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Propositional learning is a useful research heuristic but it is not a theoretical algorithm

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 April 2009

A. G. Baker
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, McGill University, Montréal, Québec, H3A 1B1, Canadaandy.baker@mcgill.cahttp://www.psych.mcgill.ca/faculty/abaker.htmlirina.baetu@mail.mcgill.ca
Irina Baetu
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, McGill University, Montréal, Québec, H3A 1B1, Canadaandy.baker@mcgill.cahttp://www.psych.mcgill.ca/faculty/abaker.htmlirina.baetu@mail.mcgill.ca
Robin A. Murphy
Affiliation:
Cognitive Perceptual and Brain Sciences Unit, Division of Psychology and Language Sciences, University College London, London, WC1E 6BT, United Kingdom. robin.murphy@ucl.ac.uk

Abstract

Mitchell et al.'s claim, that their propositional theory is a single-process theory, is illusory because they relegate some learning to a secondary memory process. This renders the single-process theory untestable. The propositional account is not a process theory of learning, but rather, a heuristic that has led to interesting research.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2009

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