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Does rational analysis stand up to rational analysis?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 February 2009

Jonathan St. B. T. Evans
Jonathan St. B. T. Evans
Affiliation:
Centre for Thinking and Language, School of Psychology, University of Plymouth, Plymouth PL4 8AA, United Kingdom. j.evans@plymouth.ac.uk
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Abstract

I agree with Oaksford & Chater (O&C) that human beings resemble Bayesian reasoners much more closely than ones engaging standard logic. However, I have many problems with their “rational analysis” framework, which appears to be rooted in normative rather than ecological rationality. The authors also overstate everyday rationality and neglect to account for much relevant psychological work on reasoning.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 32 , Issue 1 , February 2009 , pp. 88 - 89
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2009

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References

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