Published online by Cambridge University Press: 25 July 2013
Schilbach et al. contrast second-person and third-person approaches to social neuroscience. We discuss relations between second-person and first-person approaches, arguing that they cannot be studied in isolation. Contingency is central for converging first- and second-person approaches. Studies of embodiment show how contingencies scaffold first-person perspective and how the transition from a third- to a second-person perspective fundamentally involves first-person contributions.
Target article
Toward a second-person neuroscience1
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Author response
A second-person neuroscience in interaction1