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Attribution is more likely to be demonstrated in more natural contexts

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 February 1998

M. D. Matheson ,
M. Cooper ,
J. Weeks ,
R. Thompson  and
D. Fragaszy
M. D. Matheson
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Georgia, Athens, GA 30602 cmspsy37@uga.cc.uga.edu
M. Cooper
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Georgia, Athens, GA 30602 cmspsy37@uga.cc.uga.edu
J. Weeks
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Georgia, Athens, GA 30602 cmspsy37@uga.cc.uga.edu
R. Thompson
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Georgia, Athens, GA 30602 cmspsy37@uga.cc.uga.edu
D. Fragaszy
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Georgia, Athens, GA 30602 cmspsy37@uga.cc.uga.edu
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Abstract

We propose a naturalistic version of the “guesser–knower” paradigm in which the experimental subject has an opportunity to choose which individual to follow to a hidden food source. This design allows nonhumans to display the attribution of knowledge to another conspecific, rather than a human, in a naturalistic context (finding food), and it is readily adapted to different species.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 21 , Issue 1 , February 1998 , pp. 124 - 126
Copyright
© 1998 Cambridge University Press

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