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Truth-conduciveness as the primary epistemic justification of normative systems of reasoning

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 October 2011

Gerhard Schurz
Gerhard Schurz
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Duesseldorf, D-40225 Duesseldorf, Germany. schurz@phil.uni-duesseldorf.de www.phil-fak.uni-duesseldorf.de/philo/personal/thphil/
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Abstract

Although I agree with Elqayam & Evans' (E&E's) criticisms of is-ought and ought-is fallacies, I criticize their rejection of normativism on two grounds: (1) Contrary to E&E's assumption, not every normative system of reasoning consists of formal rules. (2) E&E assume that norms of reasoning are grounded on intuition or authority, whereas in contemporary epistemology they have to be justified, primarily by their truth-conduciveness.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 34 , Issue 5 , October 2011 , pp. 266 - 267
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2011

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