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Consciousness without conflation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 February 2010

Anthony P. Atkinson
Affiliation:
Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Oxford, Oxford 0X1 3UD, England, apa@vax.ox.ac.uk
Martin Davies
Affiliation:
Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Oxford, Oxford 0X1 3UD, England, mdavies@psy.ox.ac.uk

Abstract

Although information-processing theories cannot provide a full explanatory account of P-consciousness, there is less conflation and confusion in cognitive psychology than Block suspects. Some of the reasoning that Block criticises can be interpreted plausibly in the light of a folk psychological view of relation between P-consciousness and A-consciousness.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1995

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