Skip to main content Accessibility help

Can human irrationality be experimentally demonstrated?

  • L. Jonathan Cohen (a1)


The object of this paper is to show why recent research in the psychology of deductive and probabilistic reasoning does not have "bleak implications for human rationality," as has sometimes been supposed. The presence of fallacies in reasoning is evaluated by referring to normative criteria which ultimately derive their own credentials from a systematisation of the intuitions that agree with them. These normative criteria cannot be taken, as some have suggested, to constitute a part of natural science, nor can they be established by metamathematical proof. Since a theory of competence has to predict the very same intuitions, it must ascribe rationality to ordinary people.

Accordingly, psychological research on this topic falls into four categories. In the first, experimenters investigate conditions under which their subjects suffer from genuine cognitive illusions. The search for explanations of such performance errors may then generate hypotheses about the ways in which the relevant information-processing mechanisms operate. In the second category, experimenters investigate circumstances in which their subjects exhibit mathematical or scientific ignorance: these are tests of the subjects' intelligence or education. In the third and fourth categories, experimenters impute a fallacy where none exists, either because they are applying the relevant normative criteria in an inappropriate way or because the normative criteria being applied are not the appropriate ones.



Hide All
Anderson, A. R. & Belnap, B. D. (1974) Entailment: the logic of relevance and necessity. Vol. I. Princeton: Princeton University Press. [LJCar]
Anderson, N. H. & Shanteau, J. C. (1970) Information integration in risky decision making. Journal of Experimental Psychology 84:441–45. [LLL]
Armstrong, D. M. (1973) Belief, truth, and knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [WGL]
Ayer, A. J. (1946) Language, truth and logic, London: Gollancz. [LJCa]
Bar-Hillel, M. (1979) The role of sample size in sample evaluation. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance 24:245–57. [LJCr, AM]
Bar-Hillel, M. (1980) The base-rate fallacy in probability judgments. Acta Psychologica 44:211–33. [LJCr, AM]
Beach, L. R. & Peterson, C. R. (1966) Subjective probabilities for unions of events. Psychonomic Science 5:307–8. [LLL]
Bergson, H. (1903) Introduction à la métaphysique. Paris: A. Bourgeois (Cahiers de la quinzaine). [LJCa]
Bernoulli, J. (1713) Ars conjectandi. Basle. [LJC]
Berry, J. W. & Dasen, P. R. (1974) History and method in the cross-cultural study of cognition." In: Culture and cognition: Readings in cross-cultural psychology, Berry, & Dasen, . London: Methuen. [SPS]
Billingsley, P. (1979) Probability and measure. New York: Wiley. [BS]
Blackburn, S. (1973) Reason and prediction, Chs. 5–6, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [SB]
Blackburn, S. (1980) Opinions and chances. In: Prospects for pragmatism, ed. Mellor, D.H.. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [SB]
Brehmer, B. (1980) In one word: Not from experience. Acta Psychologica 45:223–41. [HJE]
Brunswik, E. (1956) Perception and the representative design of experiments. 2d ed.Berkeley: University of California Press. [HJE]
Carnap, R. (1947) Meaning and necessity. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. [LJCa]
Carnap, R. (1950) Logical foundations of probability. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. [LJCa]
Chapman, L.J. & Chapman, J.P. (1967) Genesis of popular but erroneous psychodiagnostic observations. Journal of Abnormal Psychology 72(3): 193204. [LJCa]
Chapman, L.J. & Chapman, J.P. (1969) Illusory correlation as an obstacle to the use of valid psychodiagnostic signs. Journal of Abnormal Psychology 74(3):271–80 [LJCa]
Chomsky, N. (1965) Aspects of the theory of syntax. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. [LJCa]
Chomsky, N. (1968) Language and mind. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. [SG]
Clifford, B. R. & Bull, R. (1978) The psychology of person identification. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. [SLZ]
Cohen, L. J. (1970) The implications of induction. London: Methuen. [LJCar,]
Cohen, L. J. (1971) Some remarks on Grice's views about the logical particles of natural language. In: Pragmatics of natural language, ed. Bar-Hillel, Y.. Dordrecht: Reidel. [LJCa]
Cohen, L. J. (1977a) Can the conversationalist hypothesis be defended? Philosophical Studies 31:8190. [LJCa]
Cohen, L. J. (1977b) The probable and the provable. Oxford: Oxford University Press. [LJCa, JLM, AT]
Cohen, L. J. (1979) On the psychology of prediction: Whose is the fallacy? Cognition 7:385407. [LJCar, IN, AT, RWW]
Cohen, L. J. (1980a) Bayesianism versus Baconianism in the evaluation of medical diagnoses. British Journal for Philosophy of Science 31:4562. [LJCr]
Cohen, L. J. (1980b) Some historical remarks on the Baconian conception of probability. Journal of the History of Ideas 41:219–31. [LJCa]
Cohen, L. J. (1980c) What has induction to do with causality? In Applications of inductive logic, ed. Cohen, L. J. & Hesse, M., Oxford: Clarendon Press. [LJCr]
Cohen, L. J. (1980d) Whose is the fallacy? A rejoinder to Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky. Cognition 8:8992. [LJCar, HJE, IN, AT, RWW]
Cohen, L. J. (1982, forthcoming) Intuition, induction and the middle way. Monist 65, pt. 3. [LJCr]
Cohen, L. J. (forthcoming) Subjective probability and the paradox of the gatecrasher. Arizona State Law Journal. [LJCr]
Cole, M. & Bruner, J. S. (1971) Cultural differences and inferences about psychological processes. American Psychologist 26:867–76. [SPS]
Copi, I. M. (1954) Symbolic logic. New York: Macmillan. [LJCa]
Daniels, N. (1979) Wide reflective equilibrium and theory acceptance in ethics. Journal of Philosophy 76:256–82. [LJCa]
Daniels, N. (1980) On some methods of ethics and linguistics. Philosophical Studies 37:2136. [LJCa]
Davidson, D. (1966) The logical form of action sentences. In: The logic of decision and action, ed. Rescher, N.. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. [LJCa]
Dawes, R. M. & Corrigan, B. (1974) Linear models in decision making. Psychological Bulletin 81:95106. [LJCa]
de Morgan, a. (1856) On the symbols of logic. Transactions of the Cambridge Philosophical Society 9:120. [PD]
Dennett, D. C. (1978) Intentional systems. In: Brainstorms. Montgomery: Bradford Books. [WGL]
Dennett, D. C. (1979) Brainstorms. Hassocks: Harvester. [LJCa]
Dennett, D. C. (forthcoming a) Three kinds of intentional psychology. In a Thyssen Philosophy Group volume to be edited by Healey, R. A.. [WGL]
Dennett, D. C. (forthcoming b) True believers: The intentional strategy and why it works. In a volume of 1979 Herbert Spencer lectures. Oxford: Oxford University Press. [WGL]
Dummett, M. (1978) The justification of deduction. In: Truth and other enigmas, ed. Dummett, M.. London: Duckworth. [LJCa]
Dumont, B. (1980) L'influence du language et du contexte dans des epreuves de type "logique." Ph.D. thesis, University of Paris. [PW)
Edwards, W. (1975) Comment. Journal of the American Statistical Association 70:291–93. [LJCa]
Einhorn, H. J. (1980) Learning from experience and suboptimal rules in decision making. In: Cognitive processes in choice and decision behavior, ed. Wallsten, T. S., pp. 120. Hillsdale, N. J.: Erlbaum. [HJE]
Einhorn, H. J. & Hogarth, R. M. (1978) Confidence in judgment: Persistence of the illusion of validity. Psychological Review 85:395416. [HJE]
Einhorn, H. J. & Hogarth, R. M. (1981) R. M. Behavioral decision theory: Processes of judgment and choice. Annual Review of Psychology, 32:5388. [LJCa, HJE, LLL]
Ellis, B. (1979) Rational belief systems. Oxford: Blackwell. [LJCa]
Evans, J. St. B. T. (1980) Current issues in the psychology of reasoning. British Journal of Psychology 71:227–39. [RAG]
Evans, J. St. B. T. (1982, in press) The psychology of deductive reasoning. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. [JStBTE]
Falmagne, R. J., ed. (1975) Reasoning: Representation and process. Hillsdale, N. J.: Erlbaum. [RAG]
Finetti, B. de (1931) Sul significato soggettivo della probabilità. Fundamenta mathematica 17:298329. [LJCa]
Finocchiaro, M. (1981) Fallacies and the evaluation of reasoning. American Philosophical Quarterly 18:1322. [LJCr]
Fischhoff, B. (1975) Hindsight ≠ foresight: The effect of outcome knowledge on judgment under uncertainty. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance 1:288–99. [LJCa]
Fodor, J. A. & Carrett, M. (1966) Some reflections on competence and performance. In: Psycholinguistics Papers, ed. Lyons, J. & Wales, R. J.. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. [GS]
Freedman, D.; Pisani, R. & Purves, R. (1978) Statistics. New York: W. W. Norton. [SLZ]
Glass, A. L.; Holyoak, K. J. & Santa, J. L. (1979) Cognition. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley. [RWW]
Goldberg, L.R. (1970) Man versus model of man: A rationale, plus some evidence, for a method of improving on clinical inferences. Psychological Bulletin 73(6):422–32. [LJCa]
Goldman, A. (1976) Discrimination and perceptual knowledge. Journal of Philosophy 73:771–91. [WGL]
Good, I. J. (1971) Reply to Professor Barnard. In: Foundations of statistical inference, ed. Godambe, V. P. & Sprott, D. A.. Toronto: Holt, Rinehart & Winston. [SLZ]
Goodman, N. (1954) Fact, fiction, and forecast. London: Athlone. [LJCa, AM]
Goodman, N. (1979) Fact, fiction, and forecast. 3rd ed.Indianapolis: Hackett. [SLZ]
Grace, N. D.; Muench, H. & Chalmers, T. C. (1966) The present status of shunts for portal hypertension in cirrhosis. Journal of Gastroenterology 50:646–91. [SLZ]
Grice, H. P. (1975) Logic and conversation. In: The logic of grammar, ed. Davidson, D. and Harman, G.. Encino, Cal.: Dickenson. [LJCa, RWW]
Griffin, N. (1977) Relative identity. Oxford: Oxford University Press. [LJCa]
Haack, S. (1974) Deviant logic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [LJCa]
Hacking, I. (1975) The emergence of probability. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [LJCr]
Hamblin, C. L. (1970) Fallacies. London. Methuen. [LJCa]
Hammerton, M. (1973) A case of radical probability estimation. Journal of Experimental Psychology 101:252–54. [LJCa]
Hammond, K. R. (1955) Probabilistic functionalism and the clinical method. Psychological Review 62:255–62. [HJE]
Hammond, K. R. (1978) Toward increasing competence of thought in public policy formation. In: Judgment and decision in public policy formation, ed. Hammond, K. R., pp. 1123. Denver: Westview. [HJE]
Hempel, C. G. (1945) Studies in the logic of confirmation. Mind 54:126 & 97121. [NEW]
Henle, M. (1962) On the relation between logic and thinking. Psychological Review 69:366–78. [LLL]
Henle, M. (1978) Foreword. In: Human reasoning, ed. Revlin, R. & Mayer, R. E., pp. xiii–xviii. Washington, D. C.: Winston. [MH]
Hogarth, R. M. (1975) Cognitive processes and the assessment of subjective probability distributions. Journal of the American Statistical Association 70:271–89. [LJCa]
Hume, D. (1739) A treatise of human nature. London: John Noon. [LJCa, SLZ]
Hume, D. (1975) Enquiries concerning human understanding and concerning the principles of morals. ed. Bigge, L. A. Selby. Third Ed. rev. by Nidditch, P. H.. Oxford: Oxford University Press. [JLM]
Husserl, E. (1911) Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft. Logos 1:289341. [LJCa]
Jeffrey, R. C. (1980) How is it reasonable to base preferences on estimates of chance? In: Science, belief and behaviour, ed. Mellor, D. H.. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [LJCa, AM]
Jenkins, H. M. & Ward, W. C. (1965) Judgment of contingency between responses and outcomes. Psychological Monographs: General and Applied 79, whole no. 594. [LJCa]
Johnson-Laird, P.N.; Legrenzi, P. & Sonino Legrenzi, M. (1972) Reasoning and a sense of reality. British Journal of Psychology 63:395400. [LJCa, RAG, RWW, NEW]
Johnson-Laird, P.N. & Wason, P.C. (1970) A theoretical analysis of insight into a reasoning task. Cognitive Psychology 1:134–48. [LJCa]
Johnson-Laird, P.N. & Wason, P.C. (1977) Postscript. In: Thinking: Readings in Cognitive Science, ed. Johnson-Laird, P. N. & Wason, P. C.. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [LJCa]
Kahneman, D. & Tversky, A. (1972a) On the psychology of prediction. Oregon Research Institute Research Bulletin 12, whole no. 4. [LJCa]
Kahneman, D. & Tversky, A. (1972b) Subjective probability: A judgment of representativeness. Cognitive Psychology 3: 430–54. [LJCa, RWW]
Kahneman, D. & Tversky, A. (1973) On the psychology of prediction. Psychological Review 80:237–51. [LJCa, RWW]
Kahneman, D. & Tversky, A. (1974) Subjective probability: A judgment of representativeness. In: The concept of probability in psychological experiments, ed. von Holstein, C. A. S. Stael. Dordrecht: Reidel. [LJCa]
Kahneman, D. & Tversky, A. (1979) On the interpretation of intuitive probability: A reply to Jonathan Cohen. Cognition 7:409–11. [LJCar, AT, RWW]
Kahneman, D. & Tversky, A. (1981, in press) On the study of statistical intuitions. In: Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases, ed. Kahneman, D., Slovic, P. & Tversky, A.. Cambridge University Press. [AT]
Keynes, J. M. (1921) A treatise on probability. London: Macmillan. [LJCr]
Klotz, I. (1980) The n-ray affair. Scientific American 242:168–75. [SLZ]
Kneale, W. & Kneale, M. (1962) The development of logic. Oxford: Clarendon Press. [LJCr]
Kocher, P. H. (1957) Francis Bacon on the science of jurisprudence. Journal of the History of Ideas 18:326. [LJCa]
Kolmogorov, A. (1950) Foundations of probability. New York: Chelsea. [LJCa]
Kripke, S. (1972) Naming and necessity. In: Semantics of natural language, ed. Davidson, D. and Harman, G., Dordrecht: Reidel. [LJCa]
Kyburg, H. E. (1974) The logical foundations of statistical inference. Dordrecht: Reidel. [IL]
Lakatos, I. (1970) Falsificationism and the methodology of scientific research programs. In: Criticism and the growth of knowledge, ed. Lakatos, I. and Musgrave, A. E.. Amsterdam: North Holland. [LJCa]
Lemmon, E. J. (1965) Beginning logic. London: Nelson. [LJCa]
Levi, I. (1967) Cambling with truth. New York: Knopf. [LJCr]
Levi, I. (1977) Direct inference. Journal of Philosophy 74:529. [IL]
Levi, I. (1980) The enterprise of knowledge. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. [IL]
Lewis, C. I. & Langford, C. H. (1959) Symbolic logic. New York: Dover. [LJCar]
Lewis, D. (1973) Counterfactuals. Oxford: Blackwell. [LJCa]
Lewontin, R. C. (1978) Adaptation. Scientific American 239:212–30. [HJE]
Lewontin, R. C. (1979) Sociobiology as an adaptationist program. Behavioral Science 24:514. [HJE]
Lichtenstein, S. & Slovic, P. (1973) Response-induced reversals of preference in gambling: An extended replication in Las Vegas. Journal of Experimental Psychology 101:1620. [LJCa]
Loftus, E. F. (1979) Eyewitness testimony. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. [SLZ]
Lopes, L. L. (1976) Model based decision and inference in stud poker. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 105:217–39. [LLL]
Loftus, E. F. (1980) Doing the impossible: A note on induction and the experience of randomness. Paper presented at 18th Bayesian Research Conference. Los Angeles. Cal. [LJCa]
Lopes, L. L. & Ekberg, P. H. S. (1980) Test of an ordering hypothesis of risky decision making. Acta Psychologica 45:161–67. [LLL]
Lyon, D. & Slovic, P. (1976) Dominance of accuracy information and neglect of base rates in probability estimation. Acta Psychologica 40:287–98. (LJCa, AM]
Mackie, J. L. (1973) Truth, probability. and paradox. Oxford: Oxford University Press. [LJCr, JLM]
Lyon, D. & Slovic, P. (1974) The cement of the universe: A study of causation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. [JLM]
Manktelow, K. I. & Evans, J. St. B. T. (1979) Facilitation of reasoning by realism: Effect or non-effect. British Journal of Psychology 70:477–88. [LJCa, RAG, NEW]
March, J. G. (1978) Bounded rationality, ambiguity, and the engineering of choice. Bell Journal of Economics 9:587608. (LLL)
Mellor, D. H. (1971) The matter of chance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [LJCar]
Meyer, D. K. (1980) Some/is: An investigation of logical thinking. Ph.D. dissertation, Graduate Faculty, New School for Social Research. [MH]
Mill, J. S. (1874) A system of logic. 8th ed.New York: Harper. [MH]
Mises, R. von. (1957) Probability, statistics and truth. London: Allen & Un-win. [LJCa]
Moravcsik, J. M. E. (1969) Competence, creativity, and innateness. Philosophy Forum 1:407–37. [GS]
Münsterberg, H. (1908) On the witness stand: Essays on psychology and crime. New York: The McClure Company. [SLZ]
Mynatt, C. R.; Doherty, M. E. & Tweney, R. D. (1977) Confirmation bias in a simulated research environment: An experimental study of scientific inference. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 29:8595. [LJCa]
Mynatt, C. R.; Doherty, M. E. & Tweney, R. D. (1978) Consequences of confirmation and disconfirmation in a simulated research environment. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 30:395406. [LJCa]
Nagel, E. (1939) Principles of the theory of probability. International Encyclopaedia of Unified Science, vol. 1, no. 6. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. [LJCar]
Neisser, U. (1976) Cognition and reality. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman. [RAG]
Newell, A. (1980) Reasoning, problem solving and decision processes: The problem space as a fundamental category. In: Attention and performance VIII. ed. Nickerson, R.. Hillsdale, N. J.: Erlbaum. [RAG]
Nisbett, R. E. & Borgida, E. (1975) Attribution and the psychology of prediction. Journal of Personal and Social Psychology 32:932–43. [LJCa]
Nisbett, R. E. & Ross, L. (1980) Human inference: Strategies and short-comings and social judgment. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall. [LJCar, JStBTE, SPS]
Piaget, J. (1972) The principles of genetic epistemology. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. [LJCa]
Popper, K. H. (1959a) The logic of scientific discovery. London: Hutchinson. [LJCar]
Popper, K. H. (1959b) The propensity interpretation of probability. British Journal for Philosophy of Science 10:2542. [LJCar]
Popper, K. H. (1968) On the rules of detachment and so-called inductive logic. In: The problem of inductive logic, ed. Lakatos, I.. Amsterdam: North Holland. [LJCar]
Postman, L. & Tolman, E. C. (1959) Brunswik's probabilistic functionalism. In: Psychology: A study of a science, vol. 1, ed. Koch, S., pp. 502–64. New York: McGraw-Hill. [HJE]
Quine, W. V. O. (1952) Methods of logic. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. [LJCar]
Quine, W. V. O. (1960) Word and object. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. [LJCa]
Ramsey, F. P. (1931) The foundations of mathematics. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. [LJCar]
Randi, J. (1975) The magic of Uri Geller. New York: Ballantine Books. [SLZ]
Rawls, J. (1972) A theory of justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press. [LJCa]
Reich, P. A. (1969) The finiteness of natural language. Language 45:831–43. [GS]
Reichenbach, H. (1944) Philosophic foundations of quantum mechanics. Berkeley: University of California Press. [LJCa]
Reich, P. A. (1949) The theory of probability. Berkeley: University of California Press. [LJCa]
Reid, T. (1969) Essays on the intellectual powers of man. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, reproduced from 1814-1815 ed., first published 1785. [LJCr]
Revlin, R., & Leirer, V. O. (1978) The effect of personal biases on syllogistic reasoning: Rational decisions from personalized representations. In: Human reasoning, ed. Revlin, R. & Mayer, R. E.. Washington, D. C.: Winston. [JStBTE, RAG]
Revlin, R., & Mayer, R. E., eds. (1978) Human reasoning. Washington, D. C.: Winston. [RAG, MH]
Revlis, R. (1975) Syllogistic reasoning: Logical decisions from a complex data base. In: Beasoning: Bepresentation and process, ed. Falmagne, R. J., pp. 93133. Hillsdale, N. J.: Erlbaum. [MH]
Ross, L. & Lepper, M. R. (forthcoming) The perseverance of beliefs: Empirical and normative considerations. In: New directions for methodology of behavioral science: Fallible judgment in behavioral research, ed. Shweder, R. A. & Fiske, D.. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. [LJCa]
Russell, B. (1919) Introduction to mathematical philosophy. London: Allen & Unwin. [LJCa]
Sampson, G. R. (1975) The form of language. London: Weidenfeld & Nicol-son. [LJCa, GS]
Sampson, G. R. (1979) Liberty and language. Oxford: Oxford University Press. [GS]
Seligman, M. E. P. (1970) On the generality of the laws of learning. Psychological Review 77:406–18. [HJE]
Shackle, G. L. S. (1949) Expectation in economics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [LJCr]
Shafer, G. (1976) A mathematical theory of evidence: Princeton: Princeton University Press. [DHK]
Shafer, G. (1978) Non-additive probabilities in the work of Bernoulli and Lambert. Archive for History of Exact Sciences 19:309–70. [LJCr]
Shanteau, J. C. (1974) Component processes in risky decision judgments. Journal of Experimental Psychology 103:680–91. [LLL]
Shuford, E. H. (1959) A comparison of subjective probabilities for elementary and compound events. University of North Carolina Psychometric Laboratory Report #20. [LLL]
Simon, H. A. (1957) Models of man. New York: John Wiley. [LJCa]
Simon, H. A. (1978) Rationality as process and as product of thought. American Economic Review 68:116. [HJE]
Skyrms, B. (1980) Causal necessity. New Haven: Yale University Press. [BS]
Slovic, P.; Fischhoff, B. & Lichtenstein, S. (1976) Cognitive processes and societal risk taking. In: Cognition and social behavior, ed. Carroll, J. S. & Payne, J. W.. Hillsdale, N. J.: Erlbaum. [LJCa]
Slovic, P.; Fischhoff, B. & Lichtenstein, S. (1977) Behavioral decision theory. Annual Review of Psychology 28:139. [LJCa]
Smedslund, J. (1970) Circular relation between understanding and logic. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology 11:217–19. [JS]
Smedslund, J. (1977) Piaget's psychology in practice. British Journal of Educational Psychology 4:71–6. [JS]
Smedslund, J. (1978) Bandura's theory of self-efficacy: A set of common sense theorems. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology 19:114. [JS]
Smedslund, J. (in press a) The logic of psychological treatment. Scandavian Journal of Psychology 22: [JS]
Smedslund, J. (in press b) What is necessarily true in psychology? International Journal of Theoretical Psychology: Annals 1: [JS]
Sober, E. (1978) Psychologism. Journal of the Theory of Social Behavior 8:165–91. [WCL]
Sober, E. (1981) The evolution of rationality. Synthese 46:95120. [WGL]
Sommers, F. T. (1981) The logic of natural language. Oxford: Oxford University Press. [LJCa]
Spinoza, B. de. (1914) Opera. Hague: Nijhoff. [LJCa]
Stich, S. P. (1975) Logical form and natural language. Philosophical Studies 28:397418. [LJCa]
Stich, S. & Nisbett, R. (1980) Justification and the psychology of human reasoning. Philosophy of Science 47:188202. [REN, SPS]
Swinburne, R. G. (1964) Falsifiability of scientific theories. Mind 73:434–36. [LJCa]
Toda, M. (1962) The design of a fungus-eater: A model of human behavior in an unsophisticated environment. Behavioral Science 7:164–83. [HJE]
Todhunter, I. (1949) A history of the mathematical theory of probability from the time of Pascal to that of Laplace. Reprint of 1865 edition. New York: Chelsea. [LJCar, PD, IN]
Tribe, L. H. (1973) Technology assessment and the fourth discontinuity: The limits of instrumental rationality. Southern California Law Review 46:617–60. [HJE]
Tversky, A. (1967) Utility theory and additivity analysis of risky choices. Journal of Experimental Psychology 75:2736. [LLL]
Tversky, A. & Kahneman, D. (1971) The belief in the "law of small numbers." Psychological Bulletin 76:105–10. [LJCa]
Tversky, A. & Kahneman, D. (1973) Availability: A heuristic for judging frequency and probability. Cognitive Psychology 5:207–32. [LJCa, RWW]
Tversky, A. & Kahneman, D. (1974) Judgment under uncertainly: Heuristics and biases. Science 125:1124–31. [LJCa, PD, RJS]
Tversky, A. & Kahneman, D. (1977) Causal thinking in judgment under uncertainty. In: Basic problems in methodology and linguistics, ed. Butts, R. & Hintikka, J.. Dordrecht: Reidel. [LJCa. ILAM, IN]
Tversky, A. & Kahneman, D. (1980) Causal schemas in judgments under uncertainty. In: Progress in Social Psychology, ed. Fishbein, M., 1:4972. Hillsdale, N. J.: Erlbaum. [SLZ]
Tversky, A. & Kahneman, D. (1981) The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice. Science 211:453–58. [AT]
Van Duyne, P. C. (1974) Realism and linguistic complexity. British Journal of Psychology 65:5967. [LJCa]
Van Duyne, P. C. (1976) Necessity and contingency in reasoning. Acta Psychologica 40:85101. [LJCa]
Venn, J. (1888) The logic of chance. 3rd ed.London: Macmillan and Co. [IN]
Wagenaar, W. A. (1972) Generation of random sequences by human subjects: A critical survey of literature. Psychological Bulletin 77:6572. [LJCa]
Wason, P. C. (1960) On the failure to eliminate hypothesis in a conceptual task. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 12:129–40. [LJCa, JStBTE, NEW]
Wason, P. C. (1966) Reasoning. In: New horizons in psychology, vol I, ed. Foss, B.. Harmondsworth: Penguin. [LJCa, JStBTE, RWW]
Wason, P. C. (1968) Reasoning about a rule. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 20:273–81. [LJCa]
Wason, P. C. (1969) Regression in reasoning? British Journal of Psychology 60:471–80. [PW]
Wason, P. C. (1977) Self-contradictions. In: Thinking: Readings in cognitive science, ed. Johnson-Laird, P. N. & Wason, P. C., pp. 114–28. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [MH]
Wason, P. C. & Golding, E. (1974) The language of inconsistency. British Journal of Psychology 65:537–46. [PW]
Wason, P. C. & Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1970) A conflict between selecting and evaluating information in an inferential task. British Journal of Psychology 61:509–15. [PW]
Wason, P. C. & Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1972) Psychology of reasoning: Structure and content. London: Batsford. [LJCa, RJS, PW, NEW]
Wason, P. C. & Shapiro, D. (1971) Natural and contrived experience in a reasoning problem. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 23:6371. [LJCa]
Wertheimer, M. (1959) Productive thinking. Enl. ed.New York: Harper. [MH]
Wetherick, N. E. (1970) On the representativeness of some experiments in cognition. Bulletin of the British Psychological Society 23:213–14. [NEW]
Wetherick, N. E. (1971) "Representativeness" in a reasoning problem: A reply to Shapiro. Bulletin of the British Psychological Society 24:213–14. [NEW]
Wetherick, N. E. (1973) Review of Wason, P. C. and Johnson-Laird, P. N., "Psychology of reasoning, structure and content." (1972) Bulletin of the British Psychological Society 26:4546. [NEW]
Woodworth, R. S. & Sells, S. B. (1935) An atmosphere effect in syllogistic reasoning. Journal of Experimental Psychology 18:451–60. [RAG]



Altmetric attention score

Full text views

Total number of HTML views: 0
Total number of PDF views: 0 *
Loading metrics...

Abstract views

Total abstract views: 0 *
Loading metrics...

* Views captured on Cambridge Core between <date>. This data will be updated every 24 hours.

Usage data cannot currently be displayed