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Default knowledge, time pressure, and the theory-theory of concepts

  • Thomas Blanchard (a1)


I raise two issues for Machery's discussion and interpretation of the theory-theory. First, I raise an objection against Machery's claim that theory-theorists take theories to be default bodies of knowledge. Second, I argue that theory-theorists' experimental results do not support Machery's contention that default bodies of knowledge include theories used in their own proprietary kind of categorization process.



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Default knowledge, time pressure, and the theory-theory of concepts

  • Thomas Blanchard (a1)


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