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“Nonmonotonic” does not mean “probabilistic”

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 February 2009

Keith Stenning
Affiliation:
Human Communication Research Center, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh EH8 9LW, United Kingdomkeith@inf.ed.ac.ukwww.inf.ed.ac.uk/people/staff/Keith_Stenning
Michiel van Lambalgen
Affiliation:
Institute for Logic, Language and Computation, Department of Philosophy, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, 1012CP, The Netherlands. M.vanLambalgen@uva.nlhttp://staff.science.uva.nl/~michiell

Abstract

Oaksford & Chater (O&C) advocate Bayesian probability as a way to deal formally with the pervasive nonmonotonicity of common sense reasoning. We show that some forms of nonmonotonicity cannot be treated by Bayesian methods.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2009

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References

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