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Block's philosophical anosognosia

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 February 2010

G. Rey
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742, rey@umiacs.umd.edu

Abstract

Block's P-/A-consciousness distinction rules out P's involving a specific kind of cognitive access and commits him to a “strong” Pconsciousness. This not only confounds plausible research in the area but betrays an anosognosia about Wittgenstein's diagnosis about our philosophical “introspection” of mysterious inner processes.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1995

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