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Smith, David Livingstone 2014. Self-Deception: A Teleofunctional Approach. Philosophia, Vol. 42, Issue. 1, p. 181.
Mele, Alfred R. 1998. Motivated belief and agency. Philosophical Psychology, Vol. 11, Issue. 3, p. 353.
I agree with Mele that self-deception is not intentional deception; but I do believe that self-deception involves intentional biasing, primarily for two reasons: (1) There is a Bayesian model of self-deception that explains why the biasing is rational. (2) It is implausible that the observed behavior of self- deceivers could be generated by Mele's “blind” mechanisms.
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