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The theoretical indispensability of concepts

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 June 2010

Daniel A. Weiskopf
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA 30302. dweiskopf@gsu.edu http://www2.gsu.edu/~phldaw/
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Abstract

Machery denies the traditional view that concepts are constituents of thoughts, and he more provocatively argues that concepts should be eliminated from our best psychological taxonomy. I argue that the constituency view has much to recommend it (and is presupposed by much of his own theory), and that the evidence gives us grounds for pluralism, rather than eliminativism, about concepts.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010

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References

Fodor, J. A. (1975) The language of thought. Crowell.Google Scholar
Fodor, J. A. (2008) LOT 2: The language of thought revisited. Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Machery, E. (2009) Doing without concepts. Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Weiskopf, D. A. (2009a) Atomism, pluralism, and conceptual content. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79:130–62.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Weiskopf, D. A. (2009b) The plurality of concepts. Synthese 169(1):145–73.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Weiskopf, D. A. (2010) Concepts and the modularity of thought. Dialectica 64:107–30.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Weiskopf, D. A. (forthcoming) The functional unity of special science kinds. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science .Google Scholar

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