Skip to main content
    • Aa
    • Aa

Banishing “I” and “we” from accounts of metacognition

  • Bryce Huebner (a1) (a2) and Daniel C. Dennett (a1)

Carruthers offers a promising model for how “we” know the propositional contents of “our” own minds. Unfortunately, in retaining talk of first-person access to mental states, his suggestions assume that a higher-order self is already “in the loop.” We invite Carruthers to eliminate the first-person from his model and to develop a more thoroughly third-person model of metacognition.

Hide All
Bloom P. (2005) Descartes' baby. Basic Books.
Carruthers P. (2009) An architecture for dual reasoning. In: In two minds: Dual processes and beyond, ed. Evans J. St. B. T. & Frankish K., pp. 109–27. Oxford University Press.
Dennett D. C. (1978) Mechanism and responsibility. In: Brainstorms. MIT Press.
Haslam N. (2006) Dehumanization: An integrative review. Personality and Social Psychology 10(3):252–64.
Jackendoff R. (1996) How language helps us think. Pragmatics and Cognition 4(1):134.
Metzinger T. (2004) Being no one. MIT Press.
Robbins P. & Jack A. (2006) The phenomenal stance. Philosophical Studies 127:5985.
Recommend this journal

Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this journal to your organisation's collection.

Behavioral and Brain Sciences
  • ISSN: 0140-525X
  • EISSN: 1469-1825
  • URL: /core/journals/behavioral-and-brain-sciences
Please enter your name
Please enter a valid email address
Who would you like to send this to? *


Full text views

Total number of HTML views: 2
Total number of PDF views: 25 *
Loading metrics...

Abstract views

Total abstract views: 127 *
Loading metrics...

* Views captured on Cambridge Core between September 2016 - 23rd October 2017. This data will be updated every 24 hours.