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The propositional nature of human associative learning

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 April 2009

Chris J. Mitchell
Affiliation:
School of Psychology, University of New South Wales, Kensington 2052, Australiachris.mitchell@unsw.edu.auhttp://www.psy.unsw.edu.au/profiles/cmitchell.html
Jan De Houwer
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Ghent University, Henri Dunantlaan 2, B-9000 Ghent, Belgiumjan.dehouwer@ugent.behttp://users.ugent.be/~jdhouwer/">
Peter F. Lovibond
Affiliation:
School of Psychology, University of New South Wales, Kensington 2052, Australiap.lovibond@unsw.edu.auhttp://www.psy.unsw.edu.au/profiles/plovibond.html">

Abstract

The past 50 years have seen an accumulation of evidence suggesting that associative learning depends on high-level cognitive processes that give rise to propositional knowledge. Yet, many learning theorists maintain a belief in a learning mechanism in which links between mental representations are formed automatically. We characterize and highlight the differences between the propositional and link approaches, and review the relevant empirical evidence. We conclude that learning is the consequence of propositional reasoning processes that cooperate with the unconscious processes involved in memory retrieval and perception. We argue that this new conceptual framework allows many of the important recent advances in associative learning research to be retained, but recast in a model that provides a firmer foundation for both immediate application and future research.

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Type
Main Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2009

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