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Metarepresentation, trust, and “unleashed expression”

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 February 2023

Leda Berio ,
Albert Newen  and
Richard Moore Open the ORCID record for Richard Moore [Opens in a new window]
Leda Berio
Affiliation:
Institut für Philosophie II, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, D-44801 Bochum, Germany Leda.Berio@rub.de; Albert.Newen@rub.de ledaberio.com https://www.pe.ruhr-uni-bochum.de/philosophie/ii/newen/index.html.de
Albert Newen
Affiliation:
Institut für Philosophie II, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, D-44801 Bochum, Germany Leda.Berio@rub.de; Albert.Newen@rub.de ledaberio.com https://www.pe.ruhr-uni-bochum.de/philosophie/ii/newen/index.html.de
Richard Moore
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Social Sciences Building, University of Warwick, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK. Richard.Moore@warwick.ac.uk https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/philosophy/people/summaries/moore/
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Abstract

Heintz & Scott-Phillips's account of human expression leaves a number of central issues unclear – not least, whether the lack of expression in nonhuman species is attributable to their lack of the relevant metarepresentational abilities, an absence of trust, or a consequence of other factors. In place of their view, we propose a gradualistic account of the origins of human expression.

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Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 46 , 2023 , e4
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press

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