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Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 February 2010

Dan Lloyd
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Trinity College, Hartford, CT 06106. dan.lloyd@trincoll.edu

Abstract

The information processing that constitutes accessconsciousness is not sufficient to make a representational state conscious in any sense. Standard examples of computation without consciousness undermine A-consciousness, and Block's cases seem to derive their plausibility from a lurking phenomenal awareness. That is, people and other minded systems seem to have access-consciousness only insofar as the state accessed is a phenomenal one, or the state resulting from access is phenomenal, or both.

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Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1995

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