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Acquiring a new concept is not explicable-by-content

  • Nicholas Shea (a1)
Abstract
Abstract

Carey's book describes many cases in which children develop new concepts with expressive power that could not be constructed out of their input. How does she side-step Fodor's paradox of radical concept nativism? I suggest that it is by rejecting the tacit assumption that psychology can only explain concept acquisition when it occurs by rational inference or other transitions that are explicable-by-content.

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References
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Carey S. (2009) The origin of concepts. Oxford University Press.
Fodor J. A. (1975) The language of thought. Harvard University Press.
Fodor J. A. (1981) The present status of the innateness controversy. In: Representations: Philosophical essays on the foundations of cognitive science, pp. 257316. MIT Press.
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Behavioral and Brain Sciences
  • ISSN: 0140-525X
  • EISSN: 1469-1825
  • URL: /core/journals/behavioral-and-brain-sciences
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