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Phenomenology without conscious access is a form of consciousness without top-down attention

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 March 2008

Christof Koch
Affiliation:
Division of Biology, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA 91125
Naotsugu Tsuchiya
Affiliation:
Division of Humanities and Social Sciences, Psychology and Neuroscience, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA, 91125. koch.christof@gmail.comhttp://klab.caltech.edu/~koch/naotsu@gmail.comhttp://www.emotion.caltech.edu/~naotsu/Site/index.html

Abstract

We agree with Block's basic hypothesis postulating the existence of phenomenal consciousness without cognitive access. We explain such states in terms of consciousness without top-down, endogenous attention and speculate that their correlates may be a coalition of neurons that are consigned to the back of cortex, without access to working memory and planning in frontal cortex.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2008

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