Hostname: page-component-89b8bd64d-46n74 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-05-06T13:32:35.296Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Against direct perception

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 February 2010

S. Ullman
Affiliation:
Artificial Intelligence Laboratory, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Mass. 02139

Abstract

Central to contemporary cognitive science is the notion that mental processes involve computations defined over internal representations. This view stands in sharp contrast to the “direct approach” to visual perception and cognition, whose most prominent proponent has been J.J. Gibson. In the direct theory, perception does not involve computations of any sort; it is the result of the direct pickup of available information. The publication of Gibson's recent book (Gibson 1979) offers an opportunity to examine his approach, and, more generally, to contrast the theory of direct perception with the computational/representational view. In the first part of the present article (Sections 2–3) the notion of “direct perception” is examined from a theoretical standpoint, and a number of objections are raised. Section 4 is a “case study”: the problem of perceiving the three-dimensional shape of moving objects is examined. This problem, which has been extensively studied within the immediate perception framework, serves to illustrate some of the inherent shortcomings of that approach. Finally, in Section 5, an attempt is made to place the theory of direct perception in perspective by embedding it in a more comprehensive framework.

Information

Type
Target Article
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1980

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable