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Banishing “I” and “we” from accounts of metacognition

  • Bryce Huebner (a1) (a2) and Daniel C. Dennett (a1)
  • DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X09000661
  • Published online: 01 April 2009
Abstract
Abstract

Carruthers offers a promising model for how “we” know the propositional contents of “our” own minds. Unfortunately, in retaining talk of first-person access to mental states, his suggestions assume that a higher-order self is already “in the loop.” We invite Carruthers to eliminate the first-person from his model and to develop a more thoroughly third-person model of metacognition.

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N. Haslam (2006) Dehumanization: An integrative review. Personality and Social Psychology 10(3):252–64.

P. Robbins & A. Jack (2006) The phenomenal stance. Philosophical Studies 127:5985.

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Behavioral and Brain Sciences
  • ISSN: 0140-525X
  • EISSN: 1469-1825
  • URL: /core/journals/behavioral-and-brain-sciences
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