consistent with most forms of neural reuse

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 October 2010

J. Brendan Ritchie  and
Peter Carruthers
J. Brendan Ritchie
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742. britchie@umd.edu https://sites.google.com/site/jbrendanritchie/Home pcarruth@umd.edu http://www.philosophy.umd.edu/Faculty/pcarruthers/
Peter Carruthers
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742. britchie@umd.edu https://sites.google.com/site/jbrendanritchie/Home pcarruth@umd.edu http://www.philosophy.umd.edu/Faculty/pcarruthers/
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Abstract

Anderson claims that the hypothesis of massive neural reuse is inconsistent with massive mental modularity. But much depends upon how each thesis is understood. We suggest that the thesis of massive modularity presented in Carruthers (2006) is consistent with the forms of neural reuse that are actually supported by the data cited, while being inconsistent with a stronger version of reuse that Anderson seems to support.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 33 , Issue 4 , August 2010 , pp. 289 - 290
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010

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References

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