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The underinformative formulation of conditional probability

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 October 2007

Laura Macchi  and
Maria Bagassi
Laura Macchi
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Milano-Bicocca, 20126 Milan, Italy. laura.macchi@unimib.itmaria.bagassi@unimib.it
Maria Bagassi
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Milano-Bicocca, 20126 Milan, Italy. laura.macchi@unimib.itmaria.bagassi@unimib.it
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Abstract

The formulation of the conditional probability in classical tasks does not guarantee the effective transmission of the independence of the hit rate from the base rate. In these kinds of tasks, data are all available, but subjects are able to understand them in the specific meanings proper to a specialized language only if these are adequately transmitted. From this perspective, the partitive formulation should not be considered a facilitation, but rather, a way of effectively transmitting the conditional probability.

Consider the following two phrases:

  1. 1 The death-rate among men is twice that for women.

  2. 2 In the deaths registered last month there were twice as many men as women.

Are these two different ways of saying the same or are these different events? In fact, they are different events. (Lindley 1985, p. 44)

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 30 , Issue 3 , June 2007 , pp. 274 - 275
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2007

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