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Classical logic, conditionals and “nonmonotonic” reasoning

  • Nicholas Allott (a1) and Hiroyuki Uchida (a1)
  • DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X09000296
  • Published online: 01 February 2009
Abstract
Abstract

Reasoning with conditionals is often thought to be non-monotonic, but there is no incompatibility with classical logic, and no need to formalise inference itself as probabilistic. When the addition of a new premise leads to abandonment of a previously compelling conclusion reached by modus ponens, for example, this is generally because it is hard to think of a model in which the conditional and the new premise are true.

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M. Oaksford & N Chater . (2007) Bayesian rationality: The probabilistic approach to human reasoning. Oxford University Press.

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Behavioral and Brain Sciences
  • ISSN: 0140-525X
  • EISSN: 1469-1825
  • URL: /core/journals/behavioral-and-brain-sciences
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