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Two problems with “self-deception”: No “self” and no “deception”

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 February 2011

Robert Kurzban
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104. kurzban@psych.upenn.eduhttp://www.psych.upenn.edu/~kurzban/

Abstract

While the idea that being wrong can be strategically advantageous in the context of social strategy is sound, the idea that there is a “self” to be deceived might not be. The modular view of the mind finesses this difficulty and is useful – perhaps necessary – for discussing the phenomena currently grouped under the term “self-deception.”

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2011

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